Killeffer, Samuel, Cpl

People You Remember
Sgt. T.A. Pierce
LCpl Welch
1stLt. Metzger
PFC D.A. Smith

Memories
Headquarter's Company S-2
Assignment - S2 Scout
Attached to Bravo Company for Imperial Lake
03 Dec 1970 to 26 Dec 1970
Transferred to
Charlie Co. 2nd Platoon for Imperial Lake
27 Dec 1970 - Jan 1971

Imperial Lake I Quang Nam Province 9/1/70 5/12/71
"5th Marines (HQ, USMC); 1st, 2d, 3d Battalions, 5th Marines (USMC)"
search and clear operation


1970 through 1971
Operation Keystone Blue Jay, Operation Pickens Forest, Operation Dubois Square,
Operation Imperial Lake, Operation Keystone Robin Alpha, Operation Catawba Falls,
Operation Lam Son 719, Operation Keystone Robin Charlie, Operation Scott Orchard
(1st Marines launched many no named operations in the first half of 1970)

See Highlighted Text For Operations Mentioned Above


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On 15 December 1969, President Nixon announced that fifty thousand more American troops would be pulled out of South Vietnam by 15 April 1970. Though MACV originally advised III MAE that it would be contributing two full regimental combat teams to this phase of the draw-down, the number was ultimately reduced to one. General Nickerson selected the 26th Marines to be part of the Operation Keystone Blue Jay withdrawal. After being relieved of responsibility for the defense of Khe Sanh in April 1968, the 26th Marines had operated south of the DMZ in central Quang Tn Province. When the 3d Marine Division was designated to be part of the initial American redeployment, the regiment was transferred to the 1st Marine Division. As 1970 began, the regiment was holding down positions north and west of Da Nang.

Among the supporting units that would leave with the 26th Marines were its artillery unit?the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines?and most of the 1st Tank Battalion and the 3d Amphibious Tractor Battalion. The 1st Marine Air Wing would send out one group head quarters, three jet squadrons, and one helicopter squadron.

The units participating in Operation Keystone Blue Jay began withdrawing from combat in late January. As the 26th Marines left the field, the neighboring 1st Marines extended its TAOR northward to take over the 26th's positions. In mid-February, the supporting units began boarding ships for the trip to Camp Pendleton. Between 11 and 19 March, the 26th Marines departed South Vietnam. When the regiment arrived in California, it was deactivated.

With the reduction of III MAE to less than 43,000 officers and men, it became obvious to MACV that it was now impractical for the larger XXIV Corps to remain subordinate to III MAE. Although General Nickerson recognized the need to streamline his head quarters staff, he and other senior Marines feared that any change in their command structure could result in the disruption of the long-cherished Marine air-ground team concept. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps fully supported General Nickerson in his concerns. In every discussion involving a headquarters consolidation, Marine Corps commandant Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., insisted that as long as a Marine division and air wing remained in South Vietnam, there would be a Marine headquarters over them.

Ever sensitive to inter-service rivalries, General Abrams issued a directive in mid-February that established the relationships among the various American commands in South Vietnam. The MACV directive placed XXIV Corps in command of all U.S. troops in I Corps. However, it defined III MAE as "a separate command subordinate to and under the operational control of XXIV Corps" but exercising control of all Marine ground and air units in I Corps. Generals Chapman and Nickerson were happy with this compromise.

Working together, the staffs of III MAF and XXIV Corps agreed on 9 March 1970 as the date to exchange roles. Besides the reassignment of the control of various units, for example, the Americal Division would now operate under XXIV Corps. A change of head quarters locations was needed. The III MAE agreed to turn over its headquarters complex at Camp Horn, east of Da Nang, to XXIV Corps, and the army would abandon its facilities at Phu Bai. Searching for a new headquarters site, III MAE settled on the soon-to-be- abandoned Camp Haskins, home of the navy's Seabees, on Red Beach north of Da Nang. In five years, the Marines had now come full circle, returning to the site of their original 1965 landing.

All the changes went according to plan, and on 9 March 1970 the transfer of command responsibility was completed. On the same day, General Nickerson turned over command of III MAE to Lt. Gen. Keith B. McCutcheon. No stranger to the war in South Vietnam, General McCutcheon had commanded the 1st MAW in 1966?67. The III MAE (Marine air wing) that McCutcheon took over had about forty thousand Marines on its rolls, a reduction of nearly fifteen thousand since the first of the year.

An unfortunate accident cut short the tenure of division commander Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Wheeler. On 18 April 1970, his command helicopter crashed while he was visiting a 1st Marines LZ. Wheeler suffered a badly broken leg in the accident and had to relinquish his command. His replacement was Maj. Gen. Charles F. Widdecke, who arrived from Washington on 27 April. Widdecke, who had earned a Navy Cross in World War II, also had a great deal of experience in the Vietnam War, for he had commanded the 5th Marines in 1966. He would remain in command of the 1st Marine Division until its redeployment in April 1971.

All these command changes had little impact on the Marine grunt humping the rice paddies and mountains surrounding Da Nang. His view of the war was limited to the terrain around him. All he knew was the tedious routine of daily patrols and ambushes that more of ten than not produced zero results.
Its mission of protecting Da Nang gave the 1st Marine Division a TAOR of more than thirteen hundred square kilometers of territory. Though tasked with defending the Da Nang Vital Area, the division was not responsible for the defense of the city itself. The division's TAOR began just outside the Da Nang Vital Area with the newly created Northern and Southern Sector Defense Commands (NSDC and SSDC).

With the redeployment of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines shifted north to assume responsibility for the area from the Hai Van Pass south to just north of Hill 55. The 5th Marines' TAOR was the region around the An Hoa Combat Base and the land paralleling the Song Thu;Bon. The 7th Marines' TAOR stretched from the coastal plains south of Hoi An westward into the still-hostile Que Son Valley.

To deal with the wide variety of responsibilities it held, the division headquarters' staff divided combat operations into three categories. Category I operations were focused on populated areas where the NVA and VC had direct contact with the population. These were primarily cordon and search activities where villages were sealed off and any VC were hunted down and killed or captured. Included in this category were all CAP programs.

Category II operations covered small-unit patrols and night am bushes usually conducted in the vicinity of hamlets and villages. The goal of these operations was to interdict bands of marauding NVA and VC preying on the South Vietnamese citizens. The vast majority of Marine Corps operations in 1970?71 fell into this category.

Category III was reserved for multi-company, and the increasingly rare multibattalion, operations conducted away from population centers. These operations would be aimed against enemy main force units and their base camp areas. Only a few Category III operations were conducted during the Marines' final months in the war zone.

A major concern of the 1st Marine Division continued to be the Da Nang Anti-Infiltration System (DAIS), the physical barrier similar to the McNamara Line south of the DMZ. The baffler's effectiveness in notifying the responsible unit of any marauding NVA/VC had never been good. By early 1970, it had gotten even worse. False signals were sent more often than real ones, and the real signals were usually South Vietnamese peasants or their livestock crossing the barrier. Though most Marines regarded the DAIS as an expensive waste of the taxpayer's dollar, they still had to respond to reports of enemy sightings.

One tactic developed to respond rapidly was the Kingfisher patrols. Lieutenant Purdy's Kingfisher patrol on 6 January and several others were reasonably successful. But the enemy soon grew wise to the new tactic. They altered their movement to ensure that they were under cover by first light. As a result, the effectiveness of the Kingfisher patrols rapidly diminished, and by mid-March they were rarely used.

Although the 1st Marines launched no named operations in the first half of 1970, it did conduct an occasional Category III operation. Typical of these was the one conducted by 1/1 from 15?27 April in the Charlie Ridge region. Although the area had been left essentially untouched since Operation Oklahoma Hills in early 1969, the NVA had returned to the area, honeycombing the mountains with headquarters, supply caches, and base camps. Though concealed by the jungle, these areas were also well protected by mutually supporting bunkers, tunnels, and caves.

In fact, the enemy had sown the area so thickly with camps that they could easily move to another one if an occupied camp was threatened. One defector told his interrogators, "The people in the base camp do not worry about allied operations. Forewarning of an attack is obvious when [the allies] confict air strikes, artillery fire, and when helicopters fly in the area. When an operation takes place in the vicinity of the base camp, the people simply go farther back into the mountains and return when the operation is over.

The operation began on l4 April when Company C, 1/1, humped into the Charlie Ridge area along a well-used VC trail. Two days later FSB Crawford was set up on Hill 502, about twenty kilometers south west of Da Nang and south of Company C's route of march. On 17 April, three opconned rifle companies (A and B, 1/5, and Company L, 3/5) helicoptered into three separate LZs west and south of the fire base. Once on the ground the riflemen began a thorough search of their assigned areas.

As the defector had predicted, the NVA chose not to fight over the area. Instead, they simply melted away. Only an occasional sniper round broke the silence of the jungle. A few enemy mortar rounds fell on Company B's perimeter on the night of 18 April. A probe of Company A's lines four nights later was quickly ended with a few well- tossed hand grenades.

Though actual enemy contact was rare, signs of the enemy's presence were everywhere. Almost immediately upon jumping from their Sea Knights, the ground troops started uncovering bunkers, huts, tunnels, caves, and small auxiliary base camps. On 24 April, the point man for Company B spotted a commo wire partially buried in the jungle floor. The company followed it and soon came into a large enemy base camp. Their entrance into the camp was immediately followed by the sharp crack of AK-47s. With enemy rifle rounds whizzing past them, the Marines assaulted the estimated platoon- sized force. Dashing forward among the trees, they quickly forced the withdrawal of the enemy rear guard. The company lost one man in the attack, but two NVA were killed, including one who proved to be the executive officer of the 102d Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment.

The company set about searching the camp but soon were called off. The CO was told that the enemy base camp actually lay in the AO of the neighboring 51st ARVN Regiment, who were not participating in this operation. Rather than let the Marines have any credit for their success, the local ARVN commander was angrily insisting they depart.

The base camp discovery proved to be the only major find of the operation. After a few more days of scouring their AOs, the rifle companies were pulled out. They claimed thirteen enemy killed against two dead and five wounded of their own, plus ten base camp sites uncovered and nearly one hundred weapons captured.

The TAOR of the 5th Marines began just south of Charlie Ridge. It included the formidable Arizona Territory, the An Hoa Basin, the Liberty Road and Liberty Bridge, and the Go Noi Island?Dodge City AO.

Though Go Noi Island had been scoured by the 1st Marines and Republic of Korea Marines in 1969, VC guerrillas maintained a strong presence in the region. The rifle companies of 2/5 constantly conducted recon patrols of Go Noi Island searching for bands of the enemy. On the night of 11 March, the enemy found the Marines. Staff Sergeant Allan Jay Kellogg was leading a small patrol from Company G through heavy foliage along a stream bank when the patrol was ambushed. Unleashing an intense fusillade of small arms fire, the NVA pinned down the small force. In the darkness, an enemy soldier crept up close enough to flip a grenade into their midst. It glanced off Kellogg's chest while he was tending to a casualty. Rather than duck for cover, the noncommissioned officer dropped on the lethal missile and absorbed its violent blast with his own body. Miraculously, Kellogg survived the explosion, although he was badly wounded. Ignoring the intense pain from his massive injuries, he continued in command of his patrol and extracted it from the am bush. After recovering from his wounds, Kellogg was awarded a well- deserved Medal of Honor.

Although the enemy seldom initiated offensive actions during this period, they did occur. On 8 May, Company G, 2/5, was guarding the vital Liberty Bridge. Early that night, the enemy struck with 60mm and 80mm mortar shells and B40 rockets. While the Marines hunkered down in their reinforced bunkers, an enemy infantry company crept close to the perimeter and under the protection of the exploding missiles, penetrated it. The grunts responded bravely. Ignoring the falling shells erupting around them, they went after the enemy soldiers. Soon the VC were pulling back. Calling in pre registered artillery fire, the company finally broke up the attack, suffering twenty-one wounded in the process. At dawn, battalion head quarters launched a quick reaction force to search for the attackers. A platoon from Company E soon found them headed south for the Que Son Mountains. The heliborne Marines landed in front of the enemy, blocking their escape route. In the ensuing firefight, ten enemy soldiers died before the rest broke into small bands and fled the area.

In August 1969, the 7th Marines had assumed responsibility from the Americal Division for the northern half of the much-fought-over Que Son Valley. The regiment permanently garrisoned only three bases in its TAOR: LZ Baldy, FSB Ross, and FSB Ryder, located on a hilltop in the Que Son Mountains overlooking thXXevalXXley. The 7th Marines' three battalions rotated between the three areas so as to block enemy infiltration routes into the Que Son Valley.

In early January, the Americal Division, operating to the south of the 7th Marines, passed along information that the 409th VC Local Force Battalion had moved north from their usual area in Quang Tin Province. United States Army intelligence felt that the enemy might be targeting FSB Ross.

In anticipation of such an event, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commander Lt. Col. Charles G. Cooper pulled two platoons of 1st Lt. Louis R. Ambort's Company B in from the field to the fire support base on 5 January. At first light the next morning, they'd patrol to the south trying to intercept the enemy. Besides artillerymen and support troops, Company A was also at ESB Ross that day. They were not normally stationed there either but were transitioning on their way to civilian pacification duty.

As night fell; heavy monsoon clouds rolled in from the nearby mountains. By dark, a major storm was dumping sheets of rain across thXXevalXXley, cutting visibility to less than three meters. The crafty NVA used the downpour to sneak up to the perimeter wire. Working care fully, the estimated six, five-man sapper teams cut through the barbed wire strands without alerting the perimeter guards. Wearing only shorts and head bandanas, but heavily laden with high explosives, the sappers spread out across the base.

At 0130 on 6 January, several NVA mortar rounds suddenly fell on the base. The explosions not only roused the Marines but confused the sappers, who did not know of the mortar attack. With their own shells killing and wounding them, the enemy infiltrators still at tacked. They hurled explosives into bunkers, huts, offices, and vehicles. Several sleeping Marines were killed in their bunks without knowing what had hit them. Others scrambled around in the dark ness, frantically searching for helmets, flak jackets, and weapons. Once equipped, they splashed through the mud to reach their fighting bunkers. Some bumped right into the sappers and were cut down. Others made it to their positions and started firing on the enemy troops outside the wire who were supporting the sappers.

In the driving rain and confusion, five enemy sappers made it all the way to the battalion headquarters area. The attackers put the mortar batteries' counter fire radar system out of action with a well- placed grenade. They also blew up Company A's headquarters with a satchel charge just seconds after the company commander and his chief clerk fled the building.

Quickly overcoming the initial confusion, the Marines rallied. After hunting down the infiltrators, the defenders sealed off the breached perimeter. Supporting artillery and mortar fire threw a wall of hot shrapnel around the base.

By 0330 the fight was over. Medevac helicopters were called in to evacuate the casualties. In all, the Marines lost thirteen killed and sixty-three wounded. A dawn sweep of the base's outer defenses by Company B turned up thirty-eight enemy dead, three prisoners, and a large quantity of rifles, ammo, and explosives.

That same day, Ross's permanent residents began strengthening the base's defensive positions. More concertina wire was strung, deeper bunkers were dug, more movement sensors were emplaced, and a forty-foot tower mounting a 106mm recoilless rifle and a night vision device was built. One artilleryman summed up the new attitude: "No matter where you are and no matter how secure you may feel, you have to retain the capability of fighting hand to hand...

Less than six weeks later, Company B again became embroiled with the NVA. At 0930 on 12 February, the company's 2d Platoon was moving east along the south bank of the Ly Ly River about seven kilo meters southeast of FSB Ross. Without warning an enemy machine gun fired on the column from its front. No one was hit, but before the platoon could react, another enemy machine gun off to their right, or south, opened up. The platoon leader sent a squad to handle this new threat while the rest of the platoon went after the first weapon. As the squad broke through the heavy brush along the river and entered a small rice paddy bordered by tree lines, the NVA cut loose with a heavy volume of small arms fire. Immediately, two Marines fell dead; a third lay badly wounded. The two survivors were pinned down, unable to reach the wounded man or pull back. A relief squad from the platoon was hit as soon as it reached the paddy. Now the platoon leader turned the remainder of his men south to attack the enemy emplaced in the tree line.

The platoon had fallen victim to a well-executed NVA trap. Squeezed between the river on one side and the NVA on two more, and with casualties lying exposed as bait, the 2d Platoon could not do much. Lieutenant Ambort tried to maneuver his other platoons around the western edge of the paddy, but every time one of his Marines moved, the well-placed enemy fired on him.

Lieutenant Colonel Cooper brought in reinforcements. Company C landed by helicopter on the north bank of the Ly Ly west of the battlefield and pushed east. Two companies of the Americal Division's 3/21 attacked from the southeast and east. At the same time, Marine artillery began falling on the enemy-held tree lines. Under this cover, the 2d Platoon was finally able to gather up its casualties and retreat about three hundred meters west. From this position medevac helicopters carried out the dead and wounded at about 1300.

By now, Company C had started its attack. Under this pressure the NVA pulled out, leaving behind four dead. Company C killed two more in the subsequent chase but lost four of their own before night fall at last ended the fight. Company B had nine dead and eight wounded, making it a bad day for the battalion. (One week later members of Company B participated in one of the few cases of atrocity visited upon South Vietnamese civilians by U.S. Marines. On the night of 19 February, Lieutenant Ambort exhorted a five-man "killer team to "get some damned gooks tonight" on their ambush patrol. Entering the nearby hamlet of Son Thang (4) later that evening, the patrol murdered five women and eleven children. Subsequently, Ambort was removed from command for his role in the incident and given non-judicial punishment. Four of the enlisted men were eventually tried by courts-martial; two were convicted and sentenced to jail and the other two were acquitted.)

After this fight, actual contact with the enemy decreased significantly. However, mortar and rocket attacks on FSB Ross and the nearby district capital of Que Son increased throughout the spring. Enemy sappers avoided a second attack on FSB Ross, instead focusing on Que Son. One particularly strong attack came on 6 May. Supported by a diversionary mortar attack on FSB Ross, VC ground forces hit Que Son. The local Regional Forces managed to hold the enemy at bay, but only the arrival of a quick reaction force of Marines from FSB Ross finally turned the tide. The defenders claimed twenty-seven enemy dead, but five Marines were wounded along with fourteen Regional Forces' soldiers and seventy-four civilians.

To keep the enemy off balance in the Que Son Mountains, the 7th Marines had a battalion actively scouring the rugged terrain. During late May and early June, this assignment belonged to 3/7. On their patrols the grunts found several unoccupied base camps and small caches of weapons, but enemy resistance was limited to booby traps?until the rifle companies started moving south out of the mountains into thXXevalXXley.

On 12 June, the 1st Platoon of Company I took sniper and automatic weapons fire as it moved down a ravine toward thXXevalXXley floor northwest of FSB Ross; three Marines were wounded and evacuated. A short time later, a heavy volume of automatic weapons and RPG fire suddenly tore into the platoon from three sides. Accurate return fire and a barrage of supporting artillery rounds sent the enemy fleeing. Fortunately, no Marines were hit in this exchange. The platoon then wisely altered its route of march to one that was less objectionable to the local VC.

That same evening Company I's 2d Platoon set up its night defensive position in the thick underbrush on thXXevalXXley floor. All was quiet until, suddenly, three NVA casually strolled into the platoon's camp. Instantly realizing their mistake, the enemy soldiers turned and fled before the equally surprised Marines could bring their Ml6s to bear. Starting out in pursuit, the platoon discovered that it had inadvertently set up its NDP just fifty meters from a comparable NVA position. The thick foliage had prevented either side from knowing the other was there. Scattered return fire met the Marines as they chased the enemy, but the NVA were on swallowed up by the dense underbrush and the coming of darkness.

The next day, all of 3/7 assembled in the Que Son Valley and headed for LZ Baldy. Though just nine enemy soldiers were killed during this operation, regimental headquarters considered it a success because it kept the enemy off balance in this oft-contested region.

The 7th Marines accounted for more than half the division's enemy contacts during the first half of 1970. By body count the regiment claimed 1,160 enemy dead and took nearly 50 prisoners. More than 800 Marines were wounded in the Que Son Valley and 120 were killed.

The CAP program initiated by III MAE in 1965 continued to be a viable pacification effort in denying the enemy access to local villagers. Typically, a fifteen-man, specially selected Marine platoon operated with a comparably sized Popular Forces platoon based in a specific village. As the Marines worked with the PFs and gained the confidence of the villagers, their effectiveness improved tremendously. As a result, the CAPs started winning fights against local guerrilla units and small VC main-force units. They helped establish lo cal political control over the villages and kept the VC tax collectors from harassing the peasants.
By 1970, the strength of CAP had reached 42 Marine officers and 2,050 enlisted Marines, plus 126 navy corpsmen. Administratively, the CAPs were controlled by four combined-action groups (CAGs), each one responsible for the individual platoons within a specific province.

Most of the CAPs' success was based on their aggressive patrolling. In a typical month more than 1,000 patrols were conducted by the CAPs; nearly three fourths of these were night patrols. In the first six months of 1970, the CAPs claimed nearly 500 enemy killed and more than 80 prisoners. Marine losses were 22 killed and 165 wounded.

One measure of the effectiveness of the CAPs was the number of attacks launched by the enemy on the villages they garrisoned. The better the job the Marines did, the more likely they were to be hit. One such ground attack was directed against Combined-Action Platoon 1-2-3 in Quang Ngai Province in the dark, early morning hours of 8 May. A vastly superior enemy force struck the platoon, wounding L/Cpl. Miguel Keith in the opening minutes. Disregarding his injuries, the nineteen year old moved to the PFs' firing positions to help calm them and direct their fire. When Keith spotted five enemy soldiers sneaking up on the platoon's CP, he charged them, killing three and wounding the other two. Knocked down by a grenade explosion and again wounded, Keith nonetheless continued fighting. Later, he saw a group of twenty-five enemy soldiers preparing to charge the compound. Though weak from loss of blood, he attacked them, killing at least four and driving off the others. Keith was mortally wounded in his valiant assault, but he had almost single-handedly thwarted the enemy. He became the last Marine to earn a Medal of Honor in South Vietnam.

When redeployment of U.S. forces began in 1969,111 MAE concluded that the Combined Action Force (CAE) should be reduced at a proportional rate. Consequently, III MAE decided to deactivate three CAGs in 1970. Only 2d CAG, operating in Quang Nam Province, would remain until the final pullout of American troops.

Reduction of the CAE began in April 1970 with the deactivation of individual platoons in 1st CAG in Quang Tin Province. The de activation of additional platoons continued at a steady rate until July, when, due to the lack of replacements in the manpower pipeline, the process accelerated. By the end of July, 4th CAG was gone; 1st and 3d CAGs were deactivated by mid-September. The remaining 2d CAG reduced its personnel, too. By the end of September, the unit numbered about 650 Marines and 50 navy corpsmen working in Quang Nam Province with about 900 PFs.

To help take up the slack and continue to maintain a presence at the village level, III MAE authorized the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP). Under the program, ordinary rifle companies were periodically broken down into squads, which were then paired with a PF platoon. The two major differences with the CAP program were that CUPP units were not specially trained for their role, and the companies remained under the operational control of their parent regiments. The CUPP squads could thus be pulled from their pacification assignment at any time and returned to their company.

Although never as effective as CAP 'units, the CUPP platoons proved to Marine commanders that regular rifle squads, paired with Popular Forces, could perform similar missions. By the end of 1970, though, continued redeployment had made the future of CUPP uncertain.

On 1 May 1970, U.S. Army and ARVN forces made a surprise invasion of Cambodia. Long used as a sanctuary by NVA and VC units operating near Saigon, Cambodia had been secure from overt allied military cross-border operations due to political concerns regarding its ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Then, in early 1970, political upheaval in Cambodia presented the allies with an opportunity to strike the sanctuaries. Though the invasion was limited in scope and duration, the allied effort did throw the enemy off balance. And the capture of several huge supply caches denied the NVA the logistical support necessary to launch a planned offensive against Saigon.
Marine forces had only a limited, mostly liaison role in the Cambodian incursion. However, III MAE intelligence officers paid close attention to battlefield reports in order to determine what effect the invasion may have on their operations around Da Nang.

Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cambodia, MACV issued orders on 10 June for an aggressive summer campaign in order to exploit the successes of the invasion. The orders directed al lied regular forces to attack enemy base camps and main-force units. Among the more aggressive of these efforts would be the 1st Marine Division's Operation Pickens Forest, the division's first named operation of the year. Aimed at the NVA Base Areas 112 and 127 in the mountains of western Quang Nam Province, this campaign would be the responsibility of the 7th Marines. According to intelligence reports, these base areas held headquarters and communication centers, as well as rest and training areas for NVA and VC troops.

As planned by Col. Edmund G. Durning, Jr., and his 7th Marine regimental staff, Operation Pickens Forest would be centered on three fire support bases: Defiant, Darter, and Mace. Fire Support Base Defiant would occupy a hilltop just west of the Song Thu Bon, about fifteen kilometers southwest of An Hoa; Mace would be established about five kilometers northwest of Defiant, and Darter about eight kilometers southwest of Defiant. The latter two fire sup port bases had been used previously by both U.S. Army and Marine forces and could easily be reopened. As they had on similar operations, rifle companies would occupy the fire support bases, securing them and the surrounding area. Once these positions were established, other rifle companies would helicopter into outlying LZs, then sweep toward the fire support bases, driving any enemy into the blocking Mannes.

D day for Operation Pickens Forest began at 0800 on 16 July, when CH46Ds and CH-53s loaded with men and materiel descended on their fire support bases. Company C, 1/5 (opconned to the 7th Marines), helicoptered into FSB Defiant. Ninety minutes later the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines command group, Companies C and D, and supporting mortars landed at FSB Mace. Not long afterward, the 2d Battalion command group came into FSB Dart. Individual rifle companies were then helicoptered into various LZs in the surrounding areas to begin their sweeps. None of the landings was opposed. By 1600 the entire attack force was in position. Colonel Durning called it "a beautiful example of air-ground teamwork."

For the first two weeks of the operation, the enemy avoided sustained contact. Any fighting was usually against small stay-behind groups of NVA protecting the main force as they abandoned their base camps. This lack of enemy contact resulted in the early reduction of Operation Pickens Forest forces. On 26 July, the 1/7 command group and Company B returned to LZ Baldy. Two days later, Company C, 1/5, returned to its parent regiment. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines would continue the operation.

The heaviest action of the operation came on 30 July. That day Company E was patrolling both sides of the Thu Bon River. Where the river flowed into a narrow, seven-hundred-meter-deep gorge, two squads of Marines aboard rubber boats looked for enemy-occupied caves in the sheer rock walls. They were like sitting ducks.

As the Marines on the top of the cliffs watched in horror, a force of about fifty enemy soldiers hidden in deep caves opened fire. Within seconds the boats were riddled with bullets. Two Marines were dead and four were wounded. The rest of Company E returned fire as the swift water swept the floundering Marines downriver. Though air support was called in to napalm the enemy, the gorge was too narrow for the planes to be accurate.

That evening, Company C, 1/5, returned to Operation Pickens Forest. The Marines were dropped by CH46D helicopters in a clearing south and west of the site of Company E's fight, in the hope that they could catch the fleeing enemy. Though they did kill one VC sniper and detain a number of suspects, members of Company C could not find the main body of enemy troops. They returned to 5th Marine control on 1 August.

After another week of patrolling the Thu Bon Valley with minimal results, the focus of 2/7 shifted farther west. Beginning on 9 Au gust, the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Vincent A. Albers, Jr., began shifting his companies twenty-five kilometers west to FSB Hatcher. In conjunction with an ARVN operation in the same area, Albers's rifle companies patrolled but found few signs of the enemy. The strongest contact came on 20 August when a platoon from Company H was ambushed about three kilometers northwest of the fire support base.

First Lieutenant Craig A. Edwards quickly led the rest of his company into the firefight to help the beleaguered platoon. As soon as he arrived, he pushed forward to the scene of the ambush. Four men, including the platoon leader, lay wounded just meters away from one enemy machine-gun nest. Intent only on saving the casualties, Edwards disregarded the stream of enemy bullets passing within inches of his body to charge headlong at the enemy emplacement. He threw grenades into the position, wrecking the gun and killing the crew. As he returned to the casualties, another machine gun raked the area with streams of hot lead.

As he lay there Edwards saw an enemy grenade plop down near the wounded. He kicked it away, then rolled between it and the casualties as it exploded. A large hunk of shrapnel tore a deep furrow in his leg. Ignoring the pain, the young officer used a machete to cut a path through the underbrush to a nearby riverbank. Then, accompanied by a corpsman, Edwards low-crawled back to the casualties. With enemy bullets plowing up the ground all around him, the gutsy lieutenant and corpsman pulled one casualty back to the safety of the defiladed riverbank. They then returned for another man.

By this time another Company H platoon had flanked the enemy position. The riflemen poured a heavy volume of M16 and M60 fire at the enemy, finally killing them. Edwards then directed the rescue of the other two men. Once they were safely aboard the medevac helicopter, Edwards finally consented to his own evacuation. The lieutenant's devotion to his comrades earned him a Navy Cross.

Reinforced by Companies F and G, Company H pursued the enemy. The Marines never were able to reestablish contact with them. They did find three enemy dead, however. Company H suffered one dead and nine wounded in the five-hour fight.

Four days later Albers's CP and his four companies returned to LZ Baldy, and Operation Pickens Forest came to an end. Ninety-nine enemy soldiers were killed during the operation; four Marines died and fifty-one were wounded. Though the operation achieved no spectacular results, the Marines' efforts did disrupt enemy activities in the area and destroy several supply caches.

As the year progressed, the 7th Marines continued its operations in the Que Son Valley while its sister regiments, the 1st and 5th, maintained their high level of small-unit operations in defense of Da Nang. The 1st Marines defended the Rocket Belt and the 5th Marines operated around An Hoa.

One thorn in the side of the 1st Marines disappeared in the summer of 1970. Because the Da Nang Anti-Infiltration System had never worked as envisioned and was proving impossible to maintain, 1st Marine Division headquarters requested permission from III MAF to abandon the system. On 3 May, III MAF approved the request. Between late July and 15 August the system was dismantled.

Now, to block infiltration of the Rocket Belt, the 1st Marines instituted a program of constant squad-sized patrols, running both day and night. Even so, contact with the enemy was limited to brief exchanges of small arms fire and grenades with small bands of NVA or VC.

To determine if the enemy was massing for an attack on Da Nang, the regiment launched Operation Dubois Square, on 9 September, in the mountains northwest of Da Nang. After ten days of methodically searching the steep, jungle-covered slopes and boulder-strewn ravines, the regiment's only significant campaign of the summer ended without the Marines having made any contact with the enemy.

The 5th Marines spent most of July and August moving its head quarters and support units from An Hoi to Camp Reasoner on Division Ridge outside Da Nang as part of the continuing Vietnamization program. The regiment's 2d Battalion would continue operations around An Hoa until ARVN forces took over the AG in the fall. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines concentrated its efforts in the northern Arizona Territory and on Charlie Ridge; 1/5 served as the division's reserve.

A typical operation for the field battalions during this period consisted of several companies conducting cordon and search efforts against specific hamlets suspected of harboring enemy soldiers. If contact was made, it usually consisted of a brief flurry of gunfire as small groups of VC were flushed from hiding places in and around the village. In all of August, the 5th Marines killed twenty-nine enemy soldiers while losing six dead and sixty wounded.

Though scheduled to re-deploy in the early fall of 1970, the 7th Marines kept the pressure on the enemy within its TAOR. As was true throughout the Marines' TAOR, enemy contact was infrequent. However, in late August intelligence reports indicated that the Viet Cong Front 4 Headquarters had taken up residence in the eastern Que Son Mountains. In response, regimental commander Col. Robert H. Piehl planned to begin Operation Imperial Lake in this area with an intense aerial and artillery bombardment. Four rifle companies would then be helicoptered into twelve landing zones, establishing a tight cordon around the area suspected of harboring the enemy.

The bombardment began at midnight on 31 August. For six hours, ten batteries of 3/11 Marines pounded fifty-three target sites with more than fourteen thousand shells in what was one of the largest artillery barrages of the entire Vietnam War. When the artillery fire ceased, two solid hours of air strikes followed. More than sixty-three tons of aerial ordnance fell on suspected enemy camps in the Que Sons. The effectiveness of the massive bombardment was questionable. Colonel Piehi later said that "one or two enemy bodies. .. ." were found in the target areas.

Nonetheless, at 0900 that day, CH46 and CH-53 helicopters laden with well-equipped 2d Battalion CP Marines and two platoons of 4.2-inch mortar men of Battery W, 3/11, began touching down at LZ Vulture on Hill 845, one of the highest peaks in the central Que Son Mountains. By noon, all four rifle companies of 2/7 had landed at their LZs ringing LZ Vulture. Over the next four days, the grunts scoured the rugged terrain without finding any enemy.

Finally, on 5 September, Company E encountered a platoon of NVA in a jungle-covered ravine southwest of LZ Vulture. Unable to move deeper into the ravine due to the heavy volume of fire coming from enemy soldiers concealed in caves and behind boulders, Company E was joined by the other three companies that night. Over the next four days, the Marines fought the encircled NVA. The steep terrain, numerous boulders, thick foliage, and many caves favored the enemy's elusive tactics. Though the riflemen tried several times to advance along the bottom of the ravine or down its sides, they were turned back each time by strong small arms and automatic weapons fire.

By 9 September, the Marines had suffered three killed and a dozen wounded. Realizing that his infantry could not dislodge the NVA, Lieutenant Colonel Albers pulled back his rifle companies and called for Marine jets. Nine sorties dropped forty tons of high explosives on the enemy. The next day, the Marines reentered the ravine. This time only sporadic sniper fire greeted them. The companies spent the next week searching for any surviving NVA, killing more than a dozen stragglers.

While 2/7 was fighting near LZ Vulture, 3/7 and units of the U.S. Army's Americal Division conducted Operation Nebraska Rapids to reopen Route 534 between LZ Baldy and Hiep Duc. The infantry units patrolled along the road while Marine engineers searched for mines and repaired the roadbed. The clearing operation lasted for five days, then an ARVN truck convoy made an uneventful trip along the road on 9 September.

On 13 September, 3/7 helicoptered into the Que Son Mountains to join Operation Imperial Lake. The Marines worked south of the 2d Battalion, conducting daytime patrols and night ambushes. Though they had little luck in finding the enemy, Lieutenant Colonel Albers's 2d Battalion did somewhat better. On 16 September, lead by a VC defector, his Company F uncovered a large underground complex consisting of more than the usual caves. Extending more than seventy feet into the ground, this complex included a large kitchen and a hospital complete with an operating room. What made the find even more unusual was the fact that the complex was on the lower slopes of Hill 845, right below LZ Vulture and Albers's CP.

The 7th Marines began departing the Imperial Lake operational area on 18 September in preparation for its redeployment under Operation Keystone Robin Alpha. Accordingly, the 5th Marines shifted its positions to the south to take over from the 7th Marines' AG. At the same time, the 1st Marines sent some of its forces southwest to fill in behind the departing 5th Marines' units. The threat of an enemy attack during this vulnerable period was reduced by taking positive countermeasures. To keep the enemy off balance, Operation Catawba Falls was designed to pound suspected enemy assembly areas with artillery fire. Rifle companies would further unbalance any enemy units by feigning heliborne assaults into their suspected assembly areas.

Operation Catawba Falls began at 0300 on 18 September. Over the next four days, the artillerymen of 2/11 poured more than 11,500 rounds of high explosives into enemy territory. Behind these protective measures, the various units conducted their relocation moves. By 30 September, the realignment was complete. The 5th

Marines' 3d Battalion set up at FSB Ross, with its companies deployed in the Que Son Valley; the 2d Battalion operated out of LZ Baldy in the eastern portion of the regiment's new TAOR; the 1st Battalion was assigned duty as the division reserve at Da Nang.

The 7th Marines' redeployment to Camp Pendleton began on 23 September. The official departure ceremony was held at division headquarters on 1 October. By 15 October 1970, III MAF strength stood at 24,527.

Orders issued by MACV~ on 21 September, instructed all U.S. forces to concentrate their efforts on small-unit activity designed to protect pacified areas. The 1st Marines focused its patrols on the Rocket Belt around Da Nang and conducted occasional company- sized search and destroy operations on Charlie Ridge. The 5th Marines continued Operation Imperial Lake while protecting, as best it could, the numerous hamlets around LZ Baldy and in the Que Son Valley.

Enemy activity had been infrequent throughout 1970, but it de dined even more as the year neared its end. The number of enemy- initiated contacts, ranging from ground probes of night defensive positions to occasional sniper fire, dropped in half from September to November. A large portion of that reduction resulted from un usually heavy monsoon rains and the resultant flooding in Quang Nam Province. Four major typhoons hit the area in October alone, bringing seventeen inches of rain in just one eight-day period. Flash floods inundated the entire area from just south of Da Nang all the way to LZ Baldy and inland to the foothills of the Que Son Mountains. The rapidly rising waters forced the emergency evacuation of several CAP teams and Marine patrols. More than two hundred people, mostly helpless civilians, drowned in the floodwaters.

In early November, as the floodwaters began to recede, Marine infantry units moved back into the bush to hunt for the enemy. The floods had destroyed many of the enemy's usual hiding places, forcing them into the open. Marine patrols, aloft in helicopters, pounced on them as fast as they could. Because numerous VC supply caches had been lost in the floods, enemy supplies were piling up in the Que Son Mountains. Marine patrols working this region as part of the on going Operation Imperial Lake uncovered a large number of these supply locations, further hurting the enemy.

The 5th Marines maintained at least one company in the Que Son Mountains as part of the ongoing Operation Imperial Lake. Even as tropical storms pounded the region, the Marines worked the mountains. On 26 October, a patrol from Company H, 2/5, uncovered a deserted base camp. A three-day search of the camp uncovered a substantial quantity of foodstuffs and ammo. In early November, a squad from Company B, 1/5, made a major discovery. A large quantity of documents it found in an abandoned base camp proved to be the master files for the Viet Cong organization for all of Quang Nam Province. The papers included the names of all underground leaders and agents. The information was turned over to the ARVN for processing.

Another major discovery came on Christmas Eve when Company L, 3/5, stumbled upon a large NVA command post. That afternoon a squad from Company L spotted a group of nine NVA, eight men and one woman, sitting in front of a cave. The Marines killed four of the enemy in a flurry of rifle fire, but the others escaped. After searching the area, the patrol realized that it had uncovered an important cave network. Elements of two other companies arrived the next day to help explore the six-cave complex. Besides the normal supplies, the Marines also found a variety of communications equipment. Based on their finds, the Marines felt confident that they had at last uncovered the forward CP of the elusive Viet Cong Front 4 Headquarters.

The last few months of 1970 saw the 1st Marines, now commanded by Col. Paul X. "PX" Kelley, continuing its efforts to protect Da Nang. Constant day and night patrols kept the enemy off halance in their continued attempts to hit Da Nang with rockets and mortars. Contact with enemy forces was limited to brief exchanges of a few rounds of rifle fire with small bands of NVA or VC.

On Christmas Eve, Lt. Gen. Donn J. Robertson took command of III MAE General McCutcheon had been ill with a spreading cancer for several months. His condition finally reached the point where he could no longer remain in command. General Robertson, who had commanded the 1st Marine Division in the same area from June 1967 to June 1968, was rushed to South Vietnam from his post at U.S. Marine Headquarters to replace McCutcheon.

On 1 January 1971, the role of U.S. forces in South Vietnam changed significantly. On that date all allied units ceased to have tactical areas of responsibility. From then on they would have tactical areas of interest (TAOIs); only ARVN commands could have TAORs. In effect, though, the allied units continued operating in their TAGIs just as they had in their TAORs. The main reason for the change was to lend definition to the primacy of South Vietnam's responsibility for conducting the war. The two Marine regiments remaining in-country continued defending and patrolling in Quang Nam Province as if nothing had changed.

Evidence mounted during the final two months of 1970 that the North Vietnamese Army was preparing for a major offensive in Quang Tri Province. Intelligence sources reported a major increase in the movement of men and vehicles down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Pilots flying bombing missions reported increased antiaircraft fire. Prisoners and defectors revealed plans for an invasion sometime be fore the summer of 1971. As a result, MACV revived an old contingency plan for an invasion of Laos. General Abrams's proposal to Washington claimed that the invasion would not only threaten the NVA's plans but would also disrupt the enemy's logistical system while the redeployment of U.S. forces continued. Washington approved the operation.

The III MAF had no role in the planning of Operation Lam Son 719, as the Laotian invasion was named. Indeed, it first learned of the operation only a few days before it was scheduled to begin on 8 February 1971. Marine participation in the invasion would be limited to air support, transportation units, and increased patrols in their TAGIs.

The invasion of Laos started as planned. As the first major test of South Vietnam's ability to conduct an offensive operation on its own, the campaign was closely watched by MACV. Numerous deficiencies among the ARVN units were immediately apparent, with some units literally falling apart under the slightest pressure from the NVA. Despite the problems, the offensive was proclaimed a success because it did temporarily disrupt the flow of supplies into South Vietnam.

Lam Son 719 had no effect on plans for redeploying the remaining U.S. Marine units. According to MACV's plans, the next redeployment phase, Operation Keystone Robin Charlie, would remove 12,400 Marines from South Vietnam, including the 5th Marines. Until the redeployment actually began, the 5th Marines continued to sweep the Que Son Mountains in the ongoing Operation Imperial Lake. The regiment's responsibilities also included protection of LZ Baldy and FSB Ross.

The level of enemy activity continued to decline in the early weeks of 1971. Rarely did the Marines encounter the enemy in groups larger than six men. One time that they did was on 2sJanuary. Four kilometers northeast of FSB Ross, a platoon from Company L, 3/5, heard voices and sounds of movement in the jungle nearby. The platoon leader dispatched a squad to investigate. They spotted a group of ten enemy soldiers walking toward them. Instantly reacting, the squad members poured M16 fire at the VC. In seconds it was over; nine of the enemy lay dead on the dirt trail, the tenth man having escaped. As the squad spread out to police the nearby area, a sudden burst of AK47 fire drove them to the ground. The squad maneuvered toward the source of the firing but found nothing. When the Marines returned to the site of the original ambush, they discovered that five of the enemy bodies had been dragged away.

That would prove to be the last significant action for the 3d Battalion. By 15 February, the battalion had ended its combat operations. That same day it formally passed control of FSB Ross to the ARVN. Two weeks later the regiment withdrew its 2d Battalion and its headquarters from field operations. By the end of March, the two battalions and the headquarters element were on the way back to Camp Pendleton. The 1st Battalion was in the final stages of its re deployment and would depart in a matter of weeks.

As of April 1971, the 1st Marine Regiment was the only active infantry unit of the III MAF. As a result, all the regiment's line units were spread thin, covering large TAGIs. The 1st Battalion maintained its presence in the Rocket Belt, guarding against infiltrators, and also rotated its rifle companies in and out of the Que Son Mountains as part of Operation Imperial Lake. The efforts of the 2d Battalion were focused on the area south of Da Nang, where it continually searched for the enemy among the numerous hamlets and villages dotting the region. The 3d Battalion not only guarded the Hai Van Pass but also contributed a platoon for the protection of an artillery fire base in the Que Sons.
During the first few weeks of April, enemy contacts were extremely limited. Booby traps presented a far greater danger to the Marine patrols than enemy small arms fire. As the U.S. presence in South Vietnam rapidly decreased, the infantry units placed greater reliance on artillery support. Unless a Marine patrol had a clear advantage, it would not engage a superior enemy force. Instead, artillery fire would be called in on the enemy. No one wanted to be responsible for the last Marine casualties of the war.

On 7 April 1971, orders for its last major operation of the war were issued by III MAF. Information that U.S. prisoners of war were being held at an isolated camp in the mountainous terrain of western Quang Nam Province had been received by MACV. Though III MAF intelligence officers doubted the accuracy of the reports, they recognized that the plight of American POWs had become, and would remain, a hot political item. If there was any chance to rescue POWs from the grasp of their captors, the Marines wanted to be in on it.

Operation Scott Orchard began when two teams from the 1st Recon Battalion air-assaulted into the abandoned FSB Dagger in the Que Sons at 1045 on 7 April. After a brief firefight with a small enemy force, the fire support base was declared secured. At 1100 helicopters started bringing in the howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. The next day five, rifle companies, three from 2/1 and one each from the 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, all opconned to 2/1, were inserted into separate LZs around FSB Dagger. From 8 to 11 April, the companies thoroughly scoured the rugged country west of FSB Dagger. Though they uncovered several small abandoned enemy camps, they found no evidence of a POW camp. On 11 April, the infantry companies were withdrawn from the AG and returned to their primary TAGI. At midnight that same day, Operation Scott Orchard, the last search and destroy operation for the Marines, ended. The rifle companies had suffered no casualties. The operation claimed just four enemy dead, three of whom were felled by supporting artillery fire.

While Operation Scott Orchard was in full swing, elements of the U.S. Army's Americal Division began moving into the Que Son Mountains, replacing the departing Marine units. On 13 April, the 1st Marine Division formally turned over the area south of the Thu Bon River to the Americal Division. That same day, 1/1 ceased com bat operations and began preparations for their redeployment un der Operation Keystone Oriole Alpha. The men of 2/1 altered their positions to fill in the resulting gap.

The next day the III Marine Amphibious Force ended its six-year role in the war. General Robertson moved his command to Okinawa. At the same time he activated the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Its commander was Maj. Gen. Alan J. Armstrong, an aviator who also commanded what remained of the 1st Marine Air Wing. All Marine units remaining in South Vietnam, consisting of about 15,500 officers and men, were assigned to the 3d MAB.

The two active infantry battalions of the 1st Marines continued saturation patrolling of their respective TAOIs. The 2d Battalion operated south of Da Nang; the 3d Battalion kept one company in regimental reserve and the other three in the fields north and north west of Da Nang. Members of both battalions experienced few contacts with the enemy. Those that did occur were only brief ex changes of fire. It was obvious that neither the NVA nor the VC had any desire to stand and fight or in any way induce the allies to end their redeployment plans.

The last week of U.S. Marine Corps ground combat operations in South Vietnam began on 1 May1971. That same day, 3/1 stood down and moved to Da Nang to prepare for its embarkation. The Amen- cal Division's 196th Infantry Brigade extended its TAOI north to cover nearly all of Quang Nam Province.

The final week of ground combat operations was a quiet one for the Marines of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, the last operational in- fanny unit the Marine Corps fielded in South Vietnam. The battalion's rifle companies ran more than 100 small-unit patrols that last week. They experienced no enemy contact, encountered no booby traps, and took no casualties.

At noon on 7 May 1971, Operation Imperial Lake ended. This final Marine operation had lasted eight months and involved elements of all three remaining Marine infantry regiments. In its final months the operation's scope had been expanded to cover nearly all Marine patrol and ambush activities outside their parent units' immediate vicinity. The operation claimed more than 300 enemy dead and more than 200 captured weapons. The operation cost 24 dead and 170 wounded Marines.

Also on 7 May, all units of the 3d MAB ceased combat operations. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines fired the last Marine artillery round of the war. The regimental headquarters company and the 3d Battalion were on their way to the United States by 13 May. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines turned over their TAOI to two companies of the 196th Infantry Brigade.

The Marines' long-standing commitment to civic action and pacification programs ended on 11 May. On that day the 2d CAG head quarters turned over its compound near Hoi An to the ARVN. In the preceding weeks all the remaining CAPs had been closed down.

On 19 May 1971, the commander of 2/1, Lt. Col. Roy E. Moss, his command group, and the battalion colors boarded planes bound for Camp Pendleton. The last 186 members of the battalion sailed from Da Nang aboard the USS Denver on 1 June. With all of its combat and support units gone, the 3d MAB turned over its remaining facilities to either the U.S. Army or the ARVN. The 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade was formally deactivated on 27June 1971. General Armstrong had departed for Hawaii with a dozen members of his staff the previous day. The balance of the brigade staff followed over the next few days.

The six-year U.S. Marine Corps involvement in the long, often frustrating, occasionally victorious war in South Vietnam was nearly at an end. With all Marine ground combat, aviation, and support units redeployed, the only Marines remaining in South Vietnam were the approximately 550 officers and men serving as embassy guards, on the MACV staff, or as advisers to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps