Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase VII Campaign (1970-71)/Operation Catawba Falls
From Month/Year
September / 1970
To Month/Year
September / 1970
Description
Operation Catawba Falls was from 18 to 21 Sep 1970, 1st Marine Division operation in Quảng Nam Province near Danang to cover the movement of the 5th Marines from An Hoa to the Vu Gia River Valley.
To throw the enemy off balance during the 5th Marines' move From An Hoa and the Vu Gia River Valley, the 1st Marine Division carried out a large-scale diversionary artillery attack in Base Area 112. This attack had its origins early in August in plans for a conventional infantry operation. At that time, intelligence reports located the headquarters of the 38th NVA Regiment and a number of other NVA and VC combat and support units in the mountains northwest of the area swept by the 7th Marines in Pickens Forest. In response to these reports. Colonel Clark V. Judge, commander of the 5th Marines, had his staff begin planning for a two-battalion operation in the area, to be called Operation Catawba Falls,30 On 26 August, as a preliminary to launching the main operation, a command group and two 105mm howitzers of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, with the 3d Platoon of Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines as a security force, landed from helicopters deep in Base Area 112 on Fire Support Base Dagger. The base, intended as the center of the proposed operation, covered the flat top of Ban Co, a peak 1, 031 meters high which lies about 10 miles west of An Hoa, About 100 by 400 meters in area with sheer cliffs dropping away on all sides. Dagger overlooked the maze of ridges and valleys in which the enemy were believed to be concealed.31
On 16 September, the 1st Marine Division issued orders for the execution of Operation Catawba Falls, but in a form far different from that originally contemplated. The orders called for a two-phase operation. Phase I, to be conducted by the 11th Marines under direct control of the division commander. Major General Widdecke, would consist of intensive bombardment of the target area by howitzers and mortars airlifted into FSB Dagger. Quickly emplaced, these weapons would fire rapidly for a short period of time, alternating their shelling of selected targets with intensive air strikes. This phase would begin on 18 September. A second phase, to consist of a sweep of the objective area by the 5th Marines, was included in the original orders, but only as a ruse to confuse enemy intelligence. Division headquarters hoped that the Communists, battered by the shelling and bombing, would spend the crucial period of the American redeployment preparing to resist or trying to evade the threatened infantry assault rather than conducting an offensive of their own.32
Responsibility for conducting Phase I fell to Major George W. Ryhanych's 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. Ry-hanych and his staff began detailed planning for the attack on 15 September. Given little time for their fire
* This sits constituted s. narrow corridor bounded on (he north by the Korean TAOR and on the south by that of the America! Division.
planning, they worked long hours allocating die 10, 000 rounds allowed for the attack among 160 targets furnished by intelligence. They developed a daily schedule for firing and for suspending artillery fire periodically to allow jets of the 1st MAW to make bombing runs. To carry out the plan, Ryhanych would have the two 105mm howitzers from Battery D already on Dagger, two more 103s from Battery E of his battalion. and two from Battery H of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines* Ryhanych also had available six 4.2-inch mortars, four from his own battalion and two from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and four 155mm howitzers, two from the 2d Battalion and two from the 3d. All 16 of these artillery pieces would be emplaced on Dagger, For still heavier long-range support, Ryhanych could call on the 1st 175mm Gun Battery at An Hoa and a platoon of Army 175s from the 2d Battalion, 92d U.S. Artillery, located on Hill 65. For this operation, the Army unit was integrated into the 2d Battalion's communications and fire direction system.33
On 17 September at 0800, the first of a total of 76 helicopters-CH-53Ds of the 1st MAW and Army CH-54s-began lifting guns. crews, ammunition, and equipment from Hill 65, An Hoa, and Baldy to FSB Dagger, Detachments of engineers and artillerymen swarmed over the mountain top preparing gun positions and helicopter landing zones. They were hampered in their labors by a shortage of equipment. The one minidozer on Dagger broke down after a few hours, as did a second sent in to replace it. The single chain saw "was exceedingly dull and broke down on the second day of operation." With hand tools and explosives, the Marines continued work throughout the day and into the night of the 17th. They finished gun positions and other installations and distributed thousands of rounds of ammunition.
By dawn on 18 September, 14 artillery pieces (two of the mortars were held in reserve) were emplaced and prepared to fire, and 10, 000 rounds of ammunition lay ready for their crews' hands. Major Ryhanych, who remained on Dagger for the first two days of the operation, organized his guns and crews into a provisional composite battery commanded by his battalion operations officer. Major Robert T, Adams, Under him, Adams had three sections, one of 105mm howitzers, one of 4.2-inch mortars, and one of 155mm howitzers, each commanded by a first lieutenant. A central fire direction center controlled all three sections.
At 0300 on the 18th, the provisional battery opened fire. For the rest of the day, howitzers and mortars methodically pounded each suspected base camp, cave, bunker complex, and troop position. At intervals, the battery ceased firing white jets delivered their strikes. It became apparent as the day went on that the original fire plan could not be carried out in the two days initially allotted for the operation without exhausting the gunners. The resulting fatigue would increase the risk of accidents and firing errors- Therefore, on the 18th Major General Widdecke ordered the operation extended through 20 September. The following day, another division order postponed the end of Phase I to 21 September. Tills order also declared that "Preparation for Phase II having accomplished its intended diversion mission, . ., Phase II [is] postponed indefinitely .... Op [erarion] Cataw-ba Falls will terminate concurrently with termination of Phase I."34
Throughout the 19th and 20th and part of the 21st, the battery on Dagger kept up its rain of destruction on Base Area 112. Preliminary intelligence reports indicated thai the enemy had been hit hard in certain of the target areas, and additional fire was directed there. The soft sand and loam which formed a shallow layer over most of the flat mountain top caused recoiling howitzers to shift position and required the mortar crews periodically to dig out and reset the base plates of their weapons, but hard work and ingenuity overcame these problems. During the second day of firing, heaps of trash and expended cartridge cases "became an almost overwhelming problem," bur the riflemen of the 3d Platoon, Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, who manned the firebase perimeter throughout the operation, helped the gunners dump the trash over the side of the mountain and also furnished what Major Ryhanych called "invaluable" assistance in moving ammunition to the guns. The Marines burned the mound of trash when they left the firebase.
Operation Catawba Falls ended at noon on 21 September. The weapons and crews of the composite battery were lifted by helicopter back to their permanent positions. Between 18 and 21 September. Major Ryhanych's artillerymen had fired over 11, 500 rounds, and jets of the 1st MAW had dropped 141 tons of bombs. Allied intelligence later estimated that Operation Catawba Falls had inflicted casualties on several enemy units and destroyed a suspected training center. Further indicating the success of the operation, no major enemy attacks or harassment marred the relief of the 7th Marines by the 5th Marines.35
The Regiments Realign
Protected by the artillery fire of Catawba Falls, the regiments of the 1st Marine Division carried out their complex exchanges of position. On 18 September, companies of Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Rose's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines began relieving units of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines on Hills 52, 65, and 37. The relieving companies came under temporary operational control of the 5th Marines' battalion, which in turn on 20 September passed under the control of the 1st Marines. During this relief, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines took command of Company M, the 1st Marines' CUPP unit, which had its squads defending hamlets along Route 4. Company M was part of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. On the 21st, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines assigned direct support of Rose's battalion, moved its six 105mm howitzers and two 155mm howitzers from Hill 10 to Hill 65. The following day, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines assumed control of its new TAOR.
To fill in for the 1st Battalion as it extended itself to the southwest, the other battalions of the 1st Marines enlarged and rearranged their operational boundaries. The 2d Battalion surrendered a strip of the southwestern pan of its TAOR between Route 1 and the coast to the Korean Marines while extending westward to take over Hill 55. The 3d Battalion sent companies southward to occupy several square miles of the old 1st Battalion TAOR including OP (Observation Post) Reno. By the end of September, as a result of these realignments, the 1st Marines' TAOR extended from the Cu De River on the north southwestward to where the Vu Gia and Thu Bon Rivers join. Near the coast, it abutted the enlarged Korean enclave, which extended well north of the Thu Bon-Ky Lam River line.
