I work full time at Brookline College in the admissions department and as an adjunct Professor for the University of Dubuque, Tempe Life Campus where I teach Business and Healthcare classes.
I also own Gunny's View Photography which provides a variety of Photography services (www.gunnysview.com). I have been a member of the with Arizona Professional Photographers Association since 2017 and I currently serve on the Board of Directors for the Association as Secretary/Treasurer (www.arizonappa.com)
I am also a member of the Phoenix Free Speakers Bureau (www.freespeakers.org), this gives me the opportunity to speak to a variety of groups and make a difference in my community.
I am also a Manager with Legal Shield. It is a company that provides Lawyer Services better than when we were on active duty. Not only will they write all the letters that you need and do your wills; but also they can actually go into the courtroom and fight in your behalf. If you are interested in this service I can provide you with information and get you started with this service no matter where you live. For more information check out my website at https://frankalger.wearelegalshield.com/ or Call me at (480) 570-4032 or E-mail me at frankwalger@aol.com
I am very involved with the Marine Corps League and have served as Detachment Commandant for Saguaro Detachment 554 in Mesa, AZ from 2002-2006. I moved to Casa Grande in 2020 and joined the Casa Grande Detachemtn 901 and served as Detachment Commandant from 2021-2023. I am currently the Department of Arizona Adjutant, Webmaster, and Young Marine Laison.
I am also involved with the VFW Post 1677 in Casa Grande and serve as Post Adjutant and webmaster and as VFW District 10 Adjutant and Webmaster.
I Served as the Commander of the East Valley AZ Young Marines from 2005 to 2019 and have been Adjutant from 2019 to present. I was elected as the Patriot BN Commander in 2026 and served from 2006 to 2009 and then was elected as the Commander for the Grand Canyon Regiment of the Young Marines and served in that position from 2009 to 2019. I also served as the Young Marine Division 6 Adjutant from 2016 to 2020.
Other Comments:
I was awarded the highest award for an adult volunteer at the Regiment (State) Division, and National level Young Marine Volunteer of the Year for 2008 and 2011 for the Grand Canyon Regiment (State of Arizona); Division 6 Young Marine Volunteer of the Year in 2010 and was named the NATIONAL Young Marine Volunteer of the Year in 2011.
I also received the Distinguished Citizenship Award Gold from the MCL National Commandant, 2022, Distinguished Citizenship Award Silver from MCL Southwest Division National Vice Commandant, 2021, and Distinguished Citizenship Award Bronze from Department of Arizona MCL several times, plus several other Marine Corps league awards over the last 10 years.
I was awarded the Saguaro Detachment’s Marine of the Year in 2011 and the Southwest Division’s Marine of the Year in 2022
I also earned the following Toastmasters awards: Advance Communicator Bronze and Silver and Advanced Leader Bronze awards.
On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were compounded by an expanded and intrusive mandate; greatly diminished military capabilities; more aggressive Somali opposition; uncertain support from the United States; differences within the coalition; and uncertainty by the Security Council, the Secretariat, and others.
Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.
UNOSOM II became a badly flawed peace, with military forces which came to be seen by parties to the local conflict as co-belligerents rather than impartial peacekeepers. In Somalia, peace enforcement was only an implicit element of the original U.N. mandate, which focused on peace-building (disarmament, political reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation). However, after a confrontation between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the U.N. led to the killing of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers, the Security Council made the operation's peace-enforcement mission explicit. It was executed by both U.N. forces and a 1,000-man U.S. rapid-reaction force under U.S. operational control, with the authority of the United Nations. There was also a 3,000-man U.S. logistics unit under U.N. operational control. A lack of decisiveness, cohesion, and command and control by the undermanned U.N. mission (half the strength of UNITAF, with some 20,000 personnel) and a series of armed clashes between U.S./U.N. forces and the SNA created a virtual state of war and undermined the effectiveness of the U.N. operation. Confusion over the dual-command relationship between the U.S. and UNOSOM II was another complicating factor, with a U.S. general officer serving as both the U.N. deputy forces commander and commander of U.S. forces.
A clash on 3-4 October 1993 left eighteen U.S. personnel dead and seventy-eight wounded, along with over one thousand Somali casualties. Public outcry in the United States contributed to the decision to withdraw U.S. forces in March 1994. That, coupled with continued internal strife and SNA hostility toward the U.N., led to a total U.N. withdrawal in March 1995. This was executed skillfully, without casualties, in a carefully planned combined U.S.-U.N. action.
The killing of Army Rangers in Somalia provoked a resurgence of a debate that began before the Gulf War: when is it appropriate to use military force -- and, more to the point, can you justify using the military in regions in which Americans either do not see their interests at stake or are willing to help only so long as the costs remain very low? Somalia drove home the reality that the Gulf War experience could not serve as a model for other situations where the diplomatic lineup was more confused, the stakes less clear, and the difference between good guys and bad guys less simple to discern. It was also an early indication of the coming debate on the international community's role in internal strife.
