Description Operation Fortress Attack, the 2/4 BLT went ashore near the C-2 combat base, coming under the operational control of the 9th Marines." In the meantime, the SLF Bravo battalion conducted
*General Cushman stated that the planning for an amphibious operation "never went anywhere .... it was just another plan sticking up. . . . They wanted to have one up to date, just in case, you know, got lucky or somebody else got to be President or some damn thing."
**Colonel Bruce F. Meyers, the commander of SLF Alpha, recalled his concerns about the irregularity and departure from normal amphibious doctrine during this period. He wrote that on 26 Jan "op con was passed back to me (CTG 79.4) at noon and we had all elements of BLT 2/4 back aboard our shipping in five hours and 15 minutes (261830)." He was then directed to land his tank and amtrac platoons at the mouth of the Cua Viet at the request of III MAF.
On 27 January, BLT 2/4 began Operation Fortress Attack in the 9th Marines operational area and he passed operational control to the 9th Marines at 1500.
Meyers declared that he "recognized the exigency of the threat in the Tet offensive, and our immediate response and accommodation to that threat. ..." As the SLF commander, he "was worried that Gen. Westmoreland would pick up on this usage out of our traditional 'amphibious' role ... It was obvious to both my [Navy] ARG [Amphibious Ready Group} counterpart . . . [and to Meyers} that both Adm. Sharp and Gen. Krulak were both worried about this same aspect of the use of the ARG/SLF ...."
At his debriefing at FMFPac, Meyers referred to "grave reservations and possible implications for the future of the Marine Corps role as a result of what I believed at the time to be bordering on a misuse of the ARG/SLF. In the end, we accomplished what the ground commanders needed-an immediate 'fire brigade' response to a perceived serious threat. In retrospect, it was probably the wisest response to the situation that we could have achieved." Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments.