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Marine Cpl Donald Murphy (Murph).
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Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase IV Campaign (1968)/Operation Pegasus / Lam Son 207
From Month/Year
April / 1968
To Month/Year
April / 1968
Description Apr 1 – 15 1968, This was an overland relief expedition (Operation Pegasus) was launched by a combined Marine–Army/South Vietnamese task force that eventually broke through to the Marines at Khe Sanh. 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions, 26th Marines and ARVN 2nd Division.
3rd Bn, 1st Marines was relocated to the Ca Lu combat base and assigned responsibility for securing the middle portion of Highway 9 running from Khe Sanh to the coast.
This operation featured 17 U.S. and four ARVN airborne battalions to relieve the siege of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Virtually the entire 1st Air Cav Div was committed along with five Marine battalions, mostly from the 26th Marines. The bulk of the NVA units had already departed the Khe Sanh area. The operation consisted for combat assaults to take the high ground on both sides of route 9 and systematically reopening the road. The forces discovered several caches of NVA supplies, hundreds of enemy corpses, and a "pockmarked, burnt, and ruined" landscape "like the surface of the moon." The companion ARVN operation was named LAM SON 207. Casualties: U.S. 92 KIA, 667 WIA, 5 MIA; ARVN 33 KIA, 187 WIA; enemy 1,044 KIA and 9 POWs.
American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted the new American commander in Vietnam, Gen. Creighton Abrams, decided to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. Historians have observed that the Battle of Khe Sanh may have successfully distracted American and GVN attention from the buildup of Viet Cong forces in the south prior to the early 1968 Tet Offensive. Even at the height of the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland maintained that the true intentions of the offensive was to distract forces from Khe Sanh.
