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SSgt David Nowak
to remember
Marine Cpl Stanley Nowak, Jr. (Stats).
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Casualty Info
Home Town North Tonawanda
Last Address North Tonawanda, NY
Casualty Date Jun 11, 1951
Cause KIA-Died of Wounds
Reason Gun, Small Arms Fire
Location Korea, North
Conflict Korean War
Location of Interment Elmlawn Cemetery - Town of Tonawanda, New York
Wall/Plot Coordinates Evergreen Section D Lot 203 Northwest Grave
Korean War/UN Summer-Fall Offensive (1951)/Battle for the Punch Bowl
From Month/Year
August / 1951
To Month/Year
September / 1951
Description The Battle of the Punchbowl, was one of the last battles of the movement phase of the Korean War. Following the breakdown of armistice negotiations in August 1951, the United Nations Command decided to launch a limited offensive in the late summer/early autumn to shorten and straighten sections of their lines, acquire better defensive terrain, and deny the enemy key vantage points from which they could observe and target UN positions. The Battle of Bloody Ridge took place west of the Punchbowl from August–September 1951 and this was followed by the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge northwest of the Punchbowl from September–October 1951. At the end of the UN offensive in October 1951, UN Forces controlled the line of hills north of the Punchbowl.
Phase 1: Yoke Ridge
At 06:00 on 31 August, the 7th Marines and two battalions of the 1st KMC launched the assault with an attack from Hill 793 up the eastern edge of the Punchbowl towards Yoke Ridge in the west and Tonpyong in the east. By late morning, despite heavy rain and enemy minefields, the assault units had reached Yoke Ridge and were engaging the KPA defenders. By the end of the first day, US/ROK force occupied the southeastern end of Yoke Ridge and had suffered 3 killed and 57 wounded (mostly by landmines), while the KPA had lost 129 killed, a further 218 estimated killed, 233 estimated wounded and 14 captured.
On 1 September, the 1st KMC moved west along Yoke Ridge, while the 7th Marines moved north, both assault groups clearing out KPA bunkers with grenades and flamethrowers. The KPA launched several small-scale counterattacks against the advancing Marines, but these were broken up by small-arms and mortar fire, artillery and several airstrikes. The US/ROK forces consolidated their positions in the evening under KPA mortar and artillery fire. On the night of 1/2 September, the KPA launch a night attack on the 1st KMC on Hill 924, driving them out of the position they had secured earlier that day. US/ROK losses for the day were 21 killed, 84 wounded, while the KPA had lost 72 killed, a further 218 estimated killed and 231 estimated wounded.
On the morning of 2 September, supported by heavy artillery fire, the 1st KMC recaptured Hill 924 and moved further west towards its next objective, Hill 1026 (38°19′28.92″N 128°08′20.4″E). After beating back several small KPA attacks, 3rd Battalion 7th Marines advanced towards Hill 602 (38°20′16.8″N 128°10′51.6″E) through heavily wooded terrain and following preparatory artillery fire and airstrikes, seized the hill by 14:30.[12] The KPA launched several company-size counterattacks on Hill 602, all of which were beaten back. US/ROK losses for the day were 75 killed, 349 wounded, while the KPA had lost 450 killed and 15 captured, a further 609 estimated killed and 345 estimated wounded.
At 04:00 on 3 September, the 1st KMC renewed their attack on Hill 1026, while 2nd Battalion 7th Marines assumed the defense of Hill 924. As they advanced, the 1st KMC encountered a large KPA force advancing towards Hill 924. The 1st KMC forced back the KPA and seized Hill 1026 by midday, beating back a KPA counterattack and advancing northwest to seize Hill 1055 (38°19′40.8″N 128°07′37.2″E) and west to take Hill 930 (38°19′37.2″N 128°06′54″E), thus securing all of Yoke Ridge. US/ROK losses for the day were 22 killed, 77 wounded, while the KPA had lost 10 captured, a further 294 estimated killed and 280 estimated wounded. Meanwhile, to the west of the Punchbowl, the ROK 35th Regiment, 5th Division advanced unopposed from the Kansas Line to Hill 450, approximately 3.3 km southwest of Hill 1026, while the US 2nd Infantry Division took Hill 1181, approximately 4 km southwest of Hill 930, against light resistance.
Phase 2: Kanmubong Ridge
Between 4–10 September, the 1st Marine Division and 1st KMC consolidated their positions on Yoke Ridge, established the Hays Line and built up ammunition and supplies for the second phase of the attack on Kanmubong Ridge. It was considered essential to seize Kanmubong Ridge, immediately north of Yoke Ridge, in order to defend the Hays Line and to allow X Corps to attack the KPA main line of resistance (MLR), which was believed to be located approximately 3 km north of it.The KPA used the lull in fighting to reinforce their positions on Hill 673 (38°20′52.8″N 128°11′39.48″E) opposite Hill 602.[20] The interim period saw active patrolling by both sides, and US/ROK losses were 30 killed, 186 wounded and two missing, while the KPA had lost 68 captured and an estimated 276 killed.
The 7th Marines received orders to launch an attack at 03:00 on 11 September from the Hays Line through a narrow valley, across a tributary of the Soyang River and then uphill towards Hills 680 (38°21′00″N 128°10′51.6″E) and 673, with Hill 749 (38°21′43.2″N 128°11′39.48″E) as a further objective. Supporting the 7th Marines would be the 1st Tank Battalion with artillery support from the 11th Marines. 3/7 Marines were tasked with capturing Hill 680, but despite extensive preparatory artillery fire, their advance proceeded slowly with the KPA defenders able to providing interlocking fire from their bunkers, and by the end of the day, 3/7 Marines were forced to dig in some 300 feet (91 m) south of the summit. 1st Battalion 7th Marines (1/7 Marines) were tasked with capturing Hill 673, but strong opposition from the well-protected KPA bunkers forced them to stop short of their objective. US/ROK losses for the day were 11 killed and 68wounded while the KPA lost 25 killed and 6 captured.
On the night of 11/12 September, 2nd Battalion 7th Marines (2/7 Marines) moved to the rear of Hill 673, cutting off the KPA on the hill. By 14:00, Hill 673 had been secured for the loss of 16 killed and 35 wounded, while the KPA had lost 30 killed and 3 captured and an estimated 185 killed. Sergeant Frederick W. Mausert III was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the assault on Hill 673. On the night of 12 September, the 1st Marines relieved 1/7 and 3/7 Marines on Hill 673; 2/7 Marines could not be relieved, as they were closely engaged on Hill 749, so 2nd Battalion 1st Marines (2/1 Marines) moved forward to relieve them the following day.
On 13 September, 2/1 Marines were ordered to seize Hill 749 and then move northwest to take Hills 812 (38°22′4.8″N 128°10′55.2″E), 980 (38°22′19.2″N 128°09′10.8″E), and 1052 (38°22′4.8″N 128°08′42″E), while 3/1 Marines would move west from Hill 680 to take Hill 751 (38°21′12.6″N 128°09′25.2″E) and then attack northwest to Hill 1052.[29] Hill 749 proved to be a heavily defended fortress of bunkers, covered trenches and tunnels and part of the KPA MLR. 2/1 Marines seized the summit at 12:10, but were soon driven back; they finally gained control of the summit by 15:00, but it would be 20:25 before they could relieve 2/7 Marines on the reverse slope of the hill. 3/1 Marines' advance towards Hill 751 was delayed by mines and the more urgent needs for supporting arms on Hill 749; by evening, 3/1 Marines dug in short of Hill 751, where they endured mortar fire and 10 KPA counterattacks during the night. 13 September saw the first operational use of Marine helicopters in combat, with the HRS-1 helicopters of HMR-161, operating from forward base X-83 near Cheondo-ri, conducting 28 flights to resupply the Marines near Hill 793 and evacuate 74 casualties.
On 14 September, the two Marine battalions continued their assaults from the previous day. 2/1 Marines had to clear KPA bunkers in a wooded area to the north of Hill 749 before advancing along the ridgeline towards Hill 812. By 15:30, the attack had bogged down in the face of frontal and flanking fire. During this assault, Private First Class Edward Gomez smothered a KPA hand grenade with his body, saving the lives of the rest of his machine-gun team, for which he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. 3/1 Marines, supported by accurate airstrikes, was able to seize most of Hill 751 by dusk and had dug in when the KPA counterattacked at 22:50. Marine losses for the day were 39 killed and 463 wounded, while the KPA lost 7 captured and an estimated 460 killed and 405 wounded.
In the early morning of 15 September, 3/1 Marines fought off a 100–150 man KPA counterattack, killing 18 and wounding an estimated 50. Another counterattack was broken up 14:50,[clarification needed] and Marine tanks subsequently destroyed 10 KPA bunkers in front of Hill 751. 3/1 Marines on Hill 751 were ordered to hold for further orders, while 2/1 Marines was ordered to continue clearing Hill 749. Delayed preparatory fire, limited air support, and a tenacious KPA defense meant that 2/1 Marines were unable to make any appreciable gains by nightfall and had to withdraw to their previous positions, having suffered 70 wounded. On the night of 15 September, the 5th Marine Regiment moved forward to relieve the 1st Marines and continue the assault on the Kanmubong Ridge.
At midnight on 16 September, under cover of an intense mortar and artillery barrage, the KPA 91st Regiment of the 45th Division launched a major counterattack against Hill 749; the attacks continued until 04:00, but were repeatedly repulsed for few gains and an estimated 1200 KPA killed. Corporal Joseph Vittori was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in countering the KPA assault. At dawn, 2/1 Marines resumed the assault from Hill 749 to Hill 812 making slow progress against the KPA dug in along the ridgeline. On Hill 751, 5th Marines were ordered to take Hill 812 and Hill 980 and began their assault at 08:30, however both the assault lines made little progress in the face of KPA machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. 3/5 Marines attacking towards Hill 980 had to pull back to their line of departure after 2 hours, while 2/5 Marines attacking towards Hill 812 were held up until 17:00, but by 19:00 had managed to secure ground 400 m southeast of Hill 812. Marine losses for the day were 24 killed, 127 wounded and 1 missing, while the KPA had lost 169 killed and 25 captured and an estimated 418 killed and 540 wounded.
Orders for 17 September were to continue the previous day's assaults. A dawn artillery barrage on Hills 812, 980 and 1052 inflicted significant casualties on the KPA defenders, who were eating meals in the open. 2/5 Marines advanced towards Hill 812 at 07:00 making good progress against until a KPA mortar and artillery barrage fell on the recently captured positions, the Marines then had to advance slowly neutralizing the KPA bunkers one by one. By 13:45, the summit of Hill 812 had been secured, but the KPA remained dug in on the reverse slope and had to be cleared out in close-quarters fighting. After securing Hill 812, 1/5 and 2/5 Marines began to attack west towards Hill 980, making good progress against the unprepared KPA defenders until they reached a granite point later named The Rock, where heavy machine gun fire from KPA bunkers on Hills 980 and 1052 stopped any further advance. The 5th Marines were then ordered to halt their attack and dig in on the most defensible terrain. The previous day, General Van Fleet had visited the 1st Marine Division Command Post and then ordered X Corps to suspend all major operations after 20 September, as further attacks along the Hays Line could no longer be justified,[49] and he wished to concentrate all of X Corps' fire support to conclude the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge. Marine losses for the day were 13 killed and 88 wounded, while the KPA had lost 155 killed and 37 captured and an estimated 100 killed and 191 wounded.
On 18 September, the Marines dug in and consolidated their positions, while the KPA launched several counterattacks and continued to fire from their dominating positions on Hills 980 and 1052. Marine losses were 16 killed and 98 wounded.
On the early morning of 19 September, the KPA twice attacked 2/5 Marines' western outpost near The Rock, but the attacking forces stumbled into their own minefield, suffering serious losses. Marine losses for the day were 16 killed and 98 wounded, while the KPA lost 9 captured and an estimated 50 killed and 55 wounded.
After midnight on 20 September, the KPA launched an intense mortar and artillery barrage on the Marines between The Rock and Hill 812. At 02:30, the barrage lifted and a company of KPA attacked past The Rock towards Hill 812, cutting off several outpost units. American artillery responded, firing over 1600 rounds between 02:40 and 04:50. The Marines counterattacked at 05:00, forcing the KPA to withdraw, allowing the Marines to reoccupy their original positions by 06:30. Marine losses in the attack and counterattack were 2 killed and 31 wounded, while the KPA had lost 30 dead and 11 captured and an estimated 20 killed and 15 wounded.
Also on 20 September, east of the Kanmubong Range, the ROK 8th Infantry Division was struggling to secure Hill 854 (38°22′37.2″N 128°13′44.4″E). 1st Marines were ordered to assist the 8th ROK, but the attack did not begin until 17:30 and quickly bogged down in the face of well-defended KPA bunkers. 1st Marines began to dig in at 17:00, having gained only a small amount of ground for the loss of 7 killed and 24 wounded. On 21 September, 3/1 Marines resumed the assault on Hill 854, and by 17:45, it had been secured for the loss of 2 killed and 31 wounded. KPA losses on Hill 854 were 159 killed and 29 captured with an estimated 150 killed and 225 wounded.
Aftermath
The UN offensive in the Punchbowl area concluded on 21 September, however the KPA continued to probe the UN lines and direct fire on their positions. Following the conclusion of the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge to the west, UN forces consolidated their positions and the line of hills north of the Punchbowl formed part of the new frontline, now named the Minnesota Line.[57] The failure to press on and capture Hills 980 and 1052 was viewed by many Marines as a tactical error as those heights overlooked the UN lines and numerous casualties resulted in the stalemate period that followed.[58]
The 1st Marine Division was awarded its third Presidential Unit Citation of the war for its actions during the periods from 21–26 April, 16 May-30 June and 11–25 September 1951.
The KPA captured Hill 812 from the ROK 12th Division in June 1953.
The Korean Demilitarized Zone now runs along the line of hills captured by the UN forces in September 1951. The Eulji Observatory is located on Yoke Ridge looking directly across to the Kanmubong Ridge in North Korea.
My Participation in This Battle or Operation
From Month/Year
August / 1951
To Month/Year
September / 1951
Last Updated: Mar 16, 2020
Personal Memories
People You Remember Chain of Command:
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein):
MajGen Oliver P. Smith----------------------- (to 23 Feb 1951) BrigGen Louis B. (Chesty) Puller------------- (from 24 Feb 1951 to 4 March 1951) MajGen Oliver P. Smith----------------------- (from 5 March 1951 to 24 April 1951) MajGen Gerald C. Thomas---------------------- (from 25 April 1951)
BrigGen Edward A. Craig---------------------- (to 20 Jan 1951) MajGen Edward A. Craig----------------------- (from 21 Jan 1951 to 1 Feb 1951) BrigGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller------------- (from 2 Feb 1951 to 19 May 1951) BrigGen William J. Whaling------------------- (from 20 May 1951)
Commander, 1st Marine Regiment:
Col. Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller---------------- (to 24 Jan 1951) Col. Francis M. McAlister-------------------- (from 25 Jan 1951 to 19 May 1951) Col. Wilburt S. (Big Foot) Brown------------- (from 19 May 1951)
Executive Officer, 1st Marine Regiment:
LtCol Robert W. Rickert---------------------- (from 16 Jan 1951 to 11 Feb 1951) LtCol Alan Sutter---------------------------- (from 12 Feb 1951 to 30 May 1951) LtCol Donald M. Schmuck---------------------- (from 31 May 1951)
Commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment:
LtCol Donald M. Schmuck---------------------- (to 27 Feb 1951) LtCol Robley E. West------------------------- (from 28 Feb 1951)
Maj Robley E. West--------------------------- (to 27 Feb 1951) Maj David W. Bridges------------------------- (from 28 Feb 1951)
Commander, "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines:
Capt Robert H. Barrow------------------------ (to 30 Jan 1951) Capt Thomas J. Bohannon---------------------- (from 31 Jan 1951 to 30 June 1951) 1stLt Calvin R. Baker------------------------ (from 1 July 1951)
Memories To this point dad has participated in the following:
The "Pohang Guerrilla Hunt" in January and early February 1951. The "CCF Spring Offensive" in mid February 1951. "Operation Killer (1st Phase)" in mid to late February 1951. "Operation Killer (2nd Phase)" in early March 1951. "Operation Ripper" in early March to April 1951. "Operation Rugged" in early to mid April 1951. "Operation Dauntless" in mid to late April 1951. "1st Chinese Spring Offensive" in late April 1951. "2nd Chinese Offensive" in mid to late May 1951. "Battle for the Punch Bowl" (The "Advance to the Punchbowl began on 23 May 1951. This was dads final operation.) *****************************************************************************************
The Advance to the Punchbowl began on 23 May 1951. *****************************************************************************************
Since dads letter of 9 May the following events had taken place:
On 12 May, the 1st Marine Regiment again headed northward. For the next two weeks, it pushed slowly forward against a delaying enemy.
On 16 May the expected Second Impulse of the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive fell upon units of the ROK Army in the east, and soon a 30-mile penetration threatened the U.S. 2d Infantry Division on the Marine right flank.
18 May, the 1st Marine Division performed a very tricky maneuver to readjust defensive dispositions that allowed the U.S. 2d Infantry Division to move east to reinforce its right flank which was bearing the brunt of the new Chinese offensive. The 7th Marines pulled back to the No Name Line to relieve the 1st Marines, which then sidestepped east to take over an area previously held by the U.S. Army's 9th Infantry Regiment.
On 19 May, all four regiments (1st Korean Marine, 7th Marines, 1st Marines, and 5th Marines) were aligned from left to right on the modified No Name Line as the enemy's offensive lost its momentum.
The final action of the Chinese Spring Offensive occurred on 20 May when 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, caught the CCF 44th Division in the open. The Marines on the firing line opened up with everything they had including rockets, artillery, and air support during a five-hour battle. This action marked the end of Marshal Peng's attempts to drive the 1st Marine Division into the sea.
The 1st Marine Division not only weathered the storm, it had given the enemy a bloody nose on several occasions and performed many complex maneuvers well.
By the 24th, the 1st Marines assault battalions had reached a line about five and one-half miles north of Sanggo-ri, where it was again relieved. *****************************************************************************************
Dads letter of Tuesday, 29 May 1951 included the following excerpts:
*****"Sorry for not writing sooner but we've been fairly busy and the weather has been rotten. The prediction for the month of May was three inches of rain but we've had at least ten. We went into the attack again for three days but didn't hit a thing. Then we were moved to another sector. We were in this area before when we were on the push and didn't expect to come back this way but _ _ _ _. We're sitting about five miles below the line now set up and getting hot chow. We arrived the day before yesterday and expected to leave today. I guess we hit the jackpot."
*****"The situation looks the best now that it ever has since the start of the war. Right now there are sixty to a hundred thousand Chinks trapped here in South Korea. They started an offensive that backfired. They started to push us back and then all of a sudden our troops broke through and cut all supply lines and all routes of escape. Many of them are wounded and others are doubtful as to the treatment they'll get but still and all many, many are surrendering. This action has really put a hole in Mao's Army. From what we hear Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson have both predicted the end of the war within a week. I hope they're right."
*****"I hope you know better than to believe those reporters when they say that I'll be home next month. That's out of the question. Ever since they started the rotation I've said that I'll be on my way home sometime between the middle of July and the end of October. At times I'm even doubtful as to weather I'll be on my way home then. When people tell you I'm coming home don't believe them. After all who should know better than I when I'll be home."
*****"I received a package of toll house cookies from Mrs Mickley yesterday. Boy did they hit the spot. She sent them Air Mail and they got here in ten days. I guess you know they didn't last long." *****************************************************************************************
Since dads letter of 29 May the following events had taken place:
The Battle of the Soyang, began on 27 May and lasted until 3 June. The attack was essentially a pincers movement to envelop an enemy making a desperate effort to escape. The plan of maneuver called for the 1st Mar Div on the left to drive northward and seize the Yanggu area.
The 1st Mar Div found itself committed on 27 May to the attack on Yanggu, with the 7th Marines advancing on the left of the Honchon-Inje Road and the 5th Marines on the right along the ridgelines. The 1st Marines was in division reserve, and on the extreme division left the 1st KMC Regt was able to cover the area south of the Hwachon Reservoir with patrols, since the enemy was not defending in force.
The double-barreled CCF spring offensive had backfired. Never since crossing the Yalu, in fact, had the Chinese been hit so hard as during the last few days of May. This does not mean that the enemy was crushed, however, or that he failed to extricate the bulk of his forces, even though the cost in casualties came high. For if some routed groups surrendered, others put up an almost suicidal resistance to keep the rear areas open for escape. This was especially true of the North Koreans, who set an example for the Chinese when it came to stubborn delaying actions.
It fell to the lot of the 1st Mar Div to encounter several of these expendable NK units, so that the attack on Yanggu occasionally ran into difficulties. Nevertheless, both the 5th and 7th Marines advanced 4,000 meters on the 28th against light to moderate resistance, while the KMCs continued to patrol on the division left flank with few contacts.
On the 29th the North Koreans put up a resistance for Hill 610 described as "fanatical" by Marine field reports. *****************************************************************************************
Dads letter of Sunday, 3 June 1951 included the following excerpts:
*****"We've covered much territory lately and the more we cover the less I like it. I think I told you that we moved from West Central to the East Central front. The day before yesterday we crossed the 38th parallel again and set up in another valley. Today we moved about two miles further and we're set up now on a very low hill. Our regiment (the 1st) was in Division reserve but yesterday our second and third battalions relieved the Seventh Regiment. Now my battalion is in regimental reserve but it won't last more than a day or two. Then we'll most likely go into the attack again."
*****"From what we hear the enemy that they've been hitting for the last three days has only been North Korean. The Chinese are either still on the run using these troops as rear action or else they've set them up to stop us long enough so that they (the Chinese) can get reorganized."
*****"Yesterday one of our planes came over heading south trailing smoke. He had three of his brother flyboys hovering around like a family of birds protecting their young on its first flight. He circled around our area dropping everything he could and all of a sudden he rolled it over, nosed it down and bailed out. What a sight. The plane came down and almost landed on it's own accord. It belly-landed and went up in a cloud of smoke. The flyer just drifted down and all the while the other three kept circling around him making sure he was okay. Even after he landed they circled until they found out he was okay. We learned later that while on a run a gook fired at him and hit his fuel line."
*****"It looks as if some of the Marine Reserves are actually going to be pulled out of Korea and sent home for discharge. They've got them grouped into four groups as far as I know. Group one is supposed to leave sometime this month. Six men in the battalion are in that group. From the way I get it I'll be in group two along with about half of the battalion. It will take quite a long time for group two to get out. I'm pretty sure that I'll get out of Korea sometime between the middle of July and the end of October. That will give me between six and nine and a half months here. That's too much as far as I'm concerned. I'm ready to leave here and come home anytime."
*****"I tried to pull a deal the other day. I kept complaining that I need shoes and they didn't have any. Finally they organized a detail and sent us back to Wonju. We thought we'd be back there for a few days. We didn't get new shoes but they had a complete mobile shoe repair shop there. Two hours after we got there we were on our way back. We left at nine in the morning and got back at eleven-thirty at night. That's when the trouble started *****************************************************************************************
(Curiously this letter ended in the middle of the page with the unfinished sentence "That's when the trouble started". No signature or nothing! It seemed almost prophetic considering what was to come, which I will describe in the next section) *****************************************************************************************
Since dads letter of 3 June the following events had taken place:
Seldom had a relieving outfit been given a hotter reception than the 1st Marines on 2 June, when moving up to the left of the 5th Marines. On the way to the LD near Yanggu, the 3d Bn had 52 men killed and wounded by enemy mortar fire. Among these casualties were four company commanders, the artillery liaison officer, two forward observers, the S-3, the medical officer and several veteran NCOs. A reorganization was made necessary before the attack scheduled for the following morning could jump off.
On 3 June, when the battle of the Soyang ended Marine units had secured their main objectives of the Inje and Yanggu areas.
On 4 June the 1st Marines relieved the 7th, which went into division reserve. On the Corps left the 1st Mar Div advanced northward from an LD in the Yanggu area. The advance continued against opposition that stiffened daily as the enemy reacted to growing pressure on his sensitive "Iron Triangle" assembly area.
Enemy units in contact with the 1st Mar Div were identified as elements of the Twelfth CCF Army and 5th NK Corps.
From 4 to 7 June the 1st Mar Div was advancing with three regiments abreast. There was no easy or painless way of driving out North Koreans protected by log bunkers and supported by heavy, accurate concentrations of mortar and artillery fire. Maneuver was out of the question in a terrain of ridges rising like walls ahead of them. Each enemy position in turn had to be taken by direct assault, with the infantry depending on the support of air, armor, artillery, mortars and rockets.
From 3 to 6 June the two assault battalions (1st and 2nd) of the 1st Marines attacked by day and repulsed NK probing attacks by night. Assigned objectives were taken on the 6th after a final assault aided by air strikes and 6,500 rounds of artillery as well as 452 rounds of 4.2-inch projectiles. On the other hand, it was estimated that enemy mortar and artillery fire on regimental front-line positions averaged one round every two minutes at its peak.
All four infantry regiments of the 1st Mar Div had been attacking throughout the last four days - the 1st, 7th, KMC and 5th Regiments in line from left to right. During this period the 1st Marines were attacking toward Division Objectives Baker and Dog.
Early on the 9th, as 2/1 was preparing to launch its attack, an intense artillery and mortar barrage fell upon the lines, followed by the assault of an estimated NKPA company. The Korean Reds were beaten back with heavy losses. And though the enemy fire continued, 2/1 jumped off on schedule, fighting for every inch of ground. Colonel Brown committed 1/1 on the left. It was an all-day fight for both battalions. After taking one ridge in the morning, that ridge was used as the springboard for an assault on the second objective. The weapons of the regimental Anti-Tank Company built up a base of fire that enabled this ridge to be secured by 1600 on the 9th. Average gains of 2,000 yards were made on the 9th, when the advance was delayed until the 7th ROK Div caught up along the left flank.
The pressure, which had been building up for several days reached a new high on 10 June when major elements of three NK regiments opposed the attacks launched by the 1st Marines. By 1100 the entire 2nd Battalion of the 1st Marines was committed. On the left the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines had to hold up until 1330, when the ROK's completed the occupation of the high ground dominating the route of advance.
For several hours it appeared that the Marines had met their match. A tenacious enemy defended log bunkers expertly, refusing to give ground until evicted by grenade and bayonet attacks. At every opportunity the Communists counterattacked. So effective was their resistance that at dusk the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Marines were still short of their objectives in spite of casualties draining the strength of both units.
By nightfall on 10 June, with the attacking battalions still held up, the atmosphere was tense in the regimental forward CP. Colonel Brown called for all the Air and Artillery support that could be mustered then went forward to see the finale. Colonel Brown later said: "It was a glorious spectacle, that last bayonet assault. In the last analysis 2/1 had to take its objective with the bayonet and hand grenades, crawling up the side of a mountain to get at the enemy. It was bloody work, the hardest fighting I have ever seen."
This was no small tribute, coming from a veteran officer whose combat service included three major wars, not to mention Nicaragua and China. It was nearly midnight before 2/1 took its final objective. 2nd Battalions casualties for the days attack were 14 KIA and 114 WIA exclusive of the slightly wounded, who were neither counted nor evacuated. The 1st Battalion, which seized Hill 802, overlooking the Soyang River, had won its all-day fight at a cost of 9 KIA and 97 WIA.
The 1st Marines had outfought and out-gamed a tough enemy. Never again after 10 June, was the NKPA resistance quite as determined. There was plenty of fighting remaining but the result was never again in doubt. *****************************************************************************************
On 10 June 1951 while assaulting Hill 802 with Able Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, Corporal Stanley Nowak Jr. was fatally wounded. Dad died of his wounds the following day, 11 June 1951 at "E" Co., 1st Medical Battalion, Field Hospital.
By the late afternoon of 14 June the 1st Marine Regiment was in position on the BROWN Line. This was the unofficial name for an extension of the KANSAS Line some 3,000 yards north. Colonel Brown had requested it when he realized that positions along the KANSAS Line were completely dominated by the next ridge to the north. The so-called BROWN Line was then officially designated the modified KANSAS Line.
By early afternoon on the 20th, the Division was in complete control of the modified KANSAS Line and construction of defenses began in earnest. Thus ended two months of continual hard fighting for the 1st Marine Division, beginning on 22 April with the great CCF offensive. Few and far between were the interludes of rest for troops, which saw both defensive and offensive action. After stopping the enemy's two drives, they launched a month-long counterstroke that had the enemy hard-pressed at times for survival. Only the ruthless sacrifice of NKPA troops in defensive operations enabled the Chinese Reds to recover from the blows dealt them in late May and early June.
The cost in Marine casualties had been high. Throughout the entire month the 1st Marines alone suffered 67 KIA and 1,044 WIA, most of them being reported during the first two weeks. This was a higher total than the regiment incurred during the Chosin Reservoir operation. Reflecting on the caliber of these men, their regimental commander (Col. Wilburt S. (Big Foot) Brown) had this to say:
"They used cover, maneuvered beautifully, used their own and supporting arms intelligently, were patient and not foolhardy; but when it came to the point where they had to rely on themselves with bayonet, hand grenade and sheer guts, they could and did do that too. I have long ago given up telling people what I saw them do on many occasions. Nobody believes me, nor would I believe anyone else telling the same story of other troops."
Colonel Brown, of course, paid this tribute to the troops of his regiment. But it is safe to say that the commanding officer of the 1st Marine Division would have felt that these sentiments applied equally to his own men. All the combat Marines of the 60-day battle had shown themselves to be worthy heirs of the traditions of Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir.
(During the first 10 days of June, 1st Marines personnel losses were higher than during any full month of the year so far with a higher total of battle casualties than that reported by the regiment in the Chosin Reservoir operation. But the enemy paid dearly. As in one instance, the 6th NK Division, opposing the 1st Marine Regiment, was punished so severely that the remnants eventually had to be withdrawn from the line and absorbed by another NK division. Total enemy losses for June in the zone of the 1st Mar Div were 2,672 counted and 2,525-estimated KIA, 5,559-estimated WIA and 760 prisoners.)
