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SSgt David Nowak
to remember
Marine Cpl Stanley Nowak, Jr. (Stats).
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Casualty Info
Home Town North Tonawanda
Last Address North Tonawanda, NY
Casualty Date Jun 11, 1951
Cause KIA-Died of Wounds
Reason Gun, Small Arms Fire
Location Korea, North
Conflict Korean War
Location of Interment Elmlawn Cemetery - Town of Tonawanda, New York
Wall/Plot Coordinates Evergreen Section D Lot 203 Northwest Grave
Korean War/CCF Spring Offensive (1951)/Battle of Kapyong
From Month/Year
April / 1951
To Month/Year
April / 1951
Description The Battle of Kapyong, also known as the Battle of Jiaping, was fought during the Korean War between United Nations (UN) forces—primarily Australian and Canadian—and the Chinese communist People's Volunteer Army. The fighting occurred during the Chinese Spring Offensive and saw the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade establish blocking positions in the Kapyong Valley, on a key route south to the capital, Seoul. The two forward battalions—3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) and 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI)—occupied positions astride the valley and hastily developed defences. As thousands of South Korean soldiers began to withdraw through the valley, the Chinese infiltrated the brigade position under the cover of darkness, and assaulted the Australians on Hill 504 during the evening and into the following day.
Although heavily outnumbered, the 27th Brigade held their positions into the afternoon before the Australians were finally withdrawn to positions in the rear of the brigade, with both sides having suffered heavy casualties. The Chinese then turned their attention to the Canadians on Hill 677, but during a fierce night battle they were unable to dislodge them. The fighting helped blunt the Chinese offensive and the actions of the Australians and Canadians at Kapyong were important in assisting to prevent a breakthrough on the United Nations Command central front, and ultimately the capture of Seoul. The two battalions bore the brunt of the assault and stopped an entire Chinese division during the hard fought defensive battle. The next day the Chinese withdrew back up the valley, in order to regroup. Today, the battle is regarded as one of the most famous actions fought by the Australian and Canadian armies in Korea.
My Participation in This Battle or Operation
From Month/Year
April / 1951
To Month/Year
April / 1951
Last Updated: Mar 16, 2020
Personal Memories
People You Remember Chain of Command:
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein):
MajGen Oliver P. Smith----------------------- (to 23 Feb 1951) BrigGen Louis B. (Chesty) Puller------------- (from 24 Feb 1951 to 4 March 1951) MajGen Oliver P. Smith----------------------- (from 5 March 1951 to 24 April 1951) MajGen Gerald C. Thomas---------------------- (from 25 April 1951)
BrigGen Edward A. Craig---------------------- (to 20 Jan 1951) MajGen Edward A. Craig----------------------- (from 21 Jan 1951 to 1 Feb 1951) BrigGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller------------- (from 2 Feb 1951 to 19 May 1951) BrigGen William J. Whaling------------------- (from 20 May 1951)
Commander, 1st Marine Regiment:
Col. Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller---------------- (to 24 Jan 1951) Col. Francis M. McAlister-------------------- (from 25 Jan 1951 to 19 May 1951) Col. Wilburt S. (Big Foot) Brown------------- (from 19 May 1951)
Executive Officer, 1st Marine Regiment:
LtCol Robert W. Rickert---------------------- (from 16 Jan 1951 to 11 Feb 1951) LtCol Alan Sutter---------------------------- (from 12 Feb 1951 to 30 May 1951) LtCol Donald M. Schmuck---------------------- (from 31 May 1951)
Commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment:
LtCol Donald M. Schmuck---------------------- (to 27 Feb 1951) LtCol Robley E. West------------------------- (from 28 Feb 1951)
Maj Robley E. West--------------------------- (to 27 Feb 1951) Maj David W. Bridges------------------------- (from 28 Feb 1951)
Commander, "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines:
Capt Robert H. Barrow------------------------ (to 30 Jan 1951) Capt Thomas J. Bohannon---------------------- (from 31 Jan 1951 to 30 June 1951) 1stLt Calvin R. Baker------------------------ (from 1 July 1951)
Memories To this point dad has participated in the following:
The "Pohang Guerrilla Hunt" in January and early February 1951. The "CCF Spring Offensive" in mid February 1951. "Operation Killer (1st Phase)" in mid to late February 1951. "Operation Killer (2nd Phase)" in early March 1951. "Operation Ripper" in early March to April 1951. "Operation Rugged" in early to mid April 1951. "Operation Dauntless" in mid to late April 1951. *****************************************************************************************
CCF first spring offensive took place from 22 April to 29 April 1951- Defensive operations were conducted during these major Communist offensives including the "Battle at Horseshoe Ridge". *****************************************************************************************
Since dads letter of 20 April the following events had taken place:
Operation Dauntless had just begun on 21 April with the 1st Marine Division driving toward Line QUANTICO when on the night of 22-23 April the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive began with the CCF 40th Army smashing through the 6th ROK Division which simply evaporated as its frightened soldiers fled the field of battle. Division orders suspended the attack phase of Operation Dauntless, and all units were directed to consolidate positions for defense.
It was on the left of the 1st Marine Division that the situation first became critical and measures to cope with the emergency were taken immediately. At 2230 on 22 April the 1st Marines who had been in reserve just north of Chunchon sent its 1st Battalion forward to contain a possible enemy threat to the Division left flank. "By midnight we were all on trucks and rolling on the roads north," wrote Second Lieutenant Joseph M. Reisler in a letter home. "Mile after mile, all the roads were covered with remnants of the ROK's who had fled. Thousands of them were straggling along the roads in confusion."
The heaviest fighting that took place during the night of 22-23 April was in the sector of 1/7 on the extreme left. The CCF 40th Army, hurled nearly 2,000 men at 1/7 and the thin battalion line bent under the sheer weight of numbers. But it did not break. It held through three hours of furious fighting, until the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines came up as reinforcements under the operational control of the 7th Marines. The newcomers took a position to the left of 1/7, so that the division flank was no longer completely "in the air."
At first light on 23 April the entire left flank of the 1st Marine Division lay exposed to the Chinese who had poured into the gap left by the disintegration of the 6th ROK Division.
As a first step toward setting up a defense in two directions, the 1st Marine Division was ordered to fall back to Line PENDLETON. By occupying this line, the 7th Marines could bend its left to the south in order to refuse that flank. Still farther to the south, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Marines were to take positions facing west. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division would face west as much as north. On the center and right the KMCs and 5th Marines would find it necessary to withdraw only about 1,000 yards to take up their new positions.
It was up to 1/1 to make the first move toward plugging the gap. At 0130 on the 23rd Captain John Coffey's Baker Company led the way. Moving north in the darkness along the Pukhan and then west along a tributary, the long line of vehicles made its first stop about 1,000 yards from the assigned position. 1st Battalion 1st Marines set up what was in effect an outpost to the southwest of 7th Marines. Baker Company was assigned to the left of Charlie Company holding the curve of a horseshoe-shaped ridge, with Able Company on the right. In support, along the comparatively level ground to the immediate rear, was Weapons Company. With 1/1 facing in three directions to block a CCF attack, 1/7 disengaged and withdrew.
The line of the 1st Marine Division on the afternoon of 23 April might have compared to a fishhook with the shank in the north and the barb curling around to the west and south. The three Marine battalions plugging the gap were not tied in physically. 3/7 was separated by an interval of 1,000 yards from 1/1, and the other two Marine battalions were 5,500 yards apart. But at least the 1st Marine Division had formed a new front under fire and awaited the night's attacks with confidence.
About 2000 hours on the 23rd bugle calls and green flares announced the presence of the Chinese to the west of 1/1 on Horseshoe Ridge and for four hours the attacks on Horseshoe Ridge were continuous. The regimental commanders arranged for artillery and tank support to cover the gap between 1/1 and 3/7. The attacks on 3/1 and 3/7 also continued throughout the night.
On the night of 23-24 April, the 1st Marines caught the brunt of the CCF 120th Division attack. In the north, the 1st Battalion,1st Marines, still under the operational control of 7th Marines, was dug in on Horseshoe Ridge. This was a key position, which, if lost, would split the 1st Marine Division wide open. The Marines were hit by artillery, mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire all through the night. The 1st and 7th Marines on the left flank were probed as Chinese forces searched for crew served weapons positions and weak spots in the line. In the fight for Horseshoe Ridge the men of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, managed to blunt an attack by the CCF 358th Regiment in savage hand-to-hand fighting.
Corps orders were received on the morning of 24 April for all units of the Division to pull back to Line KANSAS.
At 0930 on 24 April, the battered Marines were almost out of ammunition and their ranks had been severely thinned, but they were still standing tall. The Chinese plan to trap and annihilate the 1st Marine Division had been a costly failure.
The 1st Marine Regiment was reunited on the morning of the 24th when 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which had been hotly engaged while attached to the 7th Marines for the past few days, rejoined the regiment.
By the afternoon of 24 April the Marine sector resembled a human anthill. Columns of weary men toiled and strained in every direction. Chaotic as the scene may have seemed, however, everything had a purpose. The 1st Marine Division was in full control of all troop movement, despite the pressure of the last two nights.
Marine air reduced to a minimum the harassing efforts of the Chinese following the 1st Marines. As front line units disengaged and fell back, the length of the main line of resistance was contracted enough for the 7th Marines to be assigned a reserve roll.
Throughout the night of 24-25 April the enemy probed the 1st Marines lines, seeking in vain a weak spot where a penetration could be made.
Contrary to the usual rule, the Marines saw more action during the daylight hours on the 25th. A company-sized patrol from 1/1 became heavily engaged at 1350 and three tanks moved up in support. The fight lasted until 1645, when the enemy broke off action.
On 25 April 1st Marine Division was told to fall back to a section of the No Name Line located near Hongchon far to the south. That night of 25-26 April passed in comparative quiet for the Marines. A few CCF probing attacks and occasional mortar rounds were the extent of the enemy's activity.
The initial departure for the No Name Line began at 1130 on 26 April. The movement back to Chunchon was completed by noon, and the Marines took up defensive positions along the southern banks of the Soyang River on the afternoon of the 27th without incident. On 28 April, the second phase of the withdrawal began. It took three days to finish the move south due to serious transportation problems. Finally, on 30 April, the 5th and 7th Marines and the KMC Regiment settled in at the No Name Line while the 1st Marines went into reserve near Hongchon. *****************************************************************************************
Dad hurriedly wrote a short note on Tuesday, 1 May 1951 that included the following excerpts:
*****"Our outfit crossed the line a week ago. One of the outfits on line (6th ROK Div) was hit and they broke so our outfit was called to fill in the hole. Did we ever step into it. I've never been so scared in my life and I've never prayed so hard in my life. We set up on a hill and caught a little harassing fire. Then the next thing we knew we were surrounded. We got out thanks to the combat wise officers and the tanks that covered us."
*****"Then two days later we were assigned to take a hill in another sector. We got clobbered there too. I'm supposed to be in for a purple heart due to a small piece of shrapnel in the leg. It didn't slow me down any. Just a cut but enough to scare me."
*****"We walked for two days and a night on our withdrawal and if you want to see some beat-up men you should see us. Most of us have sore feet, all of us have sore backs, and we don't even know what's what over here. This is no place for any of us to be I don't care who says what. I just wish I was on my way home but I guess that's out for quite a while."
*****"I received a package a couple days ago. I didn't have time to enjoy the chow though because we moved out shortly after I got it so I passed it out to my buddies. They do that too often, have a package mail call and then move out." *****************************************************************************************
Since dads letter of 1 May the following events had taken place:
Along No Name Line the first days of May were so quiet that no Marine patrols made contact.
The 1st Marine Division was taken from IX Corps and assigned to X Corps.
The next two weeks were devoted primarily to improving defensive positions along No Name Line as the 1st Marine Division established an "outpost line of resistance" to maintain contact with the enemy, provide early warning of a major attack, and delay the enemy advance as long as possible. *****************************************************************************************
Dads letter of Thursday, 3 May 1951 included the following excerpts:
*****"They finally put us aboard trucks and hauled us to a rear area so now maybe I'll be able to write a few more lines. As I told you in my last note our outfit ran into a trap. They called us out of reserve loaded us in trucks and away we went across the parallel. We're credited with saving the whole Division in that we held off a Chinese Army long enough for all the other outfits to get out. From what we hear our battalion is supposed to be written up for a citation for the tremendous job we did. What happened is that we got surrounded and had to fight and I mean fight our way out. We had two tanks bringing up our rear for which all of us are very grateful. They slowed them up so that we could take off."
*****"Two days later our company stepped into trouble again. We were to take a hill which was right along a road we wanted kept clear. We had to walk up and down hill until we were fagged. Then we started into the assault. That's where we stepped into trouble. The gooks were on the hill in force and they had mortars with them. We didn't take the hill and we had quite a few casualties. When the outfit crossed the line before the trap we had eighteen men in the section. Now we have nine. The others were all wounded and hospitalized. A couple more of us including myself were hit and cut. I got hit between the knee and ankle. It was just enough to draw a little blood. When we got back to our area the Corpsman looked it over and put a bandage on it. He says that all of us have been written up for a purple heart."
*****"We've been hearing quite a few rumors again. One is that our battalion is not supposed to be put into action again without word from Division Headquarters. Another is that the Division as a unit is supposed to be relieved the end of May and sent stateside. Who knows what will happen. We'll believe it when we see it. The reserve rotation system is going to work slower than the combat rotation. At the rate things are going I'll be here for at least another six months."
*****"Talk says that we're moving to Wonju or in that area in the next day or two. We were moved fifteen to twenty miles by truck yesterday, which made us feel very good. Now we expect to move back farther. It seems all the ground we gained on the push we're losing again. As they say the only way to end the deal is politically and the only way to start it is for everybody in the states to start writing to D.C., then once all the wheels start getting the word they'll start working something out."
*****"I'm taking as good care of myself as I can considering the circumstances. I know that nothings stopping me here. I've got to come home because there's a lot waiting for me." *****************************************************************************************
