MGySgt Anthony Huntington - Military Timeline

MCAS Yuma’s mission is to provide aviation ranges, support facilities and services that enable its tenants, other Marine Corps commands, visiting military and interagency forces to enhance their missi

MCAS Yuma’s mission is to provide aviation ranges, support facilities and services that enable its tenants, other Marine Corps commands, visiting military and interagency forces to enhance their mission capability and combat readiness.

 MCAS Yuma is the Marine Corps' premier aviation training base. With access to 2.8 million acres of bombing and aviation training ranges and superb flying weather, MCAS Yuma supports 80 percent of the Corps' air-to-ground aviation training. Each year, the air station hosts numerous units and aircraft from U.S. and NATO forces.

On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were c

On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were compounded by an expanded and intrusive mandate; greatly diminished military capabilities; more aggressive Somali opposition; uncertain support from the United States; differences within the coalition; and uncertainty by the Security Council, the Secretariat, and others.

Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.

UNOSOM II became a badly flawed peace, with military forces which came to be seen by parties to the local conflict as co-belligerents rather than impartial peacekeepers. In Somalia, peace enforcement was only an implicit element of the original U.N. mandate, which focused on peace-building (disarmament, political reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation). However, after a confrontation between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the U.N. led to the killing of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers, the Security Council made the operation's peace-enforcement mission explicit. It was executed by both U.N. forces and a 1,000-man U.S. rapid-reaction force under U.S. operational control, with the authority of the United Nations. There was also a 3,000-man U.S. logistics unit under U.N. operational control. A lack of decisiveness, cohesion, and command and control by the undermanned U.N. mission (half the strength of UNITAF, with some 20,000 personnel) and a series of armed clashes between U.S./U.N. forces and the SNA created a virtual state of war and undermined the effectiveness of the U.N. operation. Confusion over the dual-command relationship between the U.S. and UNOSOM II was another complicating factor, with a U.S. general officer serving as both the U.N. deputy forces commander and commander of U.S. forces.

A clash on 3-4 October 1993 left eighteen U.S. personnel dead and seventy-eight wounded, along with over one thousand Somali casualties. Public outcry in the United States contributed to the decision to withdraw U.S. forces in March 1994. That, coupled with continued internal strife and SNA hostility toward the U.N., led to a total U.N. withdrawal in March 1995. This was executed skillfully, without casualties, in a carefully planned combined U.S.-U.N. action.

The killing of Army Rangers in Somalia provoked a resurgence of a debate that began before the Gulf War: when is it appropriate to use military force -- and, more to the point, can you justify using the military in regions in which Americans either do not see their interests at stake or are willing to help only so long as the costs remain very low? Somalia drove home the reality that the Gulf War experience could not serve as a model for other situations where the diplomatic lineup was more confused, the stakes less clear, and the difference between good guys and bad guys less simple to discern. It was also an early indication of the coming debate on the international community's role in internal strife.

Operation Quick Draw is a very poorly attested operation in Somalia that took place at some point during 1994. Although low-level US military operations continued during 1994, the association of these

Operation Quick Draw is a very poorly attested operation in Somalia that took place at some point during 1994. Although low-level US military operations continued during 1994, the association of these operations with this operation name is not immediately apparent.

In 1994 the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable (MEU/SOC) deployed to Mogadishu, Somalia, where 11th MEU/SOC participated in Operation Quick Draw. The Americans had finally left Somalia in March 1994, and Somalia was designated as a "quiet" area, even though the reality was very different. The US Embassy in Mogadishu had been evacuated and closed indefinitely in January 1991.

After the withdrawal of US forces on 25 March 1994, the United States maintained a liaison office in Mogadishu in an attempt to further the process of political reconciliation in Somalia. Security for this office was provided by a Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team (FAST) platoon.

Fighting began 23 June 1994. A detachment of approximately 50 Marines provided security at the US Liaison Office in mogadishu. About 30 US officials were assigned to the Liaison Office. Around 200 other Americans were working in Somalia as contractors, NGO workers, or as employees of the UN.

The absence of progress toward reconciliation and a continued decline in security led to the relocation of the US Liaison Office from Mogadishu. As conditions in Mogadishu deteriorated, the liaison office relocated to Nairobi and the FAST platoon redeployed to Mombasa, Kenya, on 15 September 1994, with FAST redeploying to home station three days later. US diplomats based in Kenya made periodic visits to Somalia after that date.

The UNOSOM goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high level of troops were proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify. The presence of UNOSOM II troops was having a limited impact on the peace process and on security in the face of continuing inter-clan fighting and banditry. In November 1994, in the absence of political reconciliation and a deteriorating security situation, the UNSC ordered a total withdrawal of UNOSOM from Somalia by March 31, 1995. At year's end close to 10,000 peacekeepers from Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe remained on the ground.

MCAS Yuma’s mission is to provide aviation ranges, support facilities and services that enable its tenants, other Marine Corps commands, visiting military and interagency forces to enhance their missi

MCAS Yuma’s mission is to provide aviation ranges, support facilities and services that enable its tenants, other Marine Corps commands, visiting military and interagency forces to enhance their mission capability and combat readiness.

 MCAS Yuma is the Marine Corps' premier aviation training base. With access to 2.8 million acres of bombing and aviation training ranges and superb flying weather, MCAS Yuma supports 80 percent of the Corps' air-to-ground aviation training. Each year, the air station hosts numerous units and aircraft from U.S. and NATO forces.