Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious ser... The Navy Distinguished Service Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. MoreHide
CIA Facts Click Here Richard Nixon, 4th Crisis, Latin American tour, cold war propaganda. Votes were lagging for Eisenhower and Dick. The CIA arranged this tour, now easily staged for "hard on Communists" line. Nixon briefed by CIA; told by Allen Dulles of intelligence estimates of anti-American demonstration. Col. Vernon Walters, CIA, Nixon's interpreter. Gen. Robert Cushman, CIA, gave rundowns of reactions to riots. E. Howard Hunt in Latin America, attached to CIA station, 1956-60. His cover was advisor to Defense Dept. in Latin America.
Other Memories
A Smoking Gun
The telephone call that set in motion the events that would eventually end my intelligence career came as I was preparing for bed, Saturday, June 17, 1972.
"Dick, are you still up?"
"Yes, Howard." It was a familiar voice. At this time of night, Howard Osborn, the CIA chief of security, did not need to identify himself.
"I've just learned that the District police have picked up five men in a break-in at the Democratic Party National Headquarters at the Watergate."
"Yes." Osborn was not given to idle chatter. He obviously had a brick to drop.
"Four Cubans and Jim McCord."
"McCord? Retired out of your shop?"
Osborn drew a deep breath. "Two years ago."
I remembered James McCord as a serious, straitlaced staff security and counter-audio specialist. He had retired with a good record. I was baffled. "What about the Cubans-Miami or Havana?"
"Miami," Osborn said quickly. "Florida . . . exiles, they've been in this country for some time now."
"Do we know them?"
"As of now, I can't say."
"Get hold of the operations people, first thing. Have them get on to Miami. Check every record here and in Miami."
"Okay, first thing tomorrow."
"Is that all of it?"
"No, not half," Osborn said heavily. "Howard Hunt also seems to be involved in some way."
It was my turn for a deep breath. I knew that Hunt, a former CIA officer, was also retired. Marine Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, my deputy, had mentioned a year or so previously that he'd been told Hunt was employed at the White House as a security consultant, and involved with the Special Investigations group responsible for looking into security leaks. This was the outfit that became known as the "Plumbers." While with CIA, Hunt had worked in Latin America, Mexico, and Europe. Before his retirement, he served with the task force responsible for the Bay of Pigs operation.
"What in hell were they doing in the Democratic Party offices?"
Osborn paused, almost as if he couldn't quite believe what he was about to say. "I'm not sure what they were doing, but as of now it looks as if they might have been trying to tap the phones and bug the place."
It was a moment before I could say, "Is there any indication that we could be involved in this?"
"None whatsoever," Osborn replied.
"Stay on top of it," I said, "and see me before the staff meeting Monday morning." Despite occasional taunts from congressional members and the press, CIA was a highly disciplined organization. Before Admiral Rufus Taylor gave up his assignment as CIA deputy director to return to the Navy, he remarked that the Agency was "the most disciplined organization" in which he had ever served, "including the U.S. Navy." The notion that the Agency or anyone in it would undertake a caper as bizarre as the break-in and attempted bugging of a national political party was quite simply preposterous.
Still sitting on the edge of the bed, I decided to telephone Patrick Gray, who was acting FBI director while waiting for Senate approval. He'd not had time to gain much knowledge of the internal White House workings, and I wanted to be sure he was in the picture. It took a few more minutes than usual for the ever-efficient White House switchboard to locate Gray in a Los Angeles hotel room.
Gray said that he had been informed of the break-in, but had no details. I filled him in as much as I could and assured him that, despite the background of the apparent perpetrators, CIA had nothing to do with the break-in. I added that I couldn't imagine what anyone could hope to gain by breaking into those offices. Gray listened politely but had little to say.
"You might want to look into the relationship of John Ehrlichman, the President's domestic policy advisor, with McCord and Hunt," I said. "He'll be familiar with the circumstances in which Howard Hunt was hired for work at the White House and with McCord's job on the Committee to Re-elect the President as well." Gray remained unresponsive. After repeating my assurance that CIA was not involved with any of the break-in group, I put the phone down.
When I first heard that Hunt was working as a security consultant at the White House, it struck me as peculiar that no one there had called to verify with me or the Agency his career and reputation. As a matter of common practice, someone would have checked with us-officially or quietly-before hiring any former employee for a sensitive White House job.
The first time the Agency heard from Hunt in his new job was in July 1971 when Ehrlichman telephoned my deputy, General Cushman, to tell him that Hunt would be coming to see him for assistance. Hunt arrived a few days later and asked the general to supply some operational gear-a disguise wig, a voice-altering device, and false personal-identification documents. Cushman did so, and requested that the gear be returned after use.
The decision to supply the equipment might be interpreted as falling within the deputy director of Central Intelligence's area of responsibility, but it was a very close call. As Bob later remarked, he wished he had at the outset left the baby at my doorstep. By the time the break-in scandal was in full flower, it was too late for any Monday-morning quarterbacking on my part.
The gear was not returned, and Hunt's requests for operational material continued to escalate until he asked that his former secretary be detached from her job in Paris to work in his White House office. At this point General Cushman informed me of Hunt's various demands. The petition for a secretary was, of course, refused, as were subsequent requests for telephone answering services, cover for notional offices, and such. Now, after almost a year of silence, we thought we had heard the last of Hunt.
By the time of my Monday-morning staff meeting, the Washington media were aboil with the news of the break-in. It was confirmed that McCord had been arrested at the scene, but neither the Washington Post nor the New York Times mentioned Hunt. It was all too clear that although the problem apparently rested with the White House, the arrest of a retired Agency officer, the possible involvement of another, and the ties the Cuban-Americans had to the Agency would have an explosive impact on the press.
After a general discussion, I went around the conference table asking each of the senior officers if he knew of any possible CIA involvement in the Watergate break-in. None did, and it seemed obvious to us all that the most CIA could do was quickly to establish rock-solid proof that despite its previous relations with the burglars, the Agency had nothing to do with the break-in, and then to distance itself from the incident.
My instructions in effect were, "Keep cool, do not get lured into any speculation, don't volunteer any information, and just stay the hell away from the whole damned mess." It was not long before the notion of "distancing" became a lame joke. Our exhaustive records search confirmed that the Cuban-Americans arrested at the Watergate had formerly been listed as Agency contacts in the Miami area, and that one was still on a $100-a-month retainer. Press reports that Hunt was deeply involved spread quickly across the front pages and TV screens. A check signed by Hunt was found in the hotel room used as a makeshift observation point, and notebooks with his name and telephone number were taken from the burglars' pockets. Hunt's bizarre involvement was a major embarrassment.
In most circumstances it is difficult enough to prove a negative; it is all but out of the question to do so in secret operations. We were soon to learn that it is impossible to prove anything to an inflamed national press corps already in full cry.
Although we repeatedly denied the accusations, what seemed to be daily leaks to the press kept pointing at CIA. This was not the first time the Agency had been pilloried by self-serving Washington sources. But these incidents had been short-lived, and our denials were accepted by other agencies and in time by well-informed reporters. In this instance, we got no support from the administration or Congress, and the leaks continued relentlessly.
CIA cooperation with the FBI was correct, but seemed unavailing. One question arose repeatedly: were the leaks coming from the FBI? In J. Edgar Hoover's day this would not have been the case. But what about the new Bureau administration? Was discipline as strong as it had been? We did not know.
Today, after the hours of sworn testimony-the FBI file is said to contain 16,000 pages-publication of thousands of pages of memoirs, and the raw evidence exposed in the White House tapes, it seems incredible that at the time the probability that the leaks were coming directly from the White House did not occur to me or to anyone on my staff. Later, when evidence began to emerge showing clearly that the most senior members of the White House staff were involved in this featherbrained crime, none of us realized that from the moment the news of the arrests reached the White House, President Nixon was personally manipulating the administration's effort to contain the scandal.
The day after the first newsbreak, I went to the Capitol for routine testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As I entered the hearing room, the committee chairman, Senator William Fulbright, took me to one side and in a low voice asked, "Have you read about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee?"
"Oh, yes," I said. "Yes, indeed."
"What on earth could they have been trying to find?"
"I've no idea," I answered, shaking my head. "It's as nutty an episode as I can recall." I waited a moment before saying, "There's one thing I can tell you, Mr. Chairman."
Senator Fulbright moved a bit closer.
"Despite all the allegations, we didn't have a damned thing to do with it."
"It doesn't read like one of your operations," he said. "But you understand I felt I had to ask." He smiled and took my arm as we moved to take our places. This was the only time the break-in was mentioned at the hearing.
Press reports soon indicated that Hunt and McCord and their confederates were attempting to photograph files, bug the telephones, and arrange electronic monitoring of the Democratic Committee. I could not understand why anyone would think there was anything to be gained from such a half-baked and technically difficult operation that would possibly warrant the risks involved.
On June 23, General Vernon "Dick" Walters (who had replaced General Cushman), with seven weeks on the job, and I were summoned to the White House for a meeting with John Ehrlichman. This was the only time I can recall having been directed to bring my deputy with me to a White House meeting. Because the tone was that of a command rather than an invitation, I suggested that General Walters and I have lunch in a downtown hotel and arrive at the meeting together. It did not take a great gift of imagination to guess what the meeting would be about, and it seemed unfair to risk letting any of the White House heavy hitters catch Dick Walters alone. He agreed with alacrity.
To my knowledge, General Walters's military history is unique. Not only did he rise from private to retire as a lieutenant general, but his entire career as an officer was spent in intelligence-related assignments. Dick Walters was heavyset, with a genial manner, a hearty laugh, and the ability to speak rapidly and eloquently in actual sentences-something of a rarity in the bureaucracy. He was a gifted raconteur, and apparently never forgot a good story. When he repeated an anecdote, it was always in exactly the same manner and in the identical words. I often wondered if this trick of memory contributed to his extraordinary linguistic ability. Walters was fluent in a number of languages, and I suspect could make his way in a great many more. As an interpreter, he had the admirable knack of conveying not only the words he was translating, but also the sense of the message. When Walters came into the Agency, Averell Harriman, former ambassador to the USSR and governor of New York, told me that although their political views were quite different, he had found Walters thoroughly reliable in carrying out instructions.
At the time of Ehrlichman's summons, the Agency's line into the White House was through Henry Kissinger, who was then Nixon's national security advisor. In Kissinger's absence, we worked with his deputy, Alexander Haig, and had had very little contact with any other White House staffers.
A graduate student might write a dissertation on the geography and decor of the rabbit warren of White House offices, and how the frequent reallocation of space and redecoration mark the changing fortunes of the staff. Proximity to the President's offices is the ultimate goal of every ambitious-that is to say every-White House aide. Close on the heels of proximity as a mark of favor come the size and aspect of the office space. The bigger the better; a view of anything not a wall or parking lot is next best. But if a visitor has not been around for a couple of months, and if a crisis has intervened, everything is likely to have changed. Office space will have been reallocated, and temporary partitions shifted.
We parked in the visitors' lot beside the West Wing and made our way through a basement entrance to an elevator the size of a telephone booth. On the second floor, we were escorted to what looked like an anteroom, but turned out to be John Ehrlichman's conference chamber.
I am tall; even in those days, Dick Walters had a certain bulk; and Ehrlichman's mere presence took up some space. We had scarcely wedged ourselves onto the straight-backed chairs around the conference table when H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, the White House chief of staff, marched into the room and took over the meeting.
After a few general observations about the serious nature of the allegations involving important people in the President's election campaign, he turned to me and asked very formally what connection CIA might have with the Watergate break-in.
"The CIA had no connection whatever with Watergate," I said.
Haldeman ignored this, and went on to say that the FBI investigation of certain Mexican leads might jeopardize Agency activity there. His tone stiffened as he added, "It has been decided to have General Walters go to see Pat Gray and tell him that further investigation in Mexico could lead to the exposure of certain Agency assets and channels for handling money."
"Just yesterday," I said, "I told Pat Gray again that the Agency was not involved and that none of the suspects had worked for us in the past two years." It seemed unlikely that Haldeman could possibly know more about CIA equities and funding channels than I did, but I decided to wait and hear what else he had in mind.
Criteria
The Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.
Description This campaign was from 1 June 1967 to 29 January 1968.The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions,This campaign was from 1 June 1967 to 29 January 1968.The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam swung back toward Saigon to conduct another clearing operation, MANHATTAN. This took peace in the Long Nguyen base area just north of the previously cleared "Iron Triangle."
South Vietnamese Armed Forces became more active and capable under U.S. advisors. During the year the Vietnamese Special Forces assumed responsibility for several Special Forces camps and for the CIDG companies manning them. In each case all of the U.S. advisors withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese in full command.
With an increased delegation of responsibility to them, the South Vietnamese conducted major operations during 1967, and, in spite of VC attempts to avoid battle, achieved a number of contacts.
Despite the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of 1967 of another enemy build-up, particularly in areas close to Laos and Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh. Fortunately Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat, the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh.... More
Criteria The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. ... The Legion of Merit is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States without degree for exceptionally outstanding conduct in the performance of meritorious service to the United States. The performance must merit recognition by individuals in a key position which was performed in a clearly exceptional manner. MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not suff... The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not sufficiently to justify the award of the Presidential Unit Citation). It may also be awarded to a unit that distinguishes itself by extremely meritorious service not involving combat (but in support of military operations), which renders that unit outstanding when compared to other units performing similar service. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout... The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of South Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. MoreHide
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide
Description This campaign was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of politicalThis campaign was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of political, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.
North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.
During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.
The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLEBORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.
By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.
On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam-in the so-called "Iron Triangle" about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.
In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the "Iron Triangle", were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew.
Memories I belive that it was either Gen Abrams or Gen Westmorland (the prick) who told Marine Gen Cushman t I belive that it was either Gen Abrams or Gen Westmorland (the prick) who told Marine Gen Cushman to get his lazy Maries off their a$$es and commence fighting the enemy. What he was refering to was the CAP Untis "coddling" the local people and not conducting Search & Destroy operations, Hammar & Anvel operations and taking the fight to the enemy rather than waiting to be attacked. ... More
Criteria The Vietnam Distinguished Service Order was a military decoration of South Vietnam which was awarded throughout the years of the Vietnam War. The decoration was bestowed for meritorious or heroic deed... The Vietnam Distinguished Service Order was a military decoration of South Vietnam which was awarded throughout the years of the Vietnam War. The decoration was bestowed for meritorious or heroic deeds related to war time operations and was awarded for both combat and non-combat service. There were two classes of the Vietnam Distinguished Service Order, the first class being for officers and the second class for enlisted personnel. The first class of the order was differentiated by a blossom device centered on the medal and ribbon. The Vietnam Distinguished Service Order was also provided to foreign militaries, and in the United States military the decoration was considered the equivalent of the Legion of Merit. For foreign officers, the 2nd class of the order was also provided to officers. MoreHide
Criteria Awarded by the Vietnam Government to military personnel who have accomplished deeds of valor or displayed heroic conduct while fighting the enemy and have been cited individually at the regiment, brig... Awarded by the Vietnam Government to military personnel who have accomplished deeds of valor or displayed heroic conduct while fighting the enemy and have been cited individually at the regiment, brigade, division, corps, or armed forces level. MoreHide
Criteria The Order of National Security Merit is one of the Republic of Korea's (South Korea) Orders of Merit. It is conferred on individuals who have rendered distinguished service to national security, and i... The Order of National Security Merit is one of the Republic of Korea's (South Korea) Orders of Merit. It is conferred on individuals who have rendered distinguished service to national security, and is primarily a military award. MoreHide
As early as April 1959, Richard Nixon sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower saying: ?Castro is a communist and the revolutionary government has to be overthrown.?
In 1964, Nixon said: ?I have been the strongest and most persistent advocate for setting up and supporting the CIA program of covert action against Cuba. Phil Bonsal called Richard Nixon the father of the operation. Brigadier General Robert Cushman, Nixon?s military aide and later deputy director of the CIA, described Nixon in 1960, as ?the Bay of Pigs project?s action officer of the White House.? As H.R. Haldeman, who was Nixon?s top aide when Nixon became president, wrote, ?Nixon knew more about the genesis of the Bay of Pigs than almost anyone.?
With these credentials and the danger still represented by Cuba to the United States, why the Cuban exile community would not believe the promises made by the presidential candidate when in Miami, in the summer of 1959, he told to thousands of cheering Cubans that his administration would take care of the bearded dictator? Unfortunately, they soon would realize how wrong they were to believe those promises.
Other Memories
Richard Nixon, 4th Crisis, Latin American tour, cold war propaganda. Votes were lagging for Eisenhower and Dick. The CIA arranged this tour, now easily staged for "hard on Communists" line. Nixon briefed by CIA; told by Allen Dulles of intelligence estimates of anti-American demonstration. Col. Vernon Walters, CIA, Nixon's interpreter. Gen. Robert Cushman, CIA, gave rundowns of reactions to riots. E. Howard Hunt in Latin America, attached to CIA station, 1956-60. His cover was advisor to Defense Dept. in Latin America.
Description The Battle of Iwo Jima (19 February – 26 March 1945), or Operation Detachment, was a major battle in which the United States Armed Forces fought for and captured the island of Iwo Jima from the JapaneThe Battle of Iwo Jima (19 February – 26 March 1945), or Operation Detachment, was a major battle in which the United States Armed Forces fought for and captured the island of Iwo Jima from the Japanese Empire. The American invasion had the goal of capturing the entire island, including its three airfields (including South Field and Central Field), to provide a staging area for attacks on the Japanese main islands. This five-week battle comprised some of the fiercest and bloodiest fighting of the War in the Pacific of World War II.
After the heavy losses incurred in the battle, the strategic value of the island became controversial. It was useless to the U.S. Army as a staging base and useless to the U.S. Navy as a fleet base. However, Navy SEABEES rebuilt the landing strips, which were used as emergency landing strips for USAAF B-29s.
The Imperial Japanese Army positions on the island were heavily fortified, with a dense network of bunkers, hidden artillery positions, and 18 km (11 mi) of underground tunnels. The Americans on the ground were supported by extensive naval artillery and complete air supremacy over Iwo Jima from the beginning of the battle by U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviators.
Iwo Jima was the only battle by the U.S. Marine Corps in which the Japanese combat deaths were thrice those of the Americans throughout the battle. Of the 22,000 Japanese soldiers on Iwo Jima at the beginning of the battle, only 216 were taken prisoner, some of whom were captured because they had been knocked unconscious or otherwise disabled. The majority of the remainder were killed in action, although it has been estimated that as many as 3,000 continued to resist within the various cave systems for many days afterwards, eventually succumbing to their injuries or surrendering weeks later.
Despite the bloody fighting and severe casualties on both sides, the Japanese defeat was assured from the start. Overwhelming American superiority in arms and numbers as well as complete control of air power — coupled with the impossibility of Japanese retreat or reinforcement — permitted no plausible circumstance in which the Americans could have lost the battle.
The battle was immortalized by Joe Rosenthal's photograph of the raising of the U.S. flag on top of the 166 m (545 ft) Mount Suribachi by five U.S. Marines and one U.S. Navy battlefield Hospital Corpsman. The photograph records the second flag-raising on the mountain, both of which took place on the fifth day of the 35-day battle. Rosenthal's photograph promptly became an indelible icon — of that battle, of that war in the Pacific, and of the Marine Corps itself — and has been widely reproduced.... More
Criteria The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievem... The Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal may be awarded to service members who, while serving in any capacity with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement or meritorious service (but not of sufficient nature to warrant a higher decoration). MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine ... The American Defense Service Medal was awarded for service in the Armed Forces between September 8, 1939, and December 7, 1941. Army members had to serve 12 months to be eligible, but Navy and Marine Corps members were eligible based on any length of service. MoreHide
Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Criteria The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following condi... The Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal was awarded for for qualifying service within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946, under any of the following conditions: On permanent assignment within the Asiatic-Pacific Theater; or, For service in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service in active combat in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat. MoreHide
Description Guam, ringed by reefs, cliffs, and heavy surf, presents a formidable challenge for an attacker. But despite the obstacles, on 21 July, the Americans landed on both sides of the Orote peninsula on the Guam, ringed by reefs, cliffs, and heavy surf, presents a formidable challenge for an attacker. But despite the obstacles, on 21 July, the Americans landed on both sides of the Orote peninsula on the western side of Guam, planning to cut off the airfield. The 3rd Marine Division landed near Agana to the north of Orote at 08:28, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed near Agat to the south. Japanese artillery sank 20 LVTs, and inflicted heavy casualties on the Americans, especially on the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, but by 09:00 men and tanks were ashore at both beaches. The 77th Infantry Division had a more difficult landing. Lacking amphibious vehicles, they had to wade ashore from the edge of the reef where they were dropped by their landing craft. The men stationed in the two beachheads were pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, making initial progress inland quite slow.
US Marines move inland.
By nightfall, the Americans had established beachheads about 6,600 feet (2,000 m) deep.[1] Japanese counterattacks were made throughout the first few days of the battle, mostly at night, using infiltration tactics. Several times, they penetrated the American defenses and were driven back with heavy loss of men and equipment. Lieutenant General Takeshi Takashina was killed on 28 July, and Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata took over the command of the defenders.
Supply was very difficult[2] for the Americans in the first days of the battle. Landing ships could not come closer than the reef, several hundred yards from the beach, and amphibious vehicles were scarce. However, the two beachheads were joined up on 25 July, and the Orote airfield and Apra harbor were captured by 30 July.
The counterattacks against the American beachheads, as well as the fierce fighting, had exhausted the Japanese. At the start of August, they were running out of food and ammunition and had only a handful of tanks left. Obata withdrew his troops from the south of Guam, planning to make a stand in the mountainous central and northern part of the island. But with resupply and reinforcement impossible because of American control of the sea and air around Guam, he could hope to do no more than delay the inevitable defeat for a few days.
Rain and thick jungle made conditions difficult for the Americans, but after an engagement at Mount Barrigada from 2-4 August, the Japanese line collapsed; the rest of the battle was a pursuit to the north. As in other battles of the Pacific War, the Japanese refused to surrender, and almost all were killed. On 10 August, after three weeks of combat, organized Japanese resistance ended, and Guam was declared secure. The next day, Obata committed ritual suicide.... More
Description After New Georgia, the next major operation was an invasion of the island of Bougainville, which was approached by landings at Mono and Stirling in the Treasury Islands on October 25-27, 1943. A MarinAfter New Georgia, the next major operation was an invasion of the island of Bougainville, which was approached by landings at Mono and Stirling in the Treasury Islands on October 25-27, 1943. A Marine division landed on the west coast of Bougainville at Empress Augusta Bay on November 1, 1943. The Marines were followed within the month by an Army division and replaced in the next month by another Army division.
It was late November before the beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay was secure. This beachhead was all that was needed, and no attempt was made to capture the entire island. Allied planes neutralized enemy airfields in the northern part of the island, and the Allied command made use of its naval and air superiority to contain the Japanese garrison on Bougainville and cut its supply line to Rabaul by occupying the Green Islands (February 14, 1944).
Despite these measures, the Japanese maintained pressure against the beachhead, mounting an especially heavy but unsuccessful counterattack as late as March 1944. Success at Bougainville isolated all Japanese forces left in the Solomons. The Japanese sustained comparatively heavy air and naval losses during the campaign, which further crippled the Japanese Combined Fleet and had a vital effect on the balance of naval power in the Central Pacific.... More
Criteria The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding ac... The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States in a combat theater, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service not involving aerial flight. MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Criteria The China Service Medal was awarded to Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel who: Served ashore in China or who were attached to any of the vessels that operated in support of the operations in... The China Service Medal was awarded to Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel who: Served ashore in China or who were attached to any of the vessels that operated in support of the operations in China between July 7, 1937, and September 7, 1939; or who Served ashore in China or were attached to any of the vessels that operated in support of operations in China between September 2, 1945 and April 1, 1957. Military services performed in the Asiatic-Pacific area between September 2, 1945 and March 2, 1946 could be credited for eligibility for the China Service Medal unless the individual was eligible for the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal based on service performed prior to September 2, 1945. MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
CIA Facts Click Here
Richard Nixon, 4th Crisis, Latin American tour, cold war propaganda. Votes were lagging for Eisenhower and Dick. The CIA arranged this tour, now easily staged for "hard on Communists" line. Nixon briefed by CIA; told by Allen Dulles of intelligence estimates of anti-American demonstration. Col. Vernon Walters, CIA, Nixon's interpreter. Gen. Robert Cushman, CIA, gave rundowns of reactions to riots. E. Howard Hunt in Latin America, attached to CIA station, 1956-60. His cover was advisor to Defense Dept. in Latin America.
A Smoking Gun
The telephone call that set in motion the events that would eventually end my intelligence career came as I was preparing for bed, Saturday, June 17, 1972.
"Dick, are you still up?"
"Yes, Howard." It was a familiar voice. At this time of night, Howard Osborn, the CIA chief of security, did not need to identify himself.
"I've just learned that the District police have picked up five men in a break-in at the Democratic Party National Headquarters at the Watergate."
"Yes." Osborn was not given to idle chatter. He obviously had a brick to drop.
"Four Cubans and Jim McCord."
"McCord? Retired out of your shop?"
Osborn drew a deep breath. "Two years ago."
I remembered James McCord as a serious, straitlaced staff security and counter-audio specialist. He had retired with a good record. I was baffled. "What about the Cubans-Miami or Havana?"
"Miami," Osborn said quickly. "Florida . . . exiles, they've been in this country for some time now."
"Do we know them?"
"As of now, I can't say."
"Get hold of the operations people, first thing. Have them get on to Miami. Check every record here and in Miami."
"Okay, first thing tomorrow."
"Is that all of it?"
"No, not half," Osborn said heavily. "Howard Hunt also seems to be involved in some way."
It was my turn for a deep breath. I knew that Hunt, a former CIA officer, was also retired. Marine Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, my deputy, had mentioned a year or so previously that he'd been told Hunt was employed at the White House as a security consultant, and involved with the Special Investigations group responsible for looking into security leaks. This was the outfit that became known as the "Plumbers." While with CIA, Hunt had worked in Latin America, Mexico, and Europe. Before his retirement, he served with the task force responsible for the Bay of Pigs operation.
"What in hell were they doing in the Democratic Party offices?"
Osborn paused, almost as if he couldn't quite believe what he was about to say. "I'm not sure what they were doing, but as of now it looks as if they might have been trying to tap the phones and bug the place."
It was a moment before I could say, "Is there any indication that we could be involved in this?"
"None whatsoever," Osborn replied.
"Stay on top of it," I said, "and see me before the staff meeting Monday morning." Despite occasional taunts from congressional members and the press, CIA was a highly disciplined organization. Before Admiral Rufus Taylor gave up his assignment as CIA deputy director to return to the Navy, he remarked that the Agency was "the most disciplined organization" in which he had ever served, "including the U.S. Navy." The notion that the Agency or anyone in it would undertake a caper as bizarre as the break-in and attempted bugging of a national political party was quite simply preposterous.
Still sitting on the edge of the bed, I decided to telephone Patrick Gray, who was acting FBI director while waiting for Senate approval. He'd not had time to gain much knowledge of the internal White House workings, and I wanted to be sure he was in the picture. It took a few more minutes than usual for the ever-efficient White House switchboard to locate Gray in a Los Angeles hotel room.
Gray said that he had been informed of the break-in, but had no details. I filled him in as much as I could and assured him that, despite the background of the apparent perpetrators, CIA had nothing to do with the break-in. I added that I couldn't imagine what anyone could hope to gain by breaking into those offices. Gray listened politely but had little to say.
"You might want to look into the relationship of John Ehrlichman, the President's domestic policy advisor, with McCord and Hunt," I said. "He'll be familiar with the circumstances in which Howard Hunt was hired for work at the White House and with McCord's job on the Committee to Re-elect the President as well." Gray remained unresponsive. After repeating my assurance that CIA was not involved with any of the break-in group, I put the phone down.
When I first heard that Hunt was working as a security consultant at the White House, it struck me as peculiar that no one there had called to verify with me or the Agency his career and reputation. As a matter of common practice, someone would have checked with us-officially or quietly-before hiring any former employee for a sensitive White House job.
The first time the Agency heard from Hunt in his new job was in July 1971 when Ehrlichman telephoned my deputy, General Cushman, to tell him that Hunt would be coming to see him for assistance. Hunt arrived a few days later and asked the general to supply some operational gear-a disguise wig, a voice-altering device, and false personal-identification documents. Cushman did so, and requested that the gear be returned after use.
The decision to supply the equipment might be interpreted as falling within the deputy director of Central Intelligence's area of responsibility, but it was a very close call. As Bob later remarked, he wished he had at the outset left the baby at my doorstep. By the time the break-in scandal was in full flower, it was too late for any Monday-morning quarterbacking on my part.
The gear was not returned, and Hunt's requests for operational material continued to escalate until he asked that his former secretary be detached from her job in Paris to work in his White House office. At this point General Cushman informed me of Hunt's various demands. The petition for a secretary was, of course, refused, as were subsequent requests for telephone answering services, cover for notional offices, and such. Now, after almost a year of silence, we thought we had heard the last of Hunt.
By the time of my Monday-morning staff meeting, the Washington media were aboil with the news of the break-in. It was confirmed that McCord had been arrested at the scene, but neither the Washington Post nor the New York Times mentioned Hunt. It was all too clear that although the problem apparently rested with the White House, the arrest of a retired Agency officer, the possible involvement of another, and the ties the Cuban-Americans had to the Agency would have an explosive impact on the press.
After a general discussion, I went around the conference table asking each of the senior officers if he knew of any possible CIA involvement in the Watergate break-in. None did, and it seemed obvious to us all that the most CIA could do was quickly to establish rock-solid proof that despite its previous relations with the burglars, the Agency had nothing to do with the break-in, and then to distance itself from the incident.
My instructions in effect were, "Keep cool, do not get lured into any speculation, don't volunteer any information, and just stay the hell away from the whole damned mess." It was not long before the notion of "distancing" became a lame joke. Our exhaustive records search confirmed that the Cuban-Americans arrested at the Watergate had formerly been listed as Agency contacts in the Miami area, and that one was still on a $100-a-month retainer. Press reports that Hunt was deeply involved spread quickly across the front pages and TV screens. A check signed by Hunt was found in the hotel room used as a makeshift observation point, and notebooks with his name and telephone number were taken from the burglars' pockets. Hunt's bizarre involvement was a major embarrassment.
In most circumstances it is difficult enough to prove a negative; it is all but out of the question to do so in secret operations. We were soon to learn that it is impossible to prove anything to an inflamed national press corps already in full cry.
Although we repeatedly denied the accusations, what seemed to be daily leaks to the press kept pointing at CIA. This was not the first time the Agency had been pilloried by self-serving Washington sources. But these incidents had been short-lived, and our denials were accepted by other agencies and in time by well-informed reporters. In this instance, we got no support from the administration or Congress, and the leaks continued relentlessly.
CIA cooperation with the FBI was correct, but seemed unavailing. One question arose repeatedly: were the leaks coming from the FBI? In J. Edgar Hoover's day this would not have been the case. But what about the new Bureau administration? Was discipline as strong as it had been? We did not know.
Today, after the hours of sworn testimony-the FBI file is said to contain 16,000 pages-publication of thousands of pages of memoirs, and the raw evidence exposed in the White House tapes, it seems incredible that at the time the probability that the leaks were coming directly from the White House did not occur to me or to anyone on my staff. Later, when evidence began to emerge showing clearly that the most senior members of the White House staff were involved in this featherbrained crime, none of us realized that from the moment the news of the arrests reached the White House, President Nixon was personally manipulating the administration's effort to contain the scandal.
The day after the first newsbreak, I went to the Capitol for routine testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As I entered the hearing room, the committee chairman, Senator William Fulbright, took me to one side and in a low voice asked, "Have you read about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee?"
"Oh, yes," I said. "Yes, indeed."
"What on earth could they have been trying to find?"
"I've no idea," I answered, shaking my head. "It's as nutty an episode as I can recall." I waited a moment before saying, "There's one thing I can tell you, Mr. Chairman."
Senator Fulbright moved a bit closer.
"Despite all the allegations, we didn't have a damned thing to do with it."
"It doesn't read like one of your operations," he said. "But you understand I felt I had to ask." He smiled and took my arm as we moved to take our places. This was the only time the break-in was mentioned at the hearing.
Press reports soon indicated that Hunt and McCord and their confederates were attempting to photograph files, bug the telephones, and arrange electronic monitoring of the Democratic Committee. I could not understand why anyone would think there was anything to be gained from such a half-baked and technically difficult operation that would possibly warrant the risks involved.
On June 23, General Vernon "Dick" Walters (who had replaced General Cushman), with seven weeks on the job, and I were summoned to the White House for a meeting with John Ehrlichman. This was the only time I can recall having been directed to bring my deputy with me to a White House meeting. Because the tone was that of a command rather than an invitation, I suggested that General Walters and I have lunch in a downtown hotel and arrive at the meeting together. It did not take a great gift of imagination to guess what the meeting would be about, and it seemed unfair to risk letting any of the White House heavy hitters catch Dick Walters alone. He agreed with alacrity.
To my knowledge, General Walters's military history is unique. Not only did he rise from private to retire as a lieutenant general, but his entire career as an officer was spent in intelligence-related assignments. Dick Walters was heavyset, with a genial manner, a hearty laugh, and the ability to speak rapidly and eloquently in actual sentences-something of a rarity in the bureaucracy. He was a gifted raconteur, and apparently never forgot a good story. When he repeated an anecdote, it was always in exactly the same manner and in the identical words. I often wondered if this trick of memory contributed to his extraordinary linguistic ability. Walters was fluent in a number of languages, and I suspect could make his way in a great many more. As an interpreter, he had the admirable knack of conveying not only the words he was translating, but also the sense of the message. When Walters came into the Agency, Averell Harriman, former ambassador to the USSR and governor of New York, told me that although their political views were quite different, he had found Walters thoroughly reliable in carrying out instructions.
At the time of Ehrlichman's summons, the Agency's line into the White House was through Henry Kissinger, who was then Nixon's national security advisor. In Kissinger's absence, we worked with his deputy, Alexander Haig, and had had very little contact with any other White House staffers.
A graduate student might write a dissertation on the geography and decor of the rabbit warren of White House offices, and how the frequent reallocation of space and redecoration mark the changing fortunes of the staff. Proximity to the President's offices is the ultimate goal of every ambitious-that is to say every-White House aide. Close on the heels of proximity as a mark of favor come the size and aspect of the office space. The bigger the better; a view of anything not a wall or parking lot is next best. But if a visitor has not been around for a couple of months, and if a crisis has intervened, everything is likely to have changed. Office space will have been reallocated, and temporary partitions shifted.
We parked in the visitors' lot beside the West Wing and made our way through a basement entrance to an elevator the size of a telephone booth. On the second floor, we were escorted to what looked like an anteroom, but turned out to be John Ehrlichman's conference chamber.
I am tall; even in those days, Dick Walters had a certain bulk; and Ehrlichman's mere presence took up some space. We had scarcely wedged ourselves onto the straight-backed chairs around the conference table when H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, the White House chief of staff, marched into the room and took over the meeting.
After a few general observations about the serious nature of the allegations involving important people in the President's election campaign, he turned to me and asked very formally what connection CIA might have with the Watergate break-in.
"The CIA had no connection whatever with Watergate," I said.
Haldeman ignored this, and went on to say that the FBI investigation of certain Mexican leads might jeopardize Agency activity there. His tone stiffened as he added, "It has been decided to have General Walters go to see Pat Gray and tell him that further investigation in Mexico could lead to the exposure of certain Agency assets and channels for handling money."
"Just yesterday," I said, "I told Pat Gray again that the Agency was not involved and that none of the suspects had worked for us in the past two years." It seemed unlikely that Haldeman could possibly know more about CIA equities and funding channels than I did, but I decided to wait and hear what else he had in mind.