Criteria The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. ... The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. Marine Corps while on active duty for a specified period of time. MoreHide
Criteria The Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal may be awarded to members of the Armed Forces in the grades of lieutenant commander (or major) and below. It is awarded for meritorious service or achieveme... The Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal may be awarded to members of the Armed Forces in the grades of lieutenant commander (or major) and below. It is awarded for meritorious service or achievement in either combat or noncombat based on sustained performance or specific achievement of a superlative nature but which does not warrant a Navy Commendation Medal or higher. It may not be awarded for service involving participation in aerial flight after January 1, 1969. MoreHide
Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. (World War II and Korea War service rate one ribbon for each period only) MoreHide
Description
Battle at Liberty Bridge, Phu Loc 6, March 19, 1969.
Criteria The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not suff... The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not sufficiently to justify the award of the Presidential Unit Citation). It may also be awarded to a unit that distinguishes itself by extremely meritorious service not involving combat (but in support of military operations), which renders that unit outstanding when compared to other units performing similar service. MoreHide
Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout... The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of South Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. MoreHide
Criteria
The unit citation of the Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Medal was awarded certain units by the Vietnamese government for meritorious service during the period 1 March 1961 to 28 March 1974.
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide
Description Operation Dewey Canyon (January 22 – March 18, 1969) was the last major offensive by the United States Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. It took place from January 22 through March 18, 1969 and invOperation Dewey Canyon (January 22 – March 18, 1969) was the last major offensive by the United States Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. It took place from January 22 through March 18, 1969 and involved a sweep of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)-dominated A Shau Valley by the 9th Marine Regiment reinforced by elements of the 3rd Marine Regiment; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines and ARVN 2nd Regiment.
The 56 days of combat were a tactical success but did not stop the overall flow of North Vietnamese men and matériel into South Vietnam. The 9th Marine Regiment and attached units were awarded the Army Presidential Unit Citation for their actions in Operation Dewey Canyon.
Prior to the launching of the operation, U.S. Marine infantry units in the northern I Corps region had been tied to their combat bases along the South Vietnam border as part of the McNamara Line. This "line" was a combination of infantry units and ground sensors devised to stop North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
When Lt. Gen. Raymond G. Davis took command of the 3rd Marine Division, he ordered Marine units to move out of their combat bases and engage the enemy. He had noted that the manning of the bases and the defensive posture they developed was contrary to the aggressive style of fighting that Marines favor. In early 1969, intelligence reports indicated there had been a large NVA build-up in the A Shau Valley. The A Shau was just 6 miles (10 km) east of the Laotian border and some 21 miles (34 km) long. Based on this intelligence, Col. Robert H. Barrow's 9th Marine Regiment was ordered to depart Vandegrift Combat Base some 50 miles (80 km) to the east and sweep west to deny use of the valley to the enemy.
Operation Dewey Canyon was divided into three parts: 1) the movement and positioning of air assets, 2) the movement of the 9th Marines south out of their combat base, and 3) the sweep of the A Shau valley. As the 9th Marines moved towards the A Shau valley, they established numerous firebases along the way which would provide them their artillery support once they entered the valley and guard their main supply route. All of these bases needed to be resupplied by helicopter because of their distance from the main combat bases and because resupply via ground was very difficult during monsoon season.
The Marines encountered stiff resistance throughout the conduct of the operation, most of which was fought under triple canopy jungle and within range of NVA artillery based in Laos. Marine casualties included 130 killed in action and 932 wounded.
In return, the USMC reported 1,617 killed enemies, the discovery of 500 tons of arms and munitions, and denial of the valley as an NVA staging area for the duration of the operation. They claimed the operation as an overall success.
The raids into Laos were the third and final phase of Operation Dewey Canyon. Although all three battalions were involved with the operation, only elements of the 2nd Battalion actually participated in the raid into Laos. This was because each battalion was given an area of operation south of Fire Support Bases Cunningham and Erskine with 2nd Battalion 9th Marines area of operations taking them all the way to the South Vietnamese-Laotian border.
The third phase commenced on February 11, 1969, and by February 20, Lieutenant Colonel Fox's 2nd Battalion had both Echo and Hotel Company on the Laotian border. From their position, Hotel Company could see enemy convoys traveling along Route 922. Hotel Commanding Officer David F. Winecoff later reported in U.S. Marines In Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969 (1988):[1]
"The company, of course, was talking about let's get down on the road and do some ambushing. I don't think they really thought that they were going to let us go over into Laos ... I knew if the military had their way we'd be over there in Laos and the company was all up for it.... With the Paris Peace Talks going on, I wasn't sure what route was going to be taken."
Major General Davis, 3rd Marine Division Commanding General, had sent requests up the chain of command to get permission to enter Laos. This led to Operation Prairie Fire, conducted by a Special Operations Group (SOG) to conduct reconnaissance into Laos. On February 20, Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell forwarded Davis' request to have a limited raid into Base Area 611 up to General Abrams for his approval. Things in the field were moving along much faster, and on the night of February 20, Captain Winecoff continued to observe heavy truck traffic and called in a fire mission.
On February 21, Captain Winecoff received a message from Colonel Barrow, 9th Marines Commanding Officer, to set up an ambush along route 922. The Captain's men needed rest, and he requested a postponement but was denied by Colonel Barrow. The Captain utilized his 1st and 2nd Platoons, and at 16:10, 1st Platoon moved out and made its way to 2nd Platoon's position. At 18:30, Winecoff briefed his men on the ambush. After dark they moved out towards route 922, about 900 meters away. By 01:00, Captain Winecoff and Hotel Company were in place and setting up the ambush. Within minutes of getting into position they started hearing trucks coming down the road and continued to observe as 40 minutes later, a lone truck and one NVA soldier also walked through the kill zone. Winecoff had not wanted the ambush sprung on one truck or soldier, realizing that eventually a bigger target would come down the road. At 02:30, the lights of eight trucks appeared, and as three trucks came into the kill zone the column of vehicles stopped. Not wanting to give away the ambush or their position Winecoff, set off the claymores and the ambush. The Marines poured small arms and automatic weapons fire on the three vehicles. As reported in U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standown, 1969, the forward observer alerted the artillery, and rounds bracketed the company position.[citation needed]
After minutes of fire, Captain Winecoff had his men moved forward, ensuring that everything was destroyed. The company proceeded to move out to the rally point 600 meters away and waited till daylight. Later, it rejoined with 3rd Platoon who had not been involved with the ambush because of the heavy patrols it had been involved with in the previous days. H Company was resupplied and the men rested. They had destroyed three trucks and killed eight NVA soldiers. Hotel did not suffer any casualties.
A Marine is helped to an evacuation point by two buddies after he was wounded during an enemy probe of his unit's position during Operation Dewey Canyon. Marines killed 12 North Vietnamese in the fighting northwest of the A Shau Valley.
After Action Reports of the patrol were met with positive reviews, General Abrams formally approved the operation. The success of the operation was more valuable than just the destruction of the enemy, because it allowed Colonel Barrow to request that continued operations in Laos be approved. His reasoning for continued operations was the presence of the enemy in the area was a threat to his troops. Barrow noted, "I put a final comment on my message, which said, quote, "Put another way, my forces should not be here if ground interdiction of Route 922 not authorized." The message finally reached General Abrams via General Stilwell, who had adopted the Colonel's recommendation. General Abrams approved further action on February 24 but restricted discussions of the Laotian operation. The following days brought Hotel casualties not encountered in their previous incursion into Laos.
Hotel Company was ordered to go down route 922 on February 24. Morale was low because the Marines were tired after several days of patrolling. Additionally, they did not want to leave the resupplies that included 60 mm mortar ammunition, C-rations, and beer which they consumed, as quoted by Captain Winecoff in U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standown, 1969.
Hotel Company was to move into Laos followed by E and F Companies and drive eastward on the road, forcing the enemy into the hands of the 1st and 3d Battalions. After a six hour night march, Hotel set up a hasty ambush; at 11:00 on February 24, six NVA soldiers walked into their kill zone, of which four were killed.
On February 25, Hotel Company continued to move eastward again engaging NVA, resulting in the capture of one 122 mm field gun, two 40mm antiaircraft guns and the killing of eight NVA soldiers. Hotel Company suffered nine casualties during this fire firght, two dead and seven wounded. Later that day a company patrol was ambushed by an estimated 15 NVA troops who were dug in fortified bunkers and fighting holes. The patrol was reinforced and was able to fight its way through, capturing a second 122 mm gun and killing two.
Casualties were mounting for Hotel Company: three killed and five wounded. Corporal William D. Morgan was one of the men killed in action when he made a daring dash and directed fire away from Private First Class Robinson Santiago and Private Robert Ballou. Robert Ballou was wounded multiple times that day and Robinson Santiago was killed-in-action. Corporal William D. Morgan was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by President Richard M. Nixon for this action.
Hotel Company, flanked by Echo and Foxtrot Companies, continued their drive east, which was rapid and did not allow for the companies to conduct thorough searches. Advancing much slower would have garnered much more equipment. However, 2nd battalion did capture 20 tons of foodstuffs and ammunition, while killing 48 NVA soldiers.
The three companies were within 1,000 meters of the South Vietnamese border by March 1 and were flown by helicopter to Vandergrift Combat Base on March 3, officially ending operations in Laos. 2nd battalion sustained eight killed and 33 wounded during the operation. For the record, all of the dead were listed as being killed in Quảng Trị Province, South Vietnam and for obvious political reasons no references were made about being in Laos.
Outcome and legacy
First Lt. Archie "Joe" Biggers, Platoon Leader 9th Regiment, U.S. Marine Corps, who led the platoon that captured the two 122 mm guns, was wounded in action during the operation and was awarded a Silver Star.
Lt.Gen. Raymond Davis’ son, Lieutenant Miles Davis, was wounded in action during the operation.
1Lt Lieutenant Wesley Fox was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions as commanding officer of Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.
Cpl. William D. Morgan was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions as squad leader with Hotel Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. Cpl. Morgan was killed in action on 25 February 1969.
LCpl. Thomas Noonan, Jr. was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions as a fire team leader with Hotel Company, 2nd Battalion 9th Marines. LCpl. Noonan was killed in action on 5 February 1969.
PFC Alfred M. Wilson was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions as a rifleman with Mike Company, 3rd Battalion 9th Marines. PFC Wilson was killed in action on 3 March 1969.
In 1971, the operation to clear Highway 9 from Dong Ha to the Laotian border was named Operation Dewey Canyon II in an attempt to misdirect enemy attention towards the A Shau Valley instead of Tchepone, the actual objective of the combined campaign.
In April 1971, the Vietnam Veterans Against the War organized a protest rally in Washington, D.C. and named it Operation Dewey Canyon III.... More
Description This campaign was from 23 February to 8 June 1969. From Tet 1969 through the month of June, the enemy again tried to sustain an offensive. His inability to do so can be largely attributed to aggressiThis campaign was from 23 February to 8 June 1969. From Tet 1969 through the month of June, the enemy again tried to sustain an offensive. His inability to do so can be largely attributed to aggressive allied ground operations. Between 23 February and 8 June 1969, a total of 70 significant named ground operations were terminated resulting in heavy enemy loss of life and materiel. The main operations concluded during this period were:
(1). The 3d Marine Division's Operation KENTUCKY aimed at preventing enemy infiltration through the Demilitarized Zone in central Quang Tri Province. Throughout the early part of January 1969, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces continued to avoid major contacts with Free World Forces. Their continual movement to avoid friendly forces or to search for food and supplies contributed to a decrease in the enemy-initiated ground attacks and attacks-by-fire in Quang Tri Province.
(2). Operation NEVADA EAG:E, initiated on 17 May 1968 in Thua Thien Province, continued in 1969 as the U.S. 101st Airborne Division continued to defeat enemy personnel, and capture rice caches, material, and installations within its large area of operations, where it undertook offensive sweeps along Route 547 and around Song Bo.
(3). Two battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment were engaged in Operation SCOTLAND II. Initiated on 15 April 1968, this multi-battalion search and clear operation was centered in and around Khe Sanh.
(4). The IV Corps Tactical Zone Dry Weather Campaign began on 1 December 1968 in support of the overall mission to prevent Viet Cong units from interfering with pacification efforts. This operation, "Speedy Express," interdicted lines of enemy communication and denied him the use of base areas. In 1969 the 1st Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division continued the operation in Dinh Tuong Province, using its highly successful night ambush tactics while the 2d Brigade continued its mission with the Mobile Riverine Force. Although engagements in Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS were typically small, the 9th Infantry Division fought several sizeable engagements with impressive results.
On 23 February U.S. Navy units and installations at Da Nang, Tan An, Ben Luc, Go Dan Ha, and Tra Cu came under numerous and widespread attacks associated with a new enemy offensive, but since many units in these areas were poised to meet these attacks they caused only minimal damage. April saw the heaviest cumulative enemy activity in the barrier interdiction camapign to date.... More
Description 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division at Liberty Bridge. On March 19, 1969, a battalion-size enemy force stormed the Marine outpost. Their goal was to first overrun, then annihilate the fledgling base. 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division at Liberty Bridge. On March 19, 1969, a battalion-size enemy force stormed the Marine outpost. Their goal was to first overrun, then annihilate the fledgling base. “Earlier that night, they hit the compound just across the river,” Mitchell explained. “…That woke me up. …While this was going on, they came in from the other way, cut the wire and lay down in this ravine. They were already in the compound. When things quieted back down, they hit. …They hit us shortly after midnight. I was in my hooch. Just as I heard the AK-47s, somebody ran in and hollered, ‘We’re getting hit! They’re inside the wire!’ I grabbed my stuff—ammo, gun and helmet, ran out and there’s just tracers bouncing off everything. …They were all over the place. They had at least three Russian-made flamethrowers in there and had already torched a couple of hooches. They made it to within about a hundred yards of mine.”
Mitchell joined the battle. Jumbled, close-in exchanges ensued, often deteriorating into hand-to-hand combat. “The group I was with went out to the berm and laid down cover fire. We had an M-60 with us. The 105s were shooting beehive rounds—thousands of little steel darts, right into them. Then all the choppers started coming in. We killed 70 some inside the compound alone, not to mention all those outside the wire. I know because the next morning I helped gather them up.”
Twelve Americans were killed that night with dozens more wounded. One loss in particular remains with Mitchell yet today. “When I got up that morning, I could barely walk. I was having these bad back spasms. I went to see our corpsman—a tall, skinny kid from Tennessee we called Doc Ray. …Everybody liked him. …He took me into his hooch, gave me some muscle relaxers and had me lay down on a stretcher. I stayed up there all day, maybe eight hours just talking with him. …At five or six o’clock, I went back down to my hooch, maybe a hundred yards away. About dark that night, he not only came down to check on me, but also brought me three pair of socks. We talked for about 10 more minutes and then he left. That’s the last I ever saw of him. He was killed that night.”
For his heroic actions at Liberty Bridge, above and beyond the call of duty, Corpsman David R. Ray earned the Medal of Honor.... More
People You Remember
Stationed as Radio Relay Team for 2/26 BLT H&S Comm with J.J. Kaye and a new guy PVT Black
Memories Battle started with incoming rockets overhead in the middle of the night. Secured the Radio Relay TBattle started with incoming rockets overhead in the middle of the night. Secured the Radio Relay Team and gave assignments. The NVA Sappers had flame throwers and had put our tents on fire and had put my M-83 on fire. The Sappers had overrun the compound and were everywhere. A First Seargent came into the bunker and said we should go put out the fire in my jeep. Upon going out the door a rocket landed about 15 ft in front of us and blew us into the air. I got a small piece of schrapnel in my left leg but didnt know it. He was OK. Being blown into the air is when and how I hurt my ankle. We took care of the Sapper with the flame thrower as he stood on top of our ammo bunker. The jeep was already to far gone. After that I went to help take the mess hall back. Chi-Coms laid unexploded everwhere. It was after day break when all settled down that JJ noticed my leg was bleeding so I shucked my pants and pulled out a smalll piece of schrapnel and tossed it. Then went to help load our 13 KIAs, the Sappers lost 78 or 79. Doc David Ray recieved MOH for his actions in that battle.... More
Best Friends
Scott Caldwell, Dwight Sailor, F.E. Gage, Gy. Clausen, Lt. Baird, Skip Rankin, Walter harden, Ralph "Moose" Ellis, Jason J. Kaye, Fred Lindner, Tom Hanley, John "Willie" Williams, Ken Root, Rick Rains, and many more
Best Moment
After SSgt Higgins gave me the nickname Fat Rat, my work stool disappeared. I ranted and raved about my stool being stolen. Then late one afternoon along with a warm beer, my guys gave me my work stool back with a Fat Rat painted on it. Thanks "Sweet Mary" and Sailor!
Worst Moment
Liberty Bridge, March 19, 1969
Chain of Command
Gunny Clausen - Comm Chief Lt. Baird - Comm Officer
Other Memories
Thanksgiving at Red Beach 1968, Mom had sent me several care packages with Thanksgiving Diner to prepare in them. Ham, sweet potatoes, corn and more. Surprising how fast we can "appropriate" cooking utensils, etc.
Description This campaign was from 2 November 1968 to 22 February 1969. In November 1968 the South Vietnam government with American support began a concentrated effort to expand security in the countryside. This This campaign was from 2 November 1968 to 22 February 1969. In November 1968 the South Vietnam government with American support began a concentrated effort to expand security in the countryside. This project was known as the "Accelerated Pacification Campaign."
This period covers the election of President Richard M. Nixon and a change of policy brought about by his administration after January 1969 when he announced a coming end to US combat in Southeast Asia and a simultaneous strengthening of South Vietnam's ability to defend itself. Formal truce negotiations began in Paris on January 25, 1969. The period can be characterized as marking time in preparation for an about face. Forty-seven ground combat operations were recorded during this period, the following being the most important:
(1). Operation NAPOLEON in the Dong Ha area initiated previously (1967) by Marine units, terminated on 9 December 1968.
(2). Operation WHEELER WALLOWA by 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) in north-central Quan Tin Province. This ended on 11 November.
(3). Operation MACARTHUR initiated by 4th U.S. Infantry Division in II Corps tactical zone terminated on 31 January 1969.
(4). Operation COCHISE GREEN conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province.
(5). Operation TOAN THANG II consisted of ground operations throughout III CTZ. This was a multi-division operation involving allied forces.
(6). Operation SEA LORDS was a coast and riverine operation. On 6 December Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT was started to disrupt enemy infiltration of materials from the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia. Air operations continued to be important with over 60,000 sorties flown.... More
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Description The Battle of Khe Sanh was conducted in northwestern Quảng Trị Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), between 21 January and 9 July 1968 during the Vietnam War. The belligerent parties were elThe Battle of Khe Sanh was conducted in northwestern Quảng Trị Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), between 21 January and 9 July 1968 during the Vietnam War. The belligerent parties were elements of the United States (U.S.) III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), 1st Cavalry Division, the U.S. Seventh Air Force, minor elements of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) against two to three division-size elements of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).
The American command in Saigon initially believed that combat operations around the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the summer of 1967 were just part of a series of minor North Vietnamese offensives in the border regions. That appraisal was altered when it was discovered that NVA was moving major forces into the area during the fall and winter. A build-up of Marine forces took place and actions around Khe Sanh commenced when the Marine base was isolated. During a series of desperate actions that lasted 5 months and 18 days, Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) and the hilltop outposts around it were under constant North Vietnamese ground, artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks.
During the battle, a massive aerial bombardment campaign (Operation Niagara) was launched by the U.S. Air Force to support the Marine base. Over 100,000 tons of bombs (equivalent in destructive force to five Hiroshima-size atomic bombs) were dropped until mid April by aircraft of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines onto the surrounding areas of Khe Sanh. This was roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily–five tons for every one of the 20,000 NVA soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. In addition, 158,000 large-caliber shells were delivered on the hills surrounding the base. This expenditure of aerial munitions dwarfs the amount of munitions delivered by artillery, which totals eight shells per NVA soldier believed to have been on the battlefield.
This campaign used the latest technological advances in order to locate NVA forces for targeting. The logistical effort to support KSCB, once it was isolated overland, demanded the implementation of other tactical innovations in order to keep the Marines supplied.
In March 1968, an overland relief expedition (Operation Pegasus) was launched by a combined Marine–Army/South Vietnamese task force that eventually broke through to the Marines at Khe Sanh. American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted the new American commander in Vietnam, Gen. Creighton Abrams, decided to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. Historians have observed that the Battle of Khe Sanh may have successfully distracted American and GVN attention from the buildup of Viet Cong forces in the south prior to the early 1968 Tet Offensive. Even at the height of the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland maintained that the true intentions of the offensive was to distract forces from Khe Sanh.... More
Description Jan 21 – Nov 23 1968. Operation Lancaster II was a U.S. Marine Corps security operation that took place in northern Quảng Trị Province from 20 January to 23 November 1968 during the Vietnam War. The oJan 21 – Nov 23 1968. Operation Lancaster II was a U.S. Marine Corps security operation that took place in northern Quảng Trị Province from 20 January to 23 November 1968 during the Vietnam War. The operation followed on directly from Operation Lancaster. The Marines patrolled aggressively. The response of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was mixed; Prolonged lulls alternated with fierce fighting. Broadly the Marines felt that they were successful in maintaining the supply.
1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines search-and-clear operation to safeguard Route 9 between Cam Lo and Ca Lu.... More
1st Marine Division operation centered on the Khe Sanh area of Quang Tri Province.
On April 15 1968, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. The Army 1st Air Cavalry Division, with over 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy controlled areas. The fighting was heavy. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968. Operation Scotland II lasted until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 additional Marines. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official body count
VC/NVA KIA's: 3,304 KIAs, 64 POWs
US KIA's: 435 KIA, 2,396 WIA... More
Description The 2nd battalion of the 26th Marines helicoptered into LZ Margo near the DMZ on a standard search and destroy mission. Contact was light over the next three days as units swept the area.
On Sept. 16The 2nd battalion of the 26th Marines helicoptered into LZ Margo near the DMZ on a standard search and destroy mission. Contact was light over the next three days as units swept the area.
On Sept. 16, 1968, the battalion received an order from higher headquarters to withdraw into the small LZ where they had arrived, because a big B-52 air strike was planned in the area. Marines were worried because they were tightly grouped and the ground was rock hard so they couldn't dig in.
They knew the NVA kept them under observation and were a perfect target for a mortar barrage. A short time later, hundreds of mortar rounds tore into the tightly packed Marines, killing 30 and wounding nearly 200 until the NVA ran out of ammo.... More
Description Nov 20 – Dec 9; 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 7Nov 20 – Dec 9; 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 26th Marines and ARVN 51st Regiment cordon and search operations in support of Accelerated Pacification Campaign south of Da Nang. During the operation 847 VC and 352 US killed.
The major battles of Operation Meade River would take place in the two-square-mile center of Dodge City. The operation was a County Fair mission, utilizing a cordon technique developed by the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. When the Marines mission shifted from defensive to offensive, it became necessary for platoons, companies or battalions to completely and simultaneously cordon off an area and search and clear inward, literally foot by foot, because the Viet Cong (VC) had infested hamlets west and south of the vital Da Nang airstrip. The technique was refined and used often by the 9th Marine Regiment, which operated off Hill 55 in early 1966. Operation Meade River would be the largest mission using the County Fair technique during the Vietnam War.
Intelligence had determined that remaining elements of the decimated VC Doc Lap Battalion, which had operated in the area against the Marines for more than three years, along with other understrength VC units and several hundred NVA (North Vietnamese Army) troops, were again massing in the area. Going northward through Dodge City were two major enemy infiltration routes used by the NVA to supply and assist the VC in the rocket belt, whose main objective had been, and continued to be, the destruction of the Da Nang airstrip. Intelligence also had information that an all-out attack against strategically located Hill 55, the 1st Marine Division headquarters on Hill 327, or the airstrip itself was imminent with this many enemy soldiers staging rapidly in the area.
On November 20, 1968, at 4 a.m., Operation Meade River commenced. The monsoons for this part of Vietnam had started in October. Temperatures were dropping, and the Marines often found the nights cold. The conditions were miserable, and the rains, averaging one inch daily, added to the misery.
The entire helicopter assets of the 1st Marine Air Wing were required to support the operation. Colonel Robert G. Lauffer, commanding officer of the 1st Marines, was designated Meade River commander. He personally supervised elements of seven Marine battalionsthe 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1), the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 5th Marines (2/5 and 3/5), the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines (3/26), and battalion landing teams (BLTs) from the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines (2/26), and 1st and 2nd battalions, 7th Marines (1/7 and 2/7). The Marines surrounded an area 24,000 meters in circumference, with fire teams no more than 15 meters apart. This initial movement of 5,000 infantrymen into a tightly established cordon would be the key to the successful completion of Meade River. Twenty-eight hundred of the 5,000 troops were helilifted; approximately 2,200 more were moved by truck and on foot from Hill 55 and other company and battalion areas from along the north bank of the La Tho River, Liberty Road (Ambush Row), Highway 1 and Route 4. With the troops in place by 8:25 a.m., the cordon snapped shut.
Just prior to landing within the cordons boundary, a Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight carrying one of the last elements arriving, a unit from the 3/5, was hit by enemy fire; it crashed and burned, resulting in six killed and nine wounded. In addition, as a truck convoy was moving toward the cordon, a command-detonated mine exploded halfway down the line of vehicles, destroying a 5-ton truck and wounding 19 men. Immediately, prepositioned dump trucks unloaded gravel and matting. The large hole was filled, the damaged truck removed, and the remainder of the convoy continued on into the area with little delay.
At 4:30 p.m. on the 20th, a recon team was inserted 1,000 meters south of the La Tho from the base on Hill 55 and immediately west of the cordon near Liberty Road to look for fleeing bands of the enemy. The team soon encountered enemy troops and opened fire, killing eight NVA and capturing an 82mm mortar from the enemy soldiers trying to escape the cordon. The recon team, with one wounded, was extracted back to Hill 55.
Later, it was learned from captured VC that news of the impending cordon and search operation had been received the previous day, November 19. The VC who reported this information were apprehended when villagers throughout the cordon were screened and sent to the refugee relocation center at the base of Hill 55. Fortunately, few enemy knew in advance of the cordon because of a breakdown in communication between the VC political arm and the Communist military unitsa mistake that cost the enemy many lives.
The Marines were fortunate to have trapped many more of the enemy than anticipated. Found in the objective area was a sizable, well-organized and well-trained enemy force that chose to fight, utilizing solid fortifications throughout the area of operations.
Numerous small elements of larger NVA and VC units located in the cordon, however, tried to slip away. As they found in several unsuccessful attempts, trying to escape was a deadly option, due to the tight, well-coordinated cordon. Throughout the operation, the enemy soldiers tried to conceal themselves underground until sweeping forces had passed. This tactic, however, was seldom successful, since the Marines would probe foot by foot. Throughout the area of the cordon, dozens of freshly dug enemy ö:spider holesö: were found. To help find these holes, the Marines used several thousand metal probes manufactured by the Force Logistics Command (FLC). They were issued to all battalions, and usually one man in the fire team had a probe. The probes were one-half-inch round and 36 to 48 inches long, with a T-shaped handle and forged points. These probes facilitated in the discovery of numerous holes and caches.
Many NVA and VC would try to break the cordon along the northern boundary of the operation area and slip into the La Tho River, which ran along the base of Hill 55. The sniper platoon based at Hill 55 and expert riflemen from numerous combat and support unitsfield artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, supply and engineersmaintained firing positions day and night. These marksmen operated mostly from various sites that reached down to the river. Besides using Starlight scopes, the FLC sent two searchlight teams to the hill, which aided the American snipers. The searchlights would scan the river and the riverbanks, leaving little escape area for panicky enemy forces. The snipers kept a number of the enemy from escaping.
The first major contact of Operation Meade River was made on November 20 by the 2/7. While the troops were moving eastward and attempting to close in on the railroad berm, they encountered a sizable enemy force in well-deployed and fortified positions in the bend of a small river in an area known as ö:the Horseshoe.ö: A large-scale VC and NVA force had been caught in the cordon.
On November 22, Echo Company, 2/7, tried to maneuver its way across the river into the Horseshoe, but the volume of enemy fire was too heavy, and the 2/7 resumed its previous position. The 11th Marine Artillery carried out precision destruction missions against the enemy positions during the remainder of the 22nd. On November 23, the objective area was secured. The Horseshoe contained a multibunkered complex of fighting holes and trench lines that had apparently been a battalion defensive position. Many of the bunkers had been constructed by civilians and enemy soldiers using railroad ties removed from under the remaining tracks of the Vietnam Northù:South Railroad.
After the Horseshoe was secured by the 2/7, Delta Company, 1/1, was attached to the 2/7 to provide security for the engineers who were lifted in to blow the numerous bunkers and level the fortified positions. Many bodies were found in the bunkers in addition to a great deal of equipment and field gear and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Also uncovered were many sacks of lime and lime sprayers used by the enemy to sanitize and hasten the decomposition of dead bodies.
On November 23, the Marines had a second and brief encounter in the hamlets of La Hoa 1 and 2, where the enemy also had well-fortified positions. La Hoa village (a village consisted of several hamlets designated by numbers) appeared to be a site where the enemy consolidated its forces and equipment before moving on to better defensive positions. It was amazing that such well-fortified positions were present in and about La Hoa, since that area had been heavily patrolled by the 7th Marines from Hill 55 on a regular basis. It showed again how well the NVA and VC could conceal a position.
The 11th Marines did an outstanding job of saturating the cordoned area with artillery fire. Of the dozen artillery sites designated for this operation, five fired from Hill 55. Some 1,286 fire missions expended 27,513 howitzer rounds in support of Meade River. Eight-inch howitzers fired precision destruction missionssome called in as close as 200 meters from friendly forcesthroughout the cordon.
Delta Company, 1/1, was ordered to stay in the Horseshoe for the next two weeks to provide security for the engineers, but the 2/7 left the area on November 24, continuing its delayed movement toward the railroad berm. Troops of the 2/7 continued to meet heavy resistance all the way from the Horseshoe to the berm. As they advanced to within 200 meters of the berm, an enemy force commenced firing along their right flank from well-covered positions. This area near the berm became known as ö:the Triangle.ö: The 25th was spent reducing this position by artillery and ground attacks. On the 26th, the 2/7 secured the railroad berm, finding once again that heavy enemy bunkers had been constructed from railroad ties and cement. From the empty bags it was evident that the cement was part of the civic action supplies issued to area hamlets by U.S. military forces for building and self-improvement projects.
On the 25th, the 3/26 was spread out south of the cordon to screen and keep the enemy within. That day they killed a 15-man NVA unit that was making a desperate attempt to flee the cordon. Two companies of the 1/7 were assigned the same mission along the north bank of the La Tho, keeping small enemy bands within the cordon.
On November 27, elements of the 2/5 and 2/26 started a simultaneous coordinated move westward from Highway 1, probing and searching every foot of the way. Numerous fresh enemy graves were uncovered as well as a considerable amount of supplies, and the 2/26 found one cache of 180 anti-personnel ö:Bouncing Bettyö: mines ready to be emplaced within the area. Other finds included field gear, miscellaneous documents, tons of rice buried in the ground in urns and much more equipment. Meanwhile, Delta, 1/1, which was providing security in the Horseshoe for the engineers, continued to find scores of freshly dug graves and more equipment in that area. In addition, scuba teams searching throughout the cordon found weapons, equipment, ammunition and 122mm rockets submerged in various riverbank caves and in several 20-foot-deep bomb craters that had been collecting water since the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombings during the Tet Offensive.
The cordon diminished considerably in size as the troops inched inward. The north and south boundaries of the cordon continued to be covered by various units, which accounted for many of the kills. From 6 to 7 a.m. on the 28th, the enemy was offered an opportunity to surrender, the offer broadcast clearly and repeatedly for one hour throughout the cordon. The offer was ignored. The enemy chose to fight. An extremely heavy artillery and air bombardment commenced. In addition to the numerous heavy artillery barrages, fixed-wing gunships (AC-47s and/or AC-130s) were on station 72 hours during Meade River, firing 609,000 rounds of ammunition into enemy positions. Bell Huey helicopter gunships flew 884 firing sorties during the 20-day operation. More than 2,100 helicopter sorties moved personnel, cargo, casualties and equipment. The battleship USS New Jersey (BB-62) fired 153 of its monstrous 16-inch, 1,900-pound high-capacity and 2,700-pound armor-piercing rounds against enemy bunkers throughout the cordon. The accuracy of the firepower is demonstrated by the fact that, despite the many friendly troops in the area, there were no reported friendly fire casualties.
During the operation, a platoon of deuce-and-a-half trucks, staged on Hill 55, continuously helped supply the troops via trails, roads and paths throughout the cordon. The platoon would set up ö:wagon trainsö: at different areas bordering the cordon. Many of the vehicles came under fire from small, frantic enemy units trying to break the perimeter. Often, drivers were instrumental in stopping bands of enemy soldiers who were trying to escape. Heavily armed deuce-and-a-half trucks were used to patrol Ambush Row and Route 4 day and night. In addition, 10 all-terrain vehicle ö:ottersö: from Hill 55, which was designated an LSA (logistical support area), were used to supply the troops deep within the cordon with food and ammunition.
On December 1, the hardest fighting of the operation thus far commenced as the 3/5 encountered a large enemy bunker complex along its right flank, in what would become known as ö:the Hook,ö: and received devastating fire from small arms, automatic weapons, grenades and 60mm mortars within the bunker. There were many casualties. The enemy fire came from well-entrenched, reinforced bunkers, and the 3/5's advance was temporarily halted. On December 3, even after the 11th Marine Artillery had spent most of the previous day and night conducting heavy, precision destruction missions into the Hook, the 3/5 continued taking casualties from well-entrenched enemy fire. On December 3, most of the troops of the 3/26 were moved from their screening positions along Route 4 in order to help the 3/5 in the attack against the NVA entrenched in the Hook. After repeated airstrikes with 750-pound bombs and napalm canisters, the Marines of the 3/26 fought their way into the southern portion of the Hook. By nightfall on the 4th, they had worked around to its rear area. There, the 3/26 and 3/5 called in additional air and artillery strikes very close to their own positions.
On December 5, the enemy was once again given an opportunity to surrender. This time, the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) commanders broadcast surrender-or-die messages to the enemy in the Hook. As before, the hard-core Communists chose to continue to battle. Later that day, when a final assault secured the Hook, more than 100 enemy dead were counted. Fifteen POWs were pulled out of their partially destroyed bunkers and tunnels and numerous weapons were uncovered.
Also on December 5, the 3/5 separated from the 3/26 and started a turning movement north, then commenced a sweep from west to east across the top of Dodge City. On the 6th, because of other commitments and after much heavy fighting, the 3/5 ceased to participate in Operation Meade River. However, Bravo, 1/5, which had been with the 3/5, remained at the northern boundary of Dodge City to keep what was left of the enemy confined and to search the area.
On December 6, the 3/26, having thoroughly mopped up the Hook, also moved on to positions at Dodge Citys northern boundary. The cordon remained intact, but the final, most furious battle had yet to be fought. Elements of the 2/26 and 2/5, in their careful and deliberate search of the cordons northern boundary from Highway 1, ran into a heavy concentration of enemy troops at 2:45 p.m. Those units regrouped and remained in close proximity to the last objectivethe northern bunker complexthroughout the rest of the day and on through the night, forming a blocking position to ensure that the enemy remained trapped within the cordon.
In the meantime, the 3/26 was joined by additional forces. Colonel Lauffer had attached three additional companies to the 3/26Alpha, 1/7, Hotel, 2/5 and Delta, 1/1giving them the mission of completely destroying the remaining bunkers in the Hook and then continuing a full attack into the northern bunker complex. Company E of the 2/26 was relieved of its blocking position at first light on the 7th and crossed the La Tho to join the 1/1, assigned for this assault. The 3/26 was joined by an ARVN cavalry unit, whose APCs (armored personnel carriers) were light and provided mobility for the 3/26 in the final attack. A tight line was drawn surrounding the northern bunker complex. Throughout the day the 3/26, reinforced by attached units, cautiously moved forward, literally inch by inch, maneuvering the APCs toward bunker after bunker and directing small-arms fire against the enemy. At one point, late in the day on December 8, Company I of the 3/26 moved to within 20 meters of what was thought to be the last in the series of in-depth bunker positions. But from those final hidden positions, deep within the northern bunker complexan area that had been heavily carpet-bombedcame unexpectedly accurate and deadly heavy automatic-weapons fire. Despite suffering heavy casualties, Company I silenced those machine-gun positions. The final assault was executed the next day, and a brutal fight ensued that included hand-to-hand combat against a tenacious enemy that refused to surrender. More than 300 enemy bodies were found, and this time the enemy was unable to bury its dead.
On December 9 at 6 p.m. Operation Meade River was terminated. Units were returned to their parent organizations after 20 days of vicious, intense fighting. The 1/1 took over and mopped up the northern bunker complex for two more days. During this post-Meade River period, the 1/1 found additional bodies and killed some 50 NVA who had remained in the bunkers, refusing to surrender. It also recovered numerous enemy individual and crew-served weapons. Although preliminary reports of enemy casualties varied from 1,000 to 1,500, the final count was 1,325 confirmed enemy casualties. More than 360 well-dug entrenched log, railroad-tie and cement bunkers were destroyed, and many more must have been caved in by the bombings. Of the 1,325 confirmed casualties, 1,025 were killed and 300 wounded. Only six enemy troops chose to surrender. It is estimated that 200ù:300 more bodies went undiscovered, and many more were probably obliterated by the accurate, heavy bombardment from artillery, battleship and fixed-wing aircraft, all of this in an area measuring only three miles by five miles. But this successful operation was not without cost to the U.S. military. One hundred and eight Marines were killed and 513 were wounded.
Despite all the death and destruction wrought against the NVA and VC force in the Dodge City area, it was only a matter of weeks before squad, platoon and company firefights against NVA forces that had re-infiltrated the vital area started once again. Fierce sporadic engagements in Dodge City would continue through 1969 and 1970.
Other Memories
First Ground Radar Repair Class MOS 5931 was used for labor to move the Comm Elect Schools from San Diego to Twenty Nine Palms. We even introduce ice plant to the Stumps.
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Dave Kooker