Description This campaign was from 1 November 1969 to 30 April 1970. An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at the highest level since 4-5 September signaled the start of the first phase of the Communist winter This campaign was from 1 November 1969 to 30 April 1970. An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at the highest level since 4-5 September signaled the start of the first phase of the Communist winter campaign. This was highlighted by intensified harassment incidents, and attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In November-December these were heaviest in Corps Tactical Zones III and IV (around Saigon), primarily directed against Vietnamese military installations in order to disrupt the pacification program. The most significant enemy activity occurred in November with heavy attacks upon By Prang and Duc Lap in CTZ II (Central Vietnam).
By February 1970 the focus of enemy activity began to shift to CTZ I and II. Attacks increased steadily, reaching a peak in April 1970. Hostile forces staged their heaviest attacks in the Central Highlands near Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps at Dak Seang, Dak Pek, and Ben Het in I CTZ. The enemy also conducted numerous attacks by fire and several sapper attacks against U.S. fire support bases. This high level of enemy activity began in I CTZ in April and continued through May.
During the period 1 November 1969 through 30 April 1970 U.S. and allied forces concentrated on aggressive operations to find and destroy enemy main and local forces, the penetration of base camps and installations and the seizure of enemy supplies and materiel. These operations sought to deny the enemy the initiative and to inflict heavy losses in men and materiel. Further progress was made in Vietnamization through improving the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. As a result of these advances three brigades of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and several major U.S.M.C. units were withdrawn from Vietnam during this period.
The enemy made several efforts to take the offensive at Dak Seang, which was attacked on 1 April 1970 and remained under siege throughout the month, and at Quang Duc in the By Prong-Duc Lap area which ended on 28 December. Only Vietnamese forces were engaged in both of these operations, the Quang Duc campaign involving some 12,000 ARVN troops. South Vietnamese forces again took the offensive on 14 April in a bold 3-day operation in the Angel's Wing area along the Cambodian border. The Vietnamese Army completed this mission in an aggressive professional manner without U.S. support-further evidence of their growing proficiency.... More
Memories
Was with Mag 36 and assisted in providing Chopper support for the operation.
Criteria The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. ... The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. Marine Corps while on active duty for a specified period of time. MoreHide
Description Deckhouse VI was treated as a regular assault landing complete with heavy pre-assault fires for the boat landings. In retrospect, because of the U.S. Army forces operating just to the south and west aDeckhouse VI was treated as a regular assault landing complete with heavy pre-assault fires for the boat landings. In retrospect, because of the U.S. Army forces operating just to the south and west and U.S. Marines operating to the north and west of the assault area, the pre-assault fires should have been 'on call'. There were weather problems at Deckhouse VI when heavy fog and rain obscured the landing zones on D-Day and caused a one-day postponement. Surface landings could have been carried out. The cruiser firing pre-assault fires commenced fire in spite of D-Day cancellation and probably gave some indication to any VC in the area that something unusual might be scheduled. However, this was improbable because the area was normally frequented by gunfire support destroyers.
The population of the villages just south of Sa Huynh congregated on the eastern face of a ridge, which sloped up from the boat landing area, to watch the Marine landing show. Originally, the pre-assault fires had included this area, but this had been changed on the advice of a representative from the Province Chiefs staff on board the flagship. He pointed with a dirty finger to the ridge and forced out his interpretation of 'Friend' in English. We took him at his word and put those particular fires 'on call'.
The opening phase of Deckhouse VI was uneventful. The SLF planners had suspected this would be the case. True to form, local Communist units concentrated on delaying and harassing tactics. The BLT confirmed the Communist presence in the area by destroying 167 fortifications and capturing 20 tons of assorted supplies during the 32 days of Phase I. Though there never were any major contacts, the BLT claimed 201 VC killed during this period; only six Marines died. Unfortunately, on 25 February, the HMM-363 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington, and his copilot received wounds during a troop lift; the squadron executive officer, Major Marvin E. Day, assumed command on the 28th and continued in command for the duration of Deckhouse VI. Phase I ended on 26 February when the STY Commander, Colonel Wortman, ordered a tactical withdrawal of the STY from the Sa Huynh area to its ships to prepare for Phase II.
Only 14 and one-half hours after the last element of the battalion left the Sa Huynh salt flats, the SLF landed again, this time 10 kilometers north of Sa Huynh. Phase II of Deckhouse VI, by now integrated as part of the combined 7th Marines and ARVN Operation Desoto, started at 0830 on 27 February.
As the SLF helicopters approached 12 Bat, five miles inland from the beach, they met heavy fire which hit eight of the 14 helicopters in the assault lift, and put six out of action. All other loaded helicopters diverted to the beach area while supporting Marine aircraft strafed and rocketed the VC defenders. Fortunately for the isolated Marines of the assault element, the Communists pulled out and that afternoon the rest of the battalion linked up with its first wave. By dark the BLT had consolidated near 12 Bat and began preparations for the next day's search and destroy operation.
Other than the opposed landing at LZ Bat, Phase II action almost repeated Phase I. Occasional contact and intermittent sniper fire marked the only enemy reactions. In the six days required to accomplish the second phase, the battalion killed 78 more VC, destroyed 145 fortifications, and captured an additional five tons of supplies. Similarly, as in Phase I, the price totaled six more Marines dead. Deckhouse VI concluded on 3 March.
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Memories
Was with Mag 36 and assisted in providing Chopper support for the operation.
Description This campaign was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of politicalThis campaign was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of political, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.
North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.
During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.
The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLEBORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.
By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.
On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam-in the so-called "Iron Triangle" about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.
In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the "Iron Triangle", were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew.
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Memories
Was with Mag 36 and assisted in providing Chopper support for the operation.
Criteria The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not suff... The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not sufficiently to justify the award of the Presidential Unit Citation). It may also be awarded to a unit that distinguishes itself by extremely meritorious service not involving combat (but in support of military operations), which renders that unit outstanding when compared to other units performing similar service. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide
Description Mar 4 – 7; 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and ARVN 2nd Division search and destroy operation against the NVA 36th RegimeMar 4 – 7; 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and ARVN 2nd Division search and destroy operation against the NVA 36th Regiment and VC Main Force units operation. First USMC contact with the NVA 11 km northwest of Quảng Ngãi City, 632 VC KIA and 83 US and 32 ARVN KIA during the operation.
During the night of 4 -5 March, the enemy continued to harass the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, particularly when helicopters arrived. Company "H" took a trench line in a night assault and killed 20 NVA when they revealed themselves by firing 60mm mortars at the Marines and machine-guns at the resupply helicopters. Much need supplies were brought in to the Marines and 70 casualties were evacuated by those brave helicopter pilots who flew through a hail of steel each time they arrived to the Battalions perimeter. With the heavy contact and loss of personnel, Gen. Platt had already taken measures, he ordered another 155mm Battery deployed to Binh Son, and the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines to establish blocking defenses north of Utters Battalion. LtCol. P. X. Kelleys 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines was ordered to standby in Chu Lai and be ready for deployment in the morning.
The NVA stuck the ARVN near Hill 50 around 05:00 in the morning. Marine Corps artillery battery's fired 1,900 rounds in support for period of two hours and the 1st Marines were ordered to leave their blocking poasitions advance south . While the 1st Marines were to link with the ARVN under attack, the ARVN 2d Division Commander ordered addition ARVN troops to join the operation in progress. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines were ordered to clear a landing zone of the arrival of fresh troop, clear it's battlefield from the previous day , and serve as the Task Force Delta reserve unit. Kelly's Marines began landing shortly after 08:30 and the helicopters once again were immediatly taken under fire. Several helicopters were put out of commission before all the troops were on the ground and moving towards their objectives. Two Company's of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines engaged the NVA in close quarters but persevered until all the Companies reached LtCol. Utter's Battalion and established night defensive postions. North of Utter's and Kelley's Marines the 1st Marines were slugging it out with a persistant enemy who was dug into a network of interconnected tunnels, bunkers and spider traps. Despite these defenses the Marines pressed the attack with Company "L" succeeding in taking Hill 50 after a three hour engagement. Little headway was made in the vicintiy of Chau Ngai (3) and with the coming of darkness the Marines were forced to withdraw. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines losses for the day were 32 killed and 90 wounded.
Company "B", 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which had been attached to the 4th Marines and guarding a downed helicopter, came under heavy small arms fire and a mortar attack. The Marines came under increasing pressure and at about 01:30, the NVA launched a three pronged assault. This was repulsed with the help of supporting artillery fire. By morning, when relief arrived, 38 enemy dead were found. Twice that number were believed to have been carried away during the previous night. The Marines and ARVN pulled back and a intensive two and one-half hour air and artillery bombardment was launched. At approximately 12:40 on 6 March, the three Battalions advanced but the North Vietnamese were no longer there.
The Aftermath
A search of the area revealed a cave complex which apparently served as the NVA Regimental Command Post, and 100 enemy bodies on hill 50 were found by the 1st Marines. LtCol. Utter's Marines discouvered 43 enemy bodies in another tunnel complex. During Utah, the allied forces claimed to have killed 600 North Vietnamse soldiers, captured 5 prisoners, and 49 weapons including three 12.7mm machine-guns and two mortars. Marine casualties were 98 dead and 278 wounded, while the ARVN lost 30 killed and 120 wounded, the battle had been hard fought and won by Marines who stood their ground.... More
Memories
Was with Mag 36 assisted with Chopper support of the operation.
Description Operation JACKSTAY, 26 March to 7 April, 1966--a full-scale U.S. Naval amphibious operation launched from a "blue water" force off the coast. Operation JACKSTAY was the first major U.S. naval operatioOperation JACKSTAY, 26 March to 7 April, 1966--a full-scale U.S. Naval amphibious operation launched from a "blue water" force off the coast. Operation JACKSTAY was the first major U.S. naval operation in the river environment of the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ). It marked a turning point in the unfolding saga of projection of U.S. sea power from the high seas and coastal waters into the waterways of the Delta. Prior to this, the U.S. Navy's participation in the river war was fairly well limited to inshore operations by "Swift" boats, small fast patrol craft (PCF) of the Coastal Surveillance Force, and the work of U.S. Navy advisors with the Vietnamese Navy River Assault Groups. After JACKSTAY" the beginning of River Patrol Force operations and establishment of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, the U.S. Navy became increasingly involved in the river war.
JACKSTAY pointed up the versatility made possible by control of the water whether offshore or within a country. The operation, conducted in two phases, was planned to decimate the Viet Cong in the RSSZ. These 400 square miles of swamp, thickly covered by tropical vegetation, are particularly suited to clandestine operations. For a generation the region had harbored the Viet Cong, with their arms factories, recuperation, and training camps.
Phase one began 26 March 1966 as a surface/helicopter amphibious assault on the face of the Long Thanh Peninsula by Marines of the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment. Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) swimmers, preparatory air strikes by Seventh Fleet carrier-based aircraft and naval gunfire all supported the operation. Throughout, amphibious craft and coastal surveillance craft provided blocking and surveillance against Viet Cong escape. The long inland reach of sea power swiftly adapts to complex needs.
The second phase, a deep penetration of the swamps, began 31 March as an 18-boat convoy entered the Vam Sat River. Led by two French-built, Vietnamese-manned FOMs (a V-bottomed boat about the size of an LCVP), the convoy included two Vietnamese LCCPs rigged with chain drags and grapnels for minesweeping; a Vietnamese Monitor (an armored LCM-6 with a mortar and automatic weapons); seven LCMs and two LCVPs carrying U.S. Marines; two LCPLs providing additional gunfire support; and two U.S. Navy LCM-3 salvage boats. Throughout the 7-mile transit down the Vam Sat, carrier-based aircraft and armed helicopters provided air cover. Commander Derwin T. Lamb, USN, directed the operation from the open deck of an LCPL positioned directly behind the Vietnamese "minesweepers" and ahead of the Marines. The overall commander of the operation, Captain John D. Westervelt, USN, rode a helicopter patrolling overhead.
As the group approached the first bend of the Vam Sat, the Viet Cong tripped a crude electrical mine halfway between Lamb's command LCPL and the Monitor--a booming echo of Confederate "torpedoes" a century ago. The Navy craft escaped damage, however, because they had wisely hugged the shallow side of the river instead of navigating center channel. Following the mine blast, intense small arms fire burst from the matted foliage on both banks. Driving on through enemy shots, the boats opened up with everything they had--40-mm guns on the Monitor, .30-caliber guns on the LCPL, and small arms fire from the troops in the LCMs. Meanwhile, aircraft bombed and strafed guerrilla positions about 100 yards inland, preventing the Viet Cong from bringing heavy guns to bear. About a mile down river, the enemy fire lifted, and the rest of the passage was marked only by sporadic sniping.
After landing troops in the heart of the dismal mangrove swamps, the convoy moved back up river in the same formation to embark two companies of Marines working their way through the swamp to a predetermined point. The pickup was without incident; one observer reported:
The mike boats [LCMs] churned up to the shore, crashing their way through the overhanding tree limbs and dense undergrowth along the swampy edge. And as the ramps of the mike boats were lowered, they cut an opening right through the rotted vegetation, making it easier for the Marines to come on board.
As the convoy moved ahead after picking up their Marines, they again ran into small arms fire, which continued for the greater part of the trip upriver. The open LCMs, each carrying 60 Marines, were vulnerable targets. Close air support was especially helpful. Bombing and strafing on either side of the river again prevented the Viet Cong from bringing up heavy weapons or concentrating small arms fire. As the firing slowed, then silenced, the convoy moved out into open water of the Soi Rap.
The results of JACKSTAY were more impressive than the 53 confirmed Viet Cong dead or the tons of material destroyed or captured. They can be measured in terms of the penetration of sea power into the very heart of the enemy's sanctuary. As our initial major riverine operation, it proved what the enemy would soon learn more conclusively: that wherever water reached, there was no longer any sure place to hide from the versatile extension of the American Navy.... More
Memories
Was with Mag 36 and assisted in providing Chopper support for the operation.
Description
Jun 18 – 30; BLT 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines operation in support of the 1st Cavalry Division's Operation Nathan Hale in the Phú Yên Province.
Memories
Was with Mag 36 assisted with Chopper support of the operation.
Description Jul 7 – Aug 3; 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, 1st Battalion, 1sJul 7 – Aug 3; 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines and ARVN operation against the NVA 324B Division in the Cam Lo area near the DMZ.
This was in support of Operation Nathan Hale of the 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division vicinity of Dong Tre and Tuy Hòa, Phú Yên Province.... More
Memories
Was with Mag 36 assisted with Chopper support of the operation.
Description Operation Prairie (August 3 – January 31, 1967) was a military operation in northern South Vietnam. Its job was to eliminating North Vietnamese Army forces south of the DMZ.
1st Battalion, 3rd MarineOperation Prairie (August 3 – January 31, 1967) was a military operation in northern South Vietnam. Its job was to eliminating North Vietnamese Army forces south of the DMZ.
1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines and 1st and 3rd Battalions, 26th Marines search and destroy operation against the 324B NVA Division in the hills at Con Thien/Gio Linh areas south of the DMZ at Mutter's Ridge, the Razorback, Hill 400, Hill 484 and The Rockpile.
During August, 2nd Battalion 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion 4th Marines and other units saw heavy fighting with the NVA 324B division. Prairie was a string of battles that was fought in the foothills south of the DMZ. The Commander of E Company 2nd Battalion 4th Marines, Capt. Howard V. Lee was awarded the Medal of Honor for his outstanding bravery during this operation.... More
Memories
Was with Mag 36 and assisted in providing Chopper support for the operation.
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
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