Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. ... The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. Marine Corps while on active duty for a specified period of time. MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout... The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of South Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. MoreHide
Criteria
The unit citation of the Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Medal was awarded certain units by the Vietnamese government for meritorious service during the period 1 March 1961 to 28 March 1974.
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide
Description
Jul 15 – Aug 24; 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines clear and search operation near Song Thu Bon valley, Quảng Nam Province.
Description Aug 31 – May 12 71; 1st Battalion 5th Marines, 2nd Battalion 5th Marines and 3rd Battalion 5th Marines search and clear operation in the Quảng Nam Province.
In late August intelligence reports indicAug 31 – May 12 71; 1st Battalion 5th Marines, 2nd Battalion 5th Marines and 3rd Battalion 5th Marines search and clear operation in the Quảng Nam Province.
In late August intelligence reports indicated that the Viet Cong Front 4 Headquarters had taken up residence in the eastern Que Son Mountains. In response, regimental commander Col. Robert H. Piehl planned to begin Operation Imperial Lake in this area with an intense aerial and artillery bombardment. Four rifle companies would then be helicoptered into twelve landing zones, establishing a tight cordon around the area suspected of harboring the enemy.
The bombardment began at midnight on 31 August. For six hours, ten batteries of 3/11 Marines pounded fifty-three target sites with more than fourteen thousand shells in what was one of the largest artillery barrages of the entire Vietnam War. When the artillery fire ceased, two solid hours of air strikes followed. More than sixty-three tons of aerial ordnance fell on suspected enemy camps in the Que Sons. The effectiveness of the massive bombardment was questionable. Colonel Piehi later said that 'one or two enemy bodies. .. .' were found in the target areas.
Nonetheless, at 0900 that day, CH46 and CH-53 helicopters laden with well-equipped 2d Battalion CP Marines and two platoons of 4.2-inch mortar men of Battery W, 3/11, began touching down at LZ Vulture on Hill 845, one of the highest peaks in the central Que Son Mountains. By noon, all four rifle companies of 2/7 had landed at their LZs ringing LZ Vulture. Over the next four days, the grunts scoured the rugged terrain without finding any enemy.
Finally, on 5 September, Company E encountered a platoon of NVA in a jungle-covered ravine southwest of LZ Vulture. Unable to move deeper into the ravine due to the heavy volume of fire coming from enemy soldiers concealed in caves and behind boulders, Company E was joined by the other three companies that night. Over the next four days, the Marines fought the encircled NVA. The steep terrain, numerous boulders, thick foliage, and many caves favored the enemy's elusive tactics. Though the riflemen tried several times to advance along the bottom of the ravine or down its sides, they were turned back each time by strong small arms and automatic weapons fire.
By 9 September, the Marines had suffered three killed and a dozen wounded. Realizing that his infantry could not dislodge the NVA, Lieutenant Colonel Albers pulled back his rifle companies and called for Marine jets. Nine sorties dropped forty tons of high explosives on the enemy. The next day, the Marines reentered the ravine. This time only sporadic sniper fire greeted them. The companies spent the next week searching for any surviving NVA, killing more than a dozen stragglers.
While 2/7 was fighting near LZ Vulture, 3/7 and units of the U.S. Army's Americal Division conducted Operation Nebraska Rapids to reopen Route 534 between LZ Baldy and Hiep Duc. The infantry units patrolled along the road while Marine engineers searched for mines and repaired the roadbed. The clearing operation lasted for five days, then an ARVN truck convoy made an uneventful trip along the road on 9 September.
On 13 September, 3/7 helicoptered into the Que Son Mountains to join Operation Imperial Lake. The Marines worked south of the 2d Battalion, conducting daytime patrols and night ambushes. Though they had little luck in finding the enemy, Lieutenant Colonel Albers's 2d Battalion did somewhat better. On 16 September, lead by a VC defector, his Company F uncovered a large underground complex consisting of more than the usual caves. Extending more than seventy feet into the ground, this complex included a large kitchen and a hospital complete with an operating room. What made the find even more unusual was the fact that the complex was on the lower slopes of Hill 845, right below LZ Vulture and Albers's CP.... More
Operation Catawba Falls was from 18 to 21 Sep 1970, 1st Marine Division operation in Quảng Nam Province near Danang to cover the movement of the 5th Marines from An Hoa to the Vu Gia River Valley.
To
Operation Catawba Falls was from 18 to 21 Sep 1970, 1st Marine Division operation in Quảng Nam Province near Danang to cover the movement of the 5th Marines from An Hoa to the Vu Gia River Valley.
To throw the enemy off balance during the 5th Marines' move From An Hoa and the Vu Gia River Valley, the 1st Marine Division carried out a large-scale diversionary artillery attack in Base Area 112. This attack had its origins early in August in plans for a conventional infantry operation. At that time, intelligence reports located the headquarters of the 38th NVA Regiment and a number of other NVA and VC combat and support units in the mountains northwest of the area swept by the 7th Marines in Pickens Forest. In response to these reports. Colonel Clark V. Judge, commander of the 5th Marines, had his staff begin planning for a two-battalion operation in the area, to be called Operation Catawba Falls,30 On 26 August, as a preliminary to launching the main operation, a command group and two 105mm howitzers of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, with the 3d Platoon of Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines as a security force, landed from helicopters deep in Base Area 112 on Fire Support Base Dagger. The base, intended as the center of the proposed operation, covered the flat top of Ban Co, a peak 1, 031 meters high which lies about 10 miles west of An Hoa, About 100 by 400 meters in area with sheer cliffs dropping away on all sides. Dagger overlooked the maze of ridges and valleys in which the enemy were believed to be concealed.31
On 16 September, the 1st Marine Division issued orders for the execution of Operation Catawba Falls, but in a form far different from that originally contemplated. The orders called for a two-phase operation. Phase I, to be conducted by the 11th Marines under direct control of the division commander. Major General Widdecke, would consist of intensive bombardment of the target area by howitzers and mortars airlifted into FSB Dagger. Quickly emplaced, these weapons would fire rapidly for a short period of time, alternating their shelling of selected targets with intensive air strikes. This phase would begin on 18 September. A second phase, to consist of a sweep of the objective area by the 5th Marines, was included in the original orders, but only as a ruse to confuse enemy intelligence. Division headquarters hoped that the Communists, battered by the shelling and bombing, would spend the crucial period of the American redeployment preparing to resist or trying to evade the threatened infantry assault rather than conducting an offensive of their own.32
Responsibility for conducting Phase I fell to Major George W. Ryhanych's 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. Ry-hanych and his staff began detailed planning for the attack on 15 September. Given little time for their fire
* This sits constituted s. narrow corridor bounded on (he north by the Korean TAOR and on the south by that of the America! Division.
planning, they worked long hours allocating die 10, 000 rounds allowed for the attack among 160 targets furnished by intelligence. They developed a daily schedule for firing and for suspending artillery fire periodically to allow jets of the 1st MAW to make bombing runs. To carry out the plan, Ryhanych would have the two 105mm howitzers from Battery D already on Dagger, two more 103s from Battery E of his battalion. and two from Battery H of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines* Ryhanych also had available six 4.2-inch mortars, four from his own battalion and two from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and four 155mm howitzers, two from the 2d Battalion and two from the 3d. All 16 of these artillery pieces would be emplaced on Dagger, For still heavier long-range support, Ryhanych could call on the 1st 175mm Gun Battery at An Hoa and a platoon of Army 175s from the 2d Battalion, 92d U.S. Artillery, located on Hill 65. For this operation, the Army unit was integrated into the 2d Battalion's communications and fire direction system.33
On 17 September at 0800, the first of a total of 76 helicopters-CH-53Ds of the 1st MAW and Army CH-54s-began lifting guns. crews, ammunition, and equipment from Hill 65, An Hoa, and Baldy to FSB Dagger, Detachments of engineers and artillerymen swarmed over the mountain top preparing gun positions and helicopter landing zones. They were hampered in their labors by a shortage of equipment. The one minidozer on Dagger broke down after a few hours, as did a second sent in to replace it. The single chain saw "was exceedingly dull and broke down on the second day of operation." With hand tools and explosives, the Marines continued work throughout the day and into the night of the 17th. They finished gun positions and other installations and distributed thousands of rounds of ammunition.
By dawn on 18 September, 14 artillery pieces (two of the mortars were held in reserve) were emplaced and prepared to fire, and 10, 000 rounds of ammunition lay ready for their crews' hands. Major Ryhanych, who remained on Dagger for the first two days of the operation, organized his guns and crews into a provisional composite battery commanded by his battalion operations officer. Major Robert T, Adams, Under him, Adams had three sections, one of 105mm howitzers, one of 4.2-inch mortars, and one of 155mm howitzers, each commanded by a first lieutenant. A central fire direction center controlled all three sections.
At 0300 on the 18th, the provisional battery opened fire. For the rest of the day, howitzers and mortars methodically pounded each suspected base camp, cave, bunker complex, and troop position. At intervals, the battery ceased firing white jets delivered their strikes. It became apparent as the day went on that the original fire plan could not be carried out in the two days initially allotted for the operation without exhausting the gunners. The resulting fatigue would increase the risk of accidents and firing errors- Therefore, on the 18th Major General Widdecke ordered the operation extended through 20 September. The following day, another division order postponed the end of Phase I to 21 September. Tills order also declared that "Preparation for Phase II having accomplished its intended diversion mission, . ., Phase II [is] postponed indefinitely .... Op [erarion] Cataw-ba Falls will terminate concurrently with termination of Phase I."34
Throughout the 19th and 20th and part of the 21st, the battery on Dagger kept up its rain of destruction on Base Area 112. Preliminary intelligence reports indicated thai the enemy had been hit hard in certain of the target areas, and additional fire was directed there. The soft sand and loam which formed a shallow layer over most of the flat mountain top caused recoiling howitzers to shift position and required the mortar crews periodically to dig out and reset the base plates of their weapons, but hard work and ingenuity overcame these problems. During the second day of firing, heaps of trash and expended cartridge cases "became an almost overwhelming problem," bur the riflemen of the 3d Platoon, Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, who manned the firebase perimeter throughout the operation, helped the gunners dump the trash over the side of the mountain and also furnished what Major Ryhanych called "invaluable" assistance in moving ammunition to the guns. The Marines burned the mound of trash when they left the firebase.
Operation Catawba Falls ended at noon on 21 September. The weapons and crews of the composite battery were lifted by helicopter back to their permanent positions. Between 18 and 21 September. Major Ryhanych's artillerymen had fired over 11, 500 rounds, and jets of the 1st MAW had dropped 141 tons of bombs. Allied intelligence later estimated that Operation Catawba Falls had inflicted casualties on several enemy units and destroyed a suspected training center. Further indicating the success of the operation, no major enemy attacks or harassment marred the relief of the 7th Marines by the 5th Marines.35
The Regiments Realign
Protected by the artillery fire of Catawba Falls, the regiments of the 1st Marine Division carried out their complex exchanges of position. On 18 September, companies of Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Rose's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines began relieving units of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines on Hills 52, 65, and 37. The relieving companies came under temporary operational control of the 5th Marines' battalion, which in turn on 20 September passed under the control of the 1st Marines. During this relief, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines took command of Company M, the 1st Marines' CUPP unit, which had its squads defending hamlets along Route 4. Company M was part of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. On the 21st, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines assigned direct support of Rose's battalion, moved its six 105mm howitzers and two 155mm howitzers from Hill 10 to Hill 65. The following day, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines assumed control of its new TAOR.
To fill in for the 1st Battalion as it extended itself to the southwest, the other battalions of the 1st Marines enlarged and rearranged their operational boundaries. The 2d Battalion surrendered a strip of the southwestern pan of its TAOR between Route 1 and the coast to the Korean Marines while extending westward to take over Hill 55. The 3d Battalion sent companies southward to occupy several square miles of the old 1st Battalion TAOR including OP (Observation Post) Reno. By the end of September, as a result of these realignments, the 1st Marines' TAOR extended from the Cu De River on the north southwestward to where the Vu Gia and Thu Bon Rivers join. Near the coast, it abutted the enlarged Korean enclave, which extended well north of the Thu Bon-Ky Lam River line.
Criteria The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not suff... The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not sufficiently to justify the award of the Presidential Unit Citation). It may also be awarded to a unit that distinguishes itself by extremely meritorious service not involving combat (but in support of military operations), which renders that unit outstanding when compared to other units performing similar service. MoreHide
Description This was a major land clearing operation (26 May to 8 Nov 1969) in the Dodge City and Go Noi Island area 10-20K south of Da Nang for units of the 1st Marine Div, primarily the 1st Marines, plus SLF AlThis was a major land clearing operation (26 May to 8 Nov 1969) in the Dodge City and Go Noi Island area 10-20K south of Da Nang for units of the 1st Marine Div, primarily the 1st Marines, plus SLF Alpha, the 51st ARVN Reg, and 2d Korean Marine Bde.
Prior to the war about 27,000 people lived in this area but by 1969 it was a tunneled, cave infested VC haven. Most of the island's residents had fled to other areas in Quang Nam Province.
This operation was in the same areas as ALLEN BROOK in May and MEADE RIVER in Dec, 1968. The objective was to clear the seven to nine enemy bns out of the area and reopen Route 4 from Dai Loc to Dien Ban once and for all.
The operation had many phases and Inf units moving to phase lines and blocking positions. Joint Army and Marine landing clearing companies cleared 250 acres at a time to a depth of 6 inches completely destroying the area for military use by the enemy.
In all 852 enemy were killed, 58 captured plus 410 weapons and some impressive food caches. USMC losses were 71 KIA and 498 WIA; mostly to mines. During 1970, the GVN would start a huge resettlement into this area.... More
Description Jun 15 – Sep 25; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines clear and search operation to protect civilians and assist in accelerated pacification program near the NVA Base AreaJun 15 – Sep 25; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines clear and search operation to protect civilians and assist in accelerated pacification program near the NVA Base Area 101 southeast of Quảng Trị City.
