Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. (World War II and Korea War service rate one ribbon for each period only) MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria
The unit citation of the Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Medal was awarded certain units by the Vietnamese government for meritorious service during the period 1 March 1961 to 28 March 1974.
Description Feb 27 – Mar 3; 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, and HMM-163 sweep operation joining with ARVN Operation Thừa Thiên 177 east of Phu Bai, Thừa Thiên Province.
Losses: Frd-US 15 KIA, 32 WIA; En-122 KIA,Feb 27 – Mar 3; 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, and HMM-163 sweep operation joining with ARVN Operation Thừa Thiên 177 east of Phu Bai, Thừa Thiên Province.
Description Jun 25 – Jul 2; 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and ARVN operation to engage the NVA 806th and 812th Battalions, 6th NVA Regiment that had recently moved into the Quảng Điền DisJun 25 – Jul 2; 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and ARVN operation to engage the NVA 806th and 812th Battalions, 6th NVA Regiment that had recently moved into the Quảng Điền District between Route 1 and the South China Sea about 20 km north of Huế in the Thừa Thiên Province.... More
Description This campaign was 8 March to 24 December 1965. During this campaign the U.S. objective was to hold off the enemy while gaining time needed to build base camps and logistical facilities. The U.S. also This campaign was 8 March to 24 December 1965. During this campaign the U.S. objective was to hold off the enemy while gaining time needed to build base camps and logistical facilities. The U.S. also attempted to consolidate its ground operations more efficiently. For this purpose, it organized the U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV). U.S. support in the I Corps tactical zone, composed of five northernmost provinces, was to be primarily a Marine Corps responsibility; the U.S. Army was to operate mainly in the II and III Corps tactical zones which comprised the Central highlands, adjacent coastal regions, and the area around Saigon; and ARVN troops were to retain primary responsibility for the Delta region of the IV Corps.
On 19 October 1965. three VC regiments totaling 6,000 men attacked a Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) - U.S. Special Forces at Plei Me, near the entrance to the Ia Drang Valley, in what purported to be the start of a thrust to cut the country in half.
With the assistance of massive air strikes, elements of the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division thwarted the enemy in a battle that lasted nearly a month and included several engagements. The Ia Drang Valley action was the costliest in terms of casualties to date. The successful defense of the region improved security in and around the Central Highlands and raised the morale of the soldiers involved.... More
Description Aug 25 – Oct 1; 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines route security operation to open Route 19 between Qui NhÆ¡n and An Khe for debarkation and deployment of the 1st CavAug 25 – Oct 1; 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines route security operation to open Route 19 between Qui NhÆ¡n and An Khe for debarkation and deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Bình ninh Province.... More
By 10 November both Admiral Johnson and General Westmoreland approved the recommendations of the Saigon conference and the Seventh Fleet amphibious forces began prepThe Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids
By 10 November both Admiral Johnson and General Westmoreland approved the recommendations of the Saigon conference and the Seventh Fleet amphibious forces began preparing for the next DAGGER THRUSTs. After completion of detailed plans on 26 November, the ARG/SLF, which earlier in the month had been the floating reserve for the BLUE MARUN operations, sailed for the DAGGER THRUST IV amphibious objective area, Lang Ke Ga, in III Corps. This VC-controlled and suspected infiltration point was on the coast, 90 miles east of Saigon.
For DAGGER THRUST IV, the Marines and Navy had made some more changes in command and control. Although Admiral Wulzen in the USS Eldorado (AGC 11) had joined the amphibious task group. Captain Weschler, the ARG commander, retained his position as amphibious task force commander. Colonel Burnett, the SLF commander, was to be the commander of the landing force, unlike the earlier DAGGER THRUST raids when this position was assumed by the TF 78/RAMAB commander. Admiral Blackburn had bowed to the inevitable and, on 24 November, announced his intention to dissolve TF 78. In the interim, he made General Fields commander of both TF 78 and TF 79.31
DAGGER THRUST IV followed the same pattern as the earlier DAGGER THRUST raids. On 30 November, the SLF battalion landed as planned at Lang Ke Ga, but, with the exception of scattered tank traps in the beach area and isolated incidents of small arms fire, it encountered no opposition. The next day the battalion reembarked, ending the operation, with no casualties to either side.
The final DAGGER THRUST raid. DAGGER THRUST V began on 5 December near the Phu Thu village complex, 40 miles north of Qui Nhon. This time the battalion was moderately successful, surprising a small VC force. During the two-day operation, the Marines killed 26 enemy and detained 38 suspects. The Marine battalion sustained casualties of three dead and 10 wounded. In retrospect, the DAGGER THRUST raids failed to achieve their overall objective, the quick exploitation of intelligence and resulting contact with large enemy formations. Admiral Johnson, several years later, observed:
The excessive time involved in planning and coordinating with the MACV levels resulted in completely stale intelligence. Furthermore, by the time MACV had completed his all important coordination and alerting of ARVN forces and Province Chiefs, we had also completely spooked the VC and they had flown the coop.... More
Description In early December, three Marine battalions - the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, the 3rd Battalion 3rd Marines, and the 2nd Battalion 7th Marines - were deployed to an area midway between Chu Lai and Da In early December, three Marine battalions - the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, the 3rd Battalion 3rd Marines, and the 2nd Battalion 7th Marines - were deployed to an area midway between Chu Lai and Da Nang to relieve the pressure on South Vietnamese forces that had been hit hard by the 70th Viet Cong Regiment. On the 18th, the 80th Viet Cong Battalion ambushed the 2nd Battalion 7th Marines, although the Viet Cong gained fire superiority in the beginning, the Marines turned viciously on the enemy. With the accurate artillery support from the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, forced the Viet Cong to leave the field of battle and sustaining heavy casualties. Lt. Nicholas H. Grosz Jr., the CO. of H&S Company was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions that day, and Lt. Harvey C. Barnum Jr. an Artillery FO earned the Nations highest Award for Valor, The Medal of Honor.
The Threat to the Nui Loc Son Basin
On the evening of 17 November, the 1st VC Regiment, with all three of its battalions, the 60th, 80th and 90th, overran Hiep Duc District Headquarters and the South Vietnamese reported 174 of the defenders missing and 315 weapons lost. Two South Vietnamese battalions were heli-lifted by the Marines and supporting them with air strikes after a bitter fight Hiep Duc was retaken by the ARVN on the 19th of November although the 1st VC Regiment continued to control the critical terrain to the northwest.
Planning
On 4 December, General Walt and General Thi the South Vietnamese I Corps commander met and agreed on a joint operation which became Harvest Moon/Lien Ket 18. A temporary command Task Force DELTA was activated, with Brigadier General Henderson as the Commanding Officer.
Two Battalions, LtCol. Utter's 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and LtCol. Dorsey's 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, who had only one of it's own companies, "Lima", "Echo" from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, and "Golf" from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines were attached for this operation. The SLF remained in reserve. The ARVN forces under Brigadier General Lam, consisted of the HQ Group, 1st Battalion, and 11th Ranger Battalion of the 5th ARVN Regiment.
The ARVN were directed to enter the Que Son Valley along the Thang Binh-Hiep Duc road on 8 December, contact was not expected until the second day. On the 9th , LtCol. Utter's battalion was to be inserted behind the enemy to force them towards the advancing ARVN.
The Battle
On the first day 8 December, at 1330 about halfway to Que Son, the 11th Ranger Battalion, was hit hard by the 70th VC Battalion . In the first fifteen minutes of battle the Rangers lost nearly one third of their unit and were overrun. Marine air support was called in from Chu Lai and Marine Helicopters evacuated the wounded, the 1st Battalion ARVN, attempted to reinforce the Rangers but was unable to. Eventually the 1st Battalion 6th ARVN Regiment was moved from Tam Ky replacing the Rangers and established a night defensive perimeter. The next morning, the 5th ARVN Regiment command group and it's 1st Battalion bore the weight of the VC attack. On 9 December, about 0645, the 60th, and 80th VC Battalions struck. The ARVN Regimental commander was killed and his force scattered to the south and east. At this point General Henderson decided to commit his Marines. LtCol. Utters 2nd Battalion 7th Marines was heli-lifted from Tam Ky just west of the ARVN, and By late afternoon only encountered a few Viet Cong. The same afternoon LtCol. Dorseys 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines who had motored south from DaNang were heli-lifted from a point near Thang Binh to a landing zone southeast of the 5th ARVN Regiments command group and it's 1st Battalion. Before the Marines could reach Hill 43 they ran into a force of 200 VC. The battle raged until darkness fell and resulted in 11 Marines WIA, and 17 WIA with the VC sustaining a loss of approximately 75 KIA.
On the 10th, General Henderson ordered Utter to drive east, and Dorsey to push northeast, LtCol. Robert T.Henifin's 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines were to be heli-lifted into the area and the avenue of escape for the VC to the south was to be closed. At 1100 "Fox" Company was heli-lifted to a landing zone near the hamlet of Cam La, the helicopters came under 12.7mm machine gun fire from Hill 407 and the Marines in the landing zone were kept under continuous machine gun and mortar fire. Since the rest of the Battalion landed West because of the intense ground fire, LtCol. Utter's Battalion was ordered to move South to aid the hard hit unit. "Echo" Company finally reached the stranded unit but was hit hard on its right flank; the Marines managed to join forces but sustained casualties of 20 dead and over 80 wounded for the day. As darkness fell on the battlefield that day, General Walt relieved General Henderson, and BrigGen. Jonas M. Platt became head of Task Force DELTA
On the 11th, Task Force DELTA maneuvered to consolidate it's position, by the end of the day it was apparent that the enemy had vanished. General Platt suspected that the 1st VC Regiment retreated into the Phouc Ha Valley. B52 strikes were planned and carried out on the 12th before the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines entered to search the Valley. The 1st VC Regiment was not found but large amounts of enemy supplies and equipment were found and destroyed.
The Fight at Ky Phu
While the two Marine battalions were operating in the Phouc Ha Valley, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines sought the VC along the northern bank of the Song Chang, also known as the Khang River. Except for a few snipers the Marines had more trouble with the weather, Monsoon rains harassed the Marines every step
On 18 December, on the last leg of its long trek, the Marines encountered the 80th VC Battalion in strength. In the morning the 2nd Battalion moved out in a column, with "Golf" In the lead, followed by "Fox", H&S and "Hotel" Company from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines who had replaced "Echo" because of it's high casualties, "Hotel" Company 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was not with the Battalion but was providing security for the 107mm Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. The Viet Cong allowed the Lead Company to pass through the village of Ky Phu before opening up fire on "Golf" Companies advance guard. Thinking it was an enemy force of snipers "Fox" was ordered to move forward. As "Fox" passed through the East End of Ky Phu enemy mortar rounds began to drop on H&S Company, which was still in the open rice paddies. As the mortars rained down on the Marines, the CO of H&S Company, Lt. Nicholas H, Grosz Jr., crossed the open area between his Company and the Command group warning Col. Utter of the impending danger to the Marines. Grosz then dashed across the fire swept rice paddies to rally his men against the insurgent forces. Two Viet Cong Companies were trying to enter the gap between "Fox" and 'H&S" Companies and envelope the command group. Having been warned by Lt. Grosz, and realizing that he was engaged with a major force Utter ordered "Fox" to turn and attack the "main VC positions on the H&S right flank". Supported by "Huey" gunships and artillery the Marines counterattacked, the VC just broke and ran. At the rear of the column, the VC stuck "Hotel" Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, from both the flank and the rear. Both the company commander and radio operator were mortally wounded. Lt. Harvey C. Barnum Jr., the attached artillery forward observer rallied the company and after four hours of bitter fighting led the Company into Ky Phu and rejoined the Battalion. For his heroic exploits that day he was awarded the Medal of Honor. By nightfall the 80th VC Battalion broke, leaving 104 bodies on the battlefield, LtCol. Utter's command had sustained 11 killed and 17 wounded.
The Aftermath
The next day, the 19th, all three Marine Battalions completed their movement for all practical purposes the operation was over, Harvest Moon/Lien Ket 18 officially ended on 20 December. The USMC-ARVN Operation accounted for 407 enemy killed, 33 captured, Marine casualties were 45 killed and 218 wounded. General Lam's ARVN suffered 90 killed, 91 missing, and 141 wounded, most occurring during the first two days. Despite poor weather conditions air power played a major role and the Marines learned valuable lessons in air-ground coordination for future operations
December, 1965
The plan for OPERATION HARVEST MOON / LIEN KET 18 directed the 5th ARVN Regiment, consisting of the Headquarters Group and 1st Battalion and the 11th Ranger Battalion to enter the Que Son Valley along the Thang Binh-Hiep Duc road on 8 December 1965. The objective for the first day was a point south of the village of Que Son, 8 miles southwest of Route 1. According to allied intelligence sources, the 1st VC Regiment was west of this area; contact was not expected until the second day.
On 9 December, Lt. Colonel Utter's battalion was to be inserted behind the enemy to force them eastward into the advancing ARVN. Lt. Colonel Dorsey's battalion would then be inserted to reinforce Utter's unit when needed.
The VC Strike...and the Marines are committed
The 5th ARVN Regiment left Thang Binh on schedule with the 11th Ranger Battalion on the right of the road, and the Regiment's 1st Battalion on the left. During the first few hours, the advance was uneventful. At 1330, about half way to Que Son the Ranger battalion was ambushed by the 70th VC Battalion.* The enemy allowed the ARVN to close within twenty meters and then opened fire. In the first 15 minutes of the battle, the Rangers lost nearly one third of their personnel and were overrun. According to an American advisor who was with the ARVN force, "They attacked in a mass and hit us from all sides...people were dropping around us right and left."
The badly mauled Ranger unit was able to withdraw to a position 1200 meters to the northwest and then called in Marine air support. Skyhawks from MAG-12 at Chu Lai attacked the Communist positions while Marine helicopters evacuated many of the casualties.
The first ARVN Battalion attempted to reinforce the rangers but was unable to cross the road because of enemy mortar fire and the U.S. air strikes. Later in the afternoon, General Lam, using 10 UH34Ds from Lt. Colonel Rex Denney, Jr's HMM-161, moved the 1st Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment from Tam Key to reinforce the surviving rangers and established a night defensive perimeter.
The next morning, the 5th ARVN Regiment command group and its 1st Battalion bore the weight of the VC attack. Although the battalion had been probed during the night, it had not seen heavy action. On 9 December, at about 0645, the 60th and 80th VC Battalions struck. In the heavy fighting that followed, both the 1st Battalion and the regimental command group were overrun. The ARVN regimental commander was killed and the ARVN force was scattered to the south and east. At about the same time, another VC battalion attacked the 6th ARVN Regiment to the northeast, but this ARVN unit managed to hold its ground.
At this point, General Henderson decided to commit his Marines. At 1000 hours, UH-3Ds from Denny's HMM-161 and Lt. Colonel LLoyd Childers HMM-361 lifted Utter's 2nd Battalion from Tam Key to a landing zone 5 1/2 miles west of the ARVN troops. After the landing, the battalion moved northeast, securing a hill mass 2,500 meters from the landing zone by late afternoon.
Utter's Marines encountered only a few Viet Cong and one of his platoon leaders complained: "The enemy always seemed one step ahead of us." The same afternoon, General Henderson directed Dorsey's 3rd battalion, 2rd Marines to land 1 1/2 miles southeast of the 5th ARVN Regiment's 1st Battalion and then move to link up with the shattered South Vietnamese unit.
Lt. Colonel Dorsey's Marines had left Da Nang by motor convoy that morning and were at the logistics support area on Route 1, 3 miles north of Thang Binh. Lt. Colonel Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261, the SLF helicopter squadron on board the LPH Valley Forge, was assigned the mission of ferrying the battalion into a landing zone southeast of the 5th ARVN Regiment's command group and its 1st Battalion
The 3rd Battalion landed at 1400 hours, and an hour and a half later, the battalion's lead unit, Company L, made contact with elements of the ARVN battalion and pushed northwestward toward Hill 43, 1 1/2 miles from the landiing zone. Before the Marines could reach the hill, they ran into a force of 200 VC. The firefight raged into the early evening. Supported by Marine air and artillery, Dorsey estimated that his battalion had killed 75 VC. Eleven Marines were dead and 17 wounded. The VC broke contact as darkness fell and the battalion established night positions. The next morning, the Marines took Hill 43, where they joined 40 South Vietnamese soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment.
On the 10th of December, General Henderson ordered Utter to drive east and Dorsey to push northwest to compress the enemy between them. The avenue of escape to the south was to be closed by Lt. Colonel Robert T. Hannifin Jr's 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, the SLF battalion which would be lifted into the area by Porter's HMM-261.
At 1100, 15 UH-34Ds from the Valley Forge lifted the assault elements of Company F to a landing zone near the hamlet of Cam La, 5 miles southeast of Que Son. As the helicopters landed, they came under heavy 12.7mm machine gun fire from emplacements on Hill 407, 2,000 meters to the south. The intense, heavy caliber fire surprised the Marines
Colonel Michael R. Yunck**, the 1st MAW G3, who had volunteered to act as Tactical Air Controller (Airborne) for the assault mission remembered: "We thought the LZ was far enough from the hill to the south to nullify effective fire from that distance and pretty well scrubbed the immediate area of the LZ." As the assault helicopters lifted off, Yunck maneuvered his UH-1E over the landing zone to locate the enemy gunners, but in the process was wounded by a 12.7 round. His Co-pilot, Major Edward Kuykendall, took control of the air operation and directed the remaining helicopters carrying Hannifin's command group and Company G to land in another LZ further west.
Company F at the first landing site was in trouble. The enemy kept the Marines under continuous machine gun fire and then opened up with mortars and small arms fire. The company took what cover it could in the open rice paddies and waited for reinforcements. Since the rest of the battalion had landed to the west, the task force commander ordered a company from Utter's battalion to move south to aid the hard-hit unit. Company E, 2/7, pushed southward to Hannifin's Company F, but was hit on its right flank by enemy fire. With some difficulty, Company E reached an area from which it could support the stranded company. Company F began withdrawing under the relief force's covering fire. Ten hours after the first helicopter had landed. Hannifin's battalion command group, Companys G and F, and Company E from Utter's battalion joined forces. Both Companies E and F had suffered substantial casualties during the day...20 dead and over 80 wounded.***
As darkness fell on the battlefield that day, General Walt relieved General Henderson. Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt became the head of Task Force Delta. General Platt, appraised of the battle situation, ordered another of Utter's companies to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Company G, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines arrived at Hannifin's position at 0300 the next morning.
The Search of the Phouc Ha Valley
On the 11th of December Task Force Delta manuuevered to consolidate its position, and General Platt, airborne in a helicopter, studied the terrain from which the Marines of Company F and helicopters of HMM-261 had received such extensive fire on the 10th of December. The General, surprised that his craft did not draw any fire, surmised that the Viet Cong must have abandoned their positions on Hill 407 during the night. Platt, therefore, ordered Col. Utter to seize the hill, a task which 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines accomplished without opposition.
In the interim, Col. Dorsey's 3rd Battalion searched the area north of Hill 407, while the remaining two companies of Hannifin's 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines were helilifted from the ARG ships to join the battalion. By the end of the day, it was apparent that the enemy, except for a few snipers, had vanished. General Platt suspected that the regiment had retreated into the Phouc Ha Valley, a smaller valley paralleling the Que Son Valley, 5 miles to the southeast. The Phouc Ha Valley was known VC base area. When General Thi was questioned about going into the valley after the Communists, The I Corps commander replied, "Be very, very careful." On the afternoon of the 11th, Platt was visited by Brigadier General William DePuy, General Westmoreland's J-3, who suggested that USAF B-52s from Guam could could strike the objective area before the Marines entered. General Platt accepted the offer and the first of several B-52 raids occurred on the morning of the 12th.
Lt. Colonel Joshua W. Dorsey (left) Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines confers with Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt (right). Dorsey's battalion is about to enter the Phuoc Ha Valley, a known VC main base area.
General Platt, on board a helicopter observed the first strike and directed Dorsey and Hannifin to move their battalions in to exploit the bombing mission. During the afternoon, Hannifin's battalion deployed south of the valley while Dorsey moved along two ridges, Hills 100 and 180, overlooking the northern entrances to the Phuoc Ha Valley. During the night of 12 December, General Platt ordered Dorsey to move 1,000 meters to the north so that the B52's could strike the valley again.
The next morning, after the second B52 air strike, the two Marine battalions entered the valley from both the north and the south. While searching the target area, Dorsey's battalion did not find the 1st VC Regiment, but discovered large amounts of enemy supplies and equipment. The two battalions remained in the valley for the next few days, but encountered little organized resistance.
The fight at Ky Phu
While the two battalions were operating in the Phouc Ha Valley, Utter's battalion sought the VC along along the northern bank of the Song Chang, also known as the Khang River, seven miles south of Que Son. The battalion then turned eastward toward Tam Ky, sweeping the southern boundary of the Harvest Moon objective area. The Marines had more trouble with the weather than the enemy. Except for occasional snipers, the enemy could not be located, but the monsoon rains harassed the Marines every step. During the prolonged search, the battalion slogged over 20 miles through extremely rugged terrain, varying from rice paddies to jungle-covered hills.
On 18 December, the 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, on the last leg of its long trek, encountered the 80th VC Battalion in strength. Earlier that morning, after evacuating 54 Marines suffering from immersion foot, the battalion moved out in column formation with company G in the lead, followed by Company F, H&S, and Company H, 2nd Bn, 9th Marines. The Marines moved along a narrow road which wound through hedgerow-bordered rice paddies. The Viet Cong allowed the lead company to pass through the village of Ky Phu before opening fire on the Company G advance guard. At first, Col. Utter thought that the enemy force consisted only of a few snipers and ordered Company G to clear the area south of the road and moved Company F forward.
Company F had just passed through the east end of Ky Phu when enemy mortar rounds dropped on H&S Company, still in the open paddies west of the hamlet. Two VC companies tried to enter the gap between Company F and H&S and envelop Utter's command group and H&S Company. 1st Lt. Nicholas Grosz, Jr. recalled that he crossed the area between his company and the battalion command group and told Col. Utter of the "H&S deteriorating situation". Realizing that he was engaged with a major enemy force, the battalion commander ordered Company F to turn and attack the "main VC positions on the H&S right flank."
Supported by "Huey" gunships and accurate artillery from Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, the Marines counterattacked. Company F rolled up the VC from the rear while H&S Company fought its way into Ky Phu. According to Grosz, who accompanied the lead elements of Company F in the attack, "Once we got them going, the VC just broke and ran. It was just like a turkey shoot."
At the rear of the column, Company H remained in contact with the enemy; a VC company struck the Marines from both flanks and the rear. Both the company commander and his radio operator were mortally wounded. 1st Lt. Harvey C. Barnum, the attached artillery forward observer, did what he could to save the two dying Marines, strapped the radio on his back and assumed command. The young officer rallied the company and the Marines established a defensive position on a small hill north of the road.After four hours of fighting, Barnum led Company H into Ky Phu and rejoined the battalion.****
By nightfall, the fight at Ky Phu was over. The 80th VC Battalion broke, leaving 104 bodies on the battlefield, 76 of them killed by the artillery fire. Col. Utter's command had sustained 11 killed and 71 wounded.
The Wrap-Up
The next day, 19 December, all three of the Marine battalions completed their movement out of the operation area. For all practical purposes, the Operation was over, but Operation Harvest Moon / Lien Ket ended officially on 20 December when all allied forces returned to their enclaves. The combined USMC-ARVN operation had accounted for 407 enemy killed, 33 captured, and 13 crew-served and 95 individual weapons seized. In addition, 60 tons of food and ammunition were taken in the Phuoc Ha Valley. Marine casualties were 45 killed and 218 wounded. General Lam's forces suffered 90 killed, 91 missing, and 141 wounded, most occurring during the first two days of the operation.
Operation Harvest Moon was not without its problems. The hastily established provisional headquarters, the fast moving ground situation, poor weather conditions, and the large number of tactical aircraft operating over the Que Son Valley caused coordination and control difficulties. Marines learned valuable lessons in air/ground coordination for future operations.
Harvest Moon was the last of the Marine's big battles in 1965. These large-scale efforts had become a regular feature of the war for General Walt's forces. During the last half of its first calendar year in country, III MAF conducted 15 operations of battalion size or larger. American intelligence agencies indicated that during 1966, General Walt's forces would face even larger enemy forces as North Vietnamese troops entered South Vietnam to join their Vietcong comrades. The big unit actions were only one aspect of the Marine war, nevertheless, in I Corps, According to Lt. General Victor Krulak: "we cannot be entrapped in the dangerous premise that destruction of the VC organized units per se is the whole answer to winning the war, any more than we can accept the erroneous view that pacification and civic action will solve the problem if major enemy forces are free to roam the countryside".
*The 70th Battalion, although not organic to the 1st VC Regiment, was attached during this period. Colonel Ralph E. Sullivan recalled that information on Harvest Moon was severely restricted. According to Sullivan, the 5th ARVN regimental commander was told his mission "was to be a routine 'sweep and clear' along Highway 1 to the vicinity of Key Lam. Upon reaching the vicinity of Thang Binh [the regimental commander] was brought to the "bunker" at Da Nang about 1500 on 7 December and apprised of his actual mission. General Thi warned us not to discuss the operation with any of the ARVN except for a select few in his own headquarters and that of General Lam's. The fact that at 1330 hours, 8 December the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion walked into a "prepared" ambush is prima facie evidence that if the the regimental commander was kept in the dark, the commander of the 1st VC Regiment was not."
**Colonel Yunck was the 1963 Marine Aviator of the Year. He was awarded his second Silver Star for his actions during Harvest Moon. His leg had to be amputated as a result of the wound he suffered during the battle.
***One of those casualties was Captain James E. Page, Company F commander, who had been pronounced dead on the battlefield. The next day medical personnel checking the bodies detected a faint heart beat and evacuated Capt. Page to a hospital The captain recovered.
****Lt. Barnum was performing temporary duty in Vietnam from his permanent station at Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor. He had volunteered for 60 days of "on-the-job" training under the FMPac combat indoctrination program. For his heroic exploits in this engagement, Lt. Barnum was awarded the Medal of Honor.
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. The criteria were announced in a War Department circular dated February 22, 1932, and authorized award to soldiers, upon their request, who had been awarded the Meritorious Service Citation Certificate, Army Wound Ribbon, or were authorized to wear Wound Chevrons subsequent to April 5, 1917 MoreHide
Criteria The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. ... The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is awarded on a selective basis to enlisted members in the Regular Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve to recognize good behavior and faithful service in the U.S. Marine Corps while on active duty for a specified period of time. MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout... The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of South Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. MoreHide
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide