Hatfield, Jerome David, MSgt

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Last Rank
Master Sergeant
Last Primary MOS
0369-Infantry Unit Leader
Last MOSGroup
Infantry
Primary Unit
2008-2009, 0313, 2nd Marine Division
Service Years
1991 - 2009
Enlisted Collar Insignia
Master Sergeant
Four Hash Marks

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 Personal Details 



Home State
Virginia
Virginia
Year of Birth
1972
 
This Military Service Page was created/owned by SgtMaj Steven Crawford ("Phillip") to remember Marine MSgt Jerome David Hatfield.

If you knew or served with this Marine and have additional information or photos to support this Page, please leave a message for the Page Administrator(s) HERE.
 
Casualty Info
Home Town
Axton
Casualty Date
Jul 11, 2009
 
Cause
KIA-Died of Wounds
Reason
Other Explosive Device
Location
Afghanistan
Conflict
OEF-Afghanistan/Consolidation II (2006 - 2009)/Operation Khanjar
Location of Interment
Brim Family Cemetery - Stella, Virginia

 Official Badges 


 Unofficial Badges 

Drill Instructor


 Military Associations and Other Affiliations
GWOT Fallen
  2009, GWOT Fallen


 Additional Information
Last Known Activity:

Fighting and leading his Marines in the war of Afghanistan.

   
Comments/Citation:

Citation: For heroic achievement in connection with combat operations against the enemy while serving as the Operations Chief, Delta Company, 2D Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Expeditionary Brigade - Afghanistan, from 6 May 2009 to 11 July 2009 in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Master Sergeant Hatfield led the company advanced party to Afghanistan to supervise the receipt and inspection of 25 Light Armored Vehicles and all stock list 3 items. His diligence allowed Delta Company to complete final preparations for combat in a mere two weeks after the main body arrived, thereby enabling the battalion to meet timelines for offensive operations. During the initial days of OPERATION KHANJARI, Master Sergeant Hatfield organized the defense of the Khan Neshin district center and helped repel several combined arms counterattacks by the enemy. The force protection measures he implemented withstood two direct hits from 107-milimeter rockets during one of these attacks and prevented serious injury or death to company leadership and civilian aid workers in the area. On the evening of 11 July 2009, the enemy attacked a combat logistics patrol led by Master Sergeant Hatfield with an improvised explosive device. Master Sergeant Hatfield received life-threatening wounds in the blast but directed rescuers to tend to his driver first before allowing them to remove him from the vehicle. Although gravely wounded, Master Sergeant Hatfield continued to see to the treatment of his crew until he succumbed to his wounds during medical evacuation. Master Sergeant Hatfield's distinctive contributions, unrelenting perseverance, and steadfast devotion to duty reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Servce.

Summary of Action: MSgt Hatfield was in receipt of imminent danger pay during this period. Combat Distinguishing Device is authorized.

MSgt Jerome D. Hatfield is enthusiastically recommended for the Bronze Star Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device (posthumously) for his heroic achievement as Operations Chief, Company D, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade from 6 May to 11 July 2009 in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. MSgt Hatfield's impressive achievements, leadership, and selfless devotion to duty are set forth in the following:

MSgt Hatfield volunteered for a transfer from H&S Company to Company D when 2d LAR Bn received short-notice deployment orders to Afghanistan as part of the 2d MEB. This was a period of key leadership transition in Co D due to PCS orders and post-deployment reassignments. With only 6.5 months of dwell after a 7-month deployment (less than 1:1 deploy-to-dwell ratio) following OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 08.1, MSgt Hatfield assumed his post. With a 1stLt commanding officer awaiting PCS orders, the executive officer on temporary additional duty, and a new 1stSgt unfamiliar with LAR operations, MSgt Hatfield immediately became the keystone of the company. As the operations chief, he oversaw the transfer and integration of more than 50% of Company D personnel, he then formed vehicle crews and scout teams to prepare for training. MSgt Hatfield also reorganized the armory and supervised the receipt of 25 new LAV-A2 variants. He diligently ensured closure of all outstanding discrepancies, maintained accountability of more than $90 million worth of equipment, and set a standard of professionalism that would prove invaluable when the company repeated these procedures twice more during training and embarkation.

After organizing and equipping the company, MSgt Hatfield applied his 18 years of Marine Corps experience to training the Marines for combat. With less than 120 days notice prior to deployment, he helped develop and support a condensed training plan that achieved quantifiable improvement in individual and small unit skills. An example of MSgt Hatfield's exceptional performance during this period was his support of annual LAV-25 gunnery qualifications while simultaneously embarking the company's equipment. Within a twenty-four hour period, he established a gunnery range complete with a company outpost, billeting area, maintenance area, fueling point, ammunition supply point and a command and control structure. Concurrently, after supervising 17-hour firing days, he returned to the company office to reconcile embarkation data and pack shipping containers. MSgt Hatfield efficiently accomplished all tasks without compromise, enabling the company to meet all training objectives ahead of schedule and enjoy an unplanned 48hr liberty period prior to deploying to Ft Irwin for a month-long training exercise.

Company D participated in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) at the National Training Center, Ft Irwin, CA during March 2009. This unique training venue presented numerous challenges that MSgt Hatfield tackled with his trademark thoroughness. He led the inventory and joint limited technical inspection of 25 LAVs from two separate commands and supervised their preparation for a 120-mile road march from Twentynine Palms to Fort Irwin. Other companies relied heavily on MSgt Hatfield due to his previous experience as the battalion logistics chief and he willingly mentored and assisted his peers throughout the month-long training event. He also advised the newly appointed company commander who was inexperienced in LAR operations. MSgt Hatfield participated closely in the tactical planning and his input directly contributed the successful completion of several live-fire and maneuver ranges as well as the Full Spectrum Operations culminating exercise.

Redeploying in early April to Camp Lejeune, MSgt Hatfield set in motion a plan to support Block V of the Pre-Deployment Training Program continuum and prepare the company for an early May deployment date. The Military Operations on Urban Terrain package he helped develop became the backdrop venue for a visit by the Secretary of Defense, and the final gear inspections that he supervised ensured all personnel were ready for combat. When last minute troop level restrictions cancelled Co D's deployment orders, MSgt Hatfield volunteered to lead a small advanced party forward with the battalion command element in anticipation of an increased force cap. It was in this capacity that MSgt Hatfield single-handedly contributed directly to successful combat operations involving Co D and 2d LAR Bn.

The advanced party arrived at Forward Operating Base Leatherneck, Helmand Province, Afghanistan and discovered austere conditions unsuitable for follow on forces. With minimal life support and no equipment, MSgt Hatfield and two LCpls set to work preparing for the arrival of the remainder of Company D. Displaying the same boundless initiative and tireless work ethic demonstrated during three previous equipment transfers, MSgt Hatfield expertly received 25 LAVs, supervised SL-3 inventories, inspected maintenance readiness, and worked with the battalion ordnance officer to correct deficiencies prior to the company's arrival. His efforts enabled Co D to complete reception, staging, onward movement, and integration in a mere two weeks after their arrival, thereby allowing the battalion to meet the timelines of OPERATION KHANJARI. Without MSgt Hatfield's leadership and experience, it is unlikely that Co D and 2d LAR Bn would have met the bold mission requirements to conduct a lengthy cross-country movement and to seize the furthest south district center in the Helmand Province.

On the afternoon of 27 June 2009, Co D departed FOB Leatherneck for an attack position in the western desert. The company crossed the line of departure the following day and completed more than 200km of off-road movement at night. Co D accomplished this tactical movement with no mechanical breakdowns due in large part to MSgt Hatfield and his work during the joint limited technical inspection process. During the movement, he supervised several recovery operations in difficult terrain ensuring that the unit adhered to timelines established for the assault. Company D, the battalion main effort, seized the Khan Neshin district center in the early morning hours of 1 July 2009. MSgt Hatfield immediately organized the defense of the 300-year-old castle and directed efforts to improve the company position. Operating in 120-degree heat and without heavy equipment, he oversaw the transformation of a dilapidated fortress into a defensible position within less than 72 hours. Marines, under his supervision, constructed and reinforced three entry control points, the combat operations center, and living spaces for a myriad of civilian and other government agency personnel. In the span of a few short days, Co D nearly doubled in size as members of the Afghan National Security Forces, Provincial Reconstruction Team, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other organizations occupied the castle. MSgt Hatfield briefed these groups on the defensive plan and ensured all military and non-military occupants had access to adequate cover.
The enemy launched a series of counter attacks against the district center shortly after Co D seized the castle. During a seven-day period, defenders repulsed two combined arms attacks and withstood numerous rocket strikes within the compound with no casualties to coalition forces or their partners. Two 107-millimeter rockets impacted the COC and civilian living area during one of these rocket attacks. Despite the direct hits, there were no casualties and only minimal damage to critical equipment due in large part to the survivability and force protection measures MSgt Hatfield implemented. MSgt Hatfield quickly had the damaged area repaired and continued his aggressive force protection plan throughout the early days of July.

On the evening of 11 July 2009, MSgt Hatfield departed the company perimeter at Khan Neshin Castle on a combat logistics patrol to the battalion command post. MSgt Hatfield was the vehicle commander on his Light Armored Vehicle-Logistics variant and travelled as the second vehicle in the patrol. As the patrol passed a series of ruins seven kilometers from Khan Neshin Castle, the enemy attacked MSgt Hatfield's vehicle with a pressure-plate initiated improvised explosive device. The violent force from an estimated 80 pounds of bulk explosive sent the vehicle airborne and cause severe and irreparable damage to the hull, suspension, and drivetrain. The explosive energy from the blast also sent shrapnel flying through the vehicle and rendered three scouts traveling in the cargo compartment unconscious. The shrapnel and concussion effects of the explosion killed the driver instantly and severed both of MSgt Hatfield's legs. Although his own wounds were life threatening, MSgt Hatfield directed rescuers first to the driver before allowing them to remove him from the vehicle and continued to ask about the condition of his crew throughout the evacuation process. Despite rescue efforts and treatment by shock trauma doctors, MSgt Hatfield succumbed to his wounds on the medical evacuation helicopter.

MSgt Hatfield was a consummate professional who repeatedly proved invaluable to mission accomplishment during a challenging pre-deployment training period and difficult combat deployment. His exceptional efforts to organize, train, equip Company D directly contributed to the success of the battalion and his courageous combat leadership set the example for all to emulate. MSgt Hatfield's influence is still felt today and his commitment and self- sacrifice are deserving of recognition with the Bronze Star Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device for his heroic achievements.

   


OIF/Iraqi Surge (2007-08)
From Month/Year
January / 2007
To Month/Year
December / 2008

Description
In the context of the Iraq War, the surge refers to United States President George W. Bush's 2007 increase in the number of American troops in order to provide security to Baghdad and Al Anbar Province.

The surge had been developed under the working title "The New Way Forward" and it was announced in January 2007 by Bush during a television speech. Bush ordered the deployment of more than 20,000 soldiers into Iraq, five additional brigades, and sent the majority of them into Baghdad. He also extended the tour of most of the Army troops in country and some of the Marines already in the Anbar Province area. The President described the overall objective as establishing a "...unified, democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror." The major element of the strategy was a change in focus for the US military "to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security". The President stated that the surge would then provide the time and conditions conducive to reconciliation among political and ethnic factions.

Units deployed
The five U.S. Army brigades committed to Iraq as part of the surge were

2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (Infantry): 3,447 troops. Deployed to Baghdad, January 2007
4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Infantry): 3,447 troops. Deployed to Baghdad, February 2007
3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Heavy): 3,784 troops. Deployed to southern Baghdad Belts, March 2007
4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker): 3,921 troops. Deployed to Diyala province, April 2007
2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Heavy): 3,784 troops. Deployed to the southeast of Baghdad, May 2007
This brought the number of U.S. brigades in Iraq from 15 to 20. Additionally, 4,000 Marines in Al Anbar had their 7-month tour extended. These included Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, the 2nd Battalion 4th Marines, the 1st Battalion 6th Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines. Most of the 150,000 Army personnel had their 12-month tours extended as well. By July, 2007, the percentage of the mobilized Army deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan was almost 30%; the percentage of the mobilized Marine Corps deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan was 13.5%.[55]

Operations
The plan began with a major operation to secure Baghdad, codenamed Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Operation Imposing Law), which was launched in February 2007. However, only in mid-June 2007, with the full deployment of the 28,000 additional U.S. troops, could major counter-insurgency efforts get fully under way. Operation Phantom Thunder was launched throughout Iraq on June 16, with a number of subordinate operations targeting insurgents in Diyala province, Anbar province and the southern Baghdad Belts. The additional surge troops also participated in Operation Phantom Strike and Operation Phantom Phoenix, named after the III "Phantom" Corps which was the major U.S. unit in Iraq throughout 2007.

Counterinsurgency strategy
Counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq changed significantly under the command of General Petraeus since the 2007 troop surge began. The newer approach attempted to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people through building relationships, preventing civilian casualties and compromising with and even hiring some former enemies. The new strategy was population-centric in that it focused in protecting the population rather than killing insurgents. In implementing this strategy, Petraeus used experienced gained while commanding the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003. He also explained these ideas extensively in Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, which he assisted in the writing of while serving as the Commanding General of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) located there.

Instead of seeing every Iraqi as a potential enemy, the current COIN strategy focuses on building relationships and getting cooperation from the Iraqis against Al Qaeda and minimizing the number of enemies for U.S. forces. The belief is that maintaining a long term presence of troops in a community improves security and allows for relationships and trust to develop between the locals and the U.S. military. Civilian casualties are minimized by carefully measured use of force. This means less bombing and overwhelming firepower, and more soldiers using restraint and even sometimes taking more risk in the process.

Another method of gaining cooperation is by paying locals, including former insurgents, to work as local security forces. Former Sunni insurgents have been hired by the U.S. military to stop cooperating with Al Qaeda and to start fighting against them.

To implement this strategy, troops were concentrated in the Baghdad area (at the time, Baghdad accounted for 50% of all the violence in Iraq).[64] Whereas in the past, Coalition forces isolated themselves from Iraqis by living in large forward operating bases far from population centers,[65] troops during the surge lived among the Iraqis, operating from joint security stations (JSSs) located within Baghdad itself and shared with Iraqi security forces. Coalition units were permanently assigned to a given area so that they could build long-term relationships with the local Iraqi population and security forces.

However, opponents to occupation such as US Army Col. David H. Hackworth (Ret.), asked whether he thought that British soldiers are better at nation-building than the Americans, said "They were very good at lining up local folks to do the job like operating the sewers and turning on the electricity. Far better than us -- we are heavy-handed, and in Iraq we don't understand the people and the culture. Thus we did not immediately employ locals in police and military activities to get them to build and stabilize their nation."

CNN war correspondent Michael Ware, who has reported from Iraq since before the U.S. invasion in 2003 had a similar dim view of occupation saying, "there will be very much mixed reaction in Iraq” to a long-term troop presence, but he added, “what’s the point and will it be worth it?” Mr. Ware contended that occupation could, "ferment further resentment [towards the U.S]."

Results
Security situation

Hostile and Non-Hostile Deaths.
Despite a massive security crackdown in Baghdad associated with the surge in coalition troop strength, the monthly death toll in Iraq rose 15% in March 2007. 1,869 Iraqi civilians were killed and 2,719 were wounded in March, compared to 1,646 killed and 2,701 wounded in February. In March, 165 Iraqi policemen were killed against 131 the previous month, while 44 Iraqi soldiers died compared to 29 in February. US military deaths in March were nearly double those of the Iraqi army, despite Iraqi forces leading the security crackdown in Baghdad. The death toll among insurgent militants fell to 481 in March, compared to 586 killed in February; however, the number of arrests jumped to 5,664 in March against 1,921 in February.

Three months after the start of the surge, troops controlled less than a third of the capital, far short of the initial goal, according to an internal military assessment completed in May 2007. Violence was especially chronic in mixed Shiite-Sunni neighborhoods in western Baghdad. Improvements had not yet been widespread or lasting across Baghdad.

Significant attack trends.
On September 10, 2007, David Petraeus delivered his part of the Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq. He concluded that "the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met." He cited what he called recent consistent declines in security incidents, which he attributed to recent blows dealt against Al-Qaeda in Iraq during the surge. He added that "we have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq." He argued that Coalition and Iraqi operations had drastically reduced ethno-sectarian violence in the country, though he stated that the gains were not entirely even. He recommended a gradual drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq with a goal of reaching pre-surge troop levels by July 2008 and stated that further withdraws would be "premature."

Sectarian violence.
While Petraeus credited the surge for the decrease in violence, the decrease also closely corresponded with a cease-fire order given by Iraqi political leader Muqtada al-Sadr on August 29, 2007. Al-Sadr's order, to stand down for six months, was distributed to his loyalists following the deaths of more than 50 Shia Muslim pilgrims during fighting in Karbala the day earlier.

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell of the Brookings Institution stated on December 22, 2007 that Iraq’s security environment had reached its best levels since early 2004 and credited Petraeus' strategy for the improvement. CNN stated that month that the monthly death rate for US troops in Iraq had hit its second lowest point during the entire course of the war. Military representatives attributed the successful reduction of violence and casualties directly to the troop surge. At the same time, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior reported similar reductions for civilian deaths.

Iraqi Security Force deaths.
However, on September 6, 2007, a report by an independent military commission headed by General James Jones found that the decrease in violence may have been due to areas being overrun by either Shias or Sunnis. In addition, in August 2007, the International Organization for Migration and the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization indicated that more Iraqis had fled since the troop increase.

On February 16, 2008, Iraqi Defense Minister Abdel Qader Jassim Mohammed told reporters that the surge was "working very well" and that Iraq has a "pressing" need for troops to stay to secure Iraqi borders.[76] He stated that "Results for 2007 prove that– Baghdad is good now".

In June 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that "the security, political and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven."

U.S. troop fatalities in Iraq by month, the orange and blue months being post-troop surge.
In the month of July, 2008, US forces lost only 13 soldiers, the lowest number of casualties sustained by US troops in one month since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Also, a report by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, given to Congress in May 2008, and published July 1, stated that the Iraqi government had met 15 of the 18 political benchmarks set out for them.
   
My Participation in This Battle or Operation
From Month/Year
January / 2008
To Month/Year
December / 2008
 
Last Updated:
Mar 16, 2020
   
Personal Memories
   
Units Participated in Operation

7th Marines

1st Bn, 1st Marines (1/1)

MASS-3, MACG-38

3rd Bn, 6th Marines (3/6)

5th Marines

2nd Bn, 4th Marines (2/4)

3rd Bn, 4th Marines (3/4)

3rd Bn, 4th Marines (3/4)

1st Combat Engineer Bn (CEB)

HMM-262

3rd Bn, 7th Marines (3/7)

3rd Bn, 7th Marines (3/7)

2nd Bn, 7th Marines (2/7)

3rd Bn, 2nd Marines (3/2)

HMM-161

2nd Marine Division

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron - 2 (VMAQ-2)

HMH-466 (Wolf Pack)

1st Bn, 10th Marines (1/10)

MWSS-371 Sandsharks

2nd Engineer Bn

VMFA-115

2nd Bn, 3rd Marines (2/3)

HMR-162

HMM-361

MAG-29

1st Bn, 4th Marines (1/4)

VMFA-122 (Crusaders)

HMLA-167

8th Comm Bn

9th Engineer Support Bn (ESB)

2nd Medical Bn

8th Engineer Support Bn (ESB)

2nd Bn, 5th Marines (2/5)

2nd Bn, 24th Marines (2/24)

H&S Bn, 1st Marine Logistics Group (1st MLG)

9th Comm Bn

2nd Assault Amphibian Bn (2nd AABn)

2nd Supply Bn

HMLA-367

9th Engineer Bn

 
My Photos From This Battle or Operation
No Available Photos

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  • Adams, John, CWO5, (1984-Present)
  • Adams, Troy, Sgt, (2000-2008)
  • Adcock, Richard, Sgt, (2005-2016)
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