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Profiles in Courage: The Heroic Battle of Iwo Jima

Japan's ambition as a world power began in the late 1800s, but lacking in raw materials (oil, iron, and rubber) necessary to make it a reality, it seized material-rich colonies and islands. Ensuring they kept what they seized, Japan established naval and army bases throughout the Pacific. Following long-standing complaints from the United States about their laying claims on territories that did not belong to them, Japan's military leaders unwisely decided to attack America, beginning with the infamous surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the naval officer, tasked with planning and carrying out the attack, said: "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve." His insightful prophecy became a horrible reality for Japan.

As the Americans prepared to take the offensive in 1942, military planners realized it would be impossible to recapture every Japanese-held island in the Pacific, so a strategy of "island-hopping" was created. This allowed Allied forces to bypass heavily fortified, sizable Japanese garrisons and instead concentrate its limited resources on strategically important islands that were not well defended but capable of supporting the drive to the main island of Japan.

By early 1945, American forces had re-taken a sweeping number of islands held by the Japanese.  For all its gains, however, two small Japanese homeland islands - Iwo Jima and Okinawa - remained critical to a successful invasion of Japan. Capturing these two heavily defended islands would give American forces vital staging areas and airfields within the bombing range of Japan. 

Iwo Jima was attacked first. After ten weeks of relentless bombing from carrier-based planes and medium bombers - the heaviest up to that point in the war - it was thought the island defenses would be in ruins. That was not to be. The island commander, Lt. General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, prepared his defenses it depth, having constructed a vast array of interlocking fortified positions connected by a large network of underground tunnel and caves providing cover from naval fire and aerial bombs.

 

At 2 a.m. on February 19, 1945, as the Marine landing force lay off shore, U.S. ships and aircraft delivered pre-landing fires. Still, like the earlier ship and aerial bombardments, it proved largely ineffective due to the nature of the Japanese defenses.

The next morning, at 8:59 a.m., the first landings began as the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions came ashore. 

 

Early resistance was minimal. This proved to be only a trick to draw the exposed Marines onto the beaches. It was then that determined Japanese defenders, led by Kuribayashi, opened up from their concealed mountain defenses.

Against these defenses, the Marine now had to advance. Subject to relentless gunfire and shelling from Japanese artillery, they moved by the inch, not the mile.  It took four days to advance 1,000 yards, scale Mt. Suribachi, and plant the flag captured in Joe Rosenthal's iconic photograph. But Marines still had to root out Japanese defenses stretched across the four-mile-long island. Even as American planes dropped bombs and napalm on Japanese concrete bunkers, they clung tenaciously to their positions forcing the Americans to roust them out bunker by bunker. Following a final Japanese assault during March 25-26, Iwo Jima was secured after 36 days of brutal combat.

But victory came at a heavy price. At the battle's conclusion, 6,281 Americans and more than 20,000 Japanese were killed. Twenty-two Marines and five sailors received the Medal of Honor for their actions on Iwo Jima - the most bestowed for any campaign. Admiral Nimitz remarked, "Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue."

Next came Okinawa, where the Japanese had more than three times the force than what had been committed to Iwo Jima. The Americans paid an even greater price for Okinawa: 12,000 Allied dead and another 38,000 wounded. But the Japanese lost more than 100,000 men and an island critical to the defense of Japan. The end of the battle left little doubt that the end of the war was near.

Although the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa were the most deadly and significant in the approach toward Japan, it was the battle of Iwo Jima that earned a place in American lore with the publication of Rosenthal's iconic photograph showing the U.S. flag being raised on the fourth day of the battle. The photograph was extremely popular, being reprinted in thousands of publications. It won the Pulitzer Prize for Photography that same year and ultimately came to be regarded as one of the most significant and recognizable images of war.


But that flag-raising was not the first. A 40-man combat patrol climbed Mt. Suribachi to attack and capture the mountaintop and raise the American flag to signal that the volcanic mountain was captured. The photograph of that flag raising by five Marines was shot by Photographer Staff Sgt. Louis R. Lowery. But the flag was too small to be seen easily from the nearby landing beaches on Iwo Jima, so a second, larger replacement flag with a longer and heavier pipe was planted hours later by five Marines and a Navy medical corpsman, resulting in the famous photograph taken by Joe Rosenthal.

According to Ruth Ben-Ghiat, a professor of history and a specialist in 20th-century European history, Rosenthal's photo became the more popular of the two because of how he captured the moment but also transcended it with its diagonal back-leaning position contrasting with the forward motion of the soldiers: "They seem to rise out of the ash and other detritus of the battlefield, and there is already something sculptural in their massed bodies, in their muscular legs and arms that strain to hoist up the heavy pole. The leg of the lead bearer crosses the flagpole, adding a further sense of solidity," she wrote about the photograph. She also wrote that there is something deeply reassuring about this photograph in its display of strength and teamwork and its communication of a push forward to victory. "The fact we cannot see their faces also works to lift the image out of its original context, lending it a universal quality," she added.

On July 2, 1945, while marines, soldiers, and sailors rested, trained, and prepared for the expected invasion of mainland Japan, the first atomic bomb was tested in New Mexico. An alternative to the invasion was now a definite possibility. On the morning of August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima. Three days later, Nagasaki suffered a similar fate. 

No mainland invasion would take place; the fighting and the war was over.

 

 

 

 

 


Battlefield Chronicles: Turning Point in Vietnam War

Most military historians and analysts agree the 1968 Tet Offensive was the turning point in the war in Vietnam. They reason that many Americans, seeing the bitter fighting raging up and down South Vietnam on the evening news, fostered a psychological impact that further generated an increased anti-war sentiment.

Although the Tet Offensive began on January 31, 1968, when the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces launched massive, well-coordinated surprise attacks on major cities, towns, and military bases throughout South Vietnam, it's planning began in early 1967. The plan's architect was General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's most brilliant military mind. He also engineered the Viet Minh's decisive victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. 

His overall plan for the Tet Offensive was somewhat similar: to ignite a general uprising among the South Vietnamese people, shatter the South Vietnamese military forces, and topple the Saigon regime. At the same time, he wanted to increase the level of pain for the Americans by inflicting more casualties on U.S. Forces. At the very least, he and the decision-makers in Hanoi hoped to position themselves more favorably in any peace negotiations they hoped would take place in the wake of the offensive.  Much in the same way, the April 1954 Geneva Agreements forced France to abandon its colonies on the Indochinese peninsula.  

The first step in Giap's plan was to draw U.S. and Allied attention away from the population centers, which would be their ultimate objectives for the 1968 Tet Offensive. This phase began in the summer months of 1967when NVA forces engaged the Marines in a series of sharp battles in the hills surrounding Khe Sanh, a base in western Thua Thien Province, south of the DMZ near the Laotian border. Further to the east, additional NVA forces besieged the Marine base at Con Thien just south of the Demilitarized Zone.  Further south, Communist forces attacked Loc Ninh and Song Be, both in III Corps Tactical Zone, and in November, they struck U.S. forces at Dak To in the Central Highlands. 

In purely tactical terms, these "border battles" were costly failures for the Communists, and they no doubt lost some of their best troops; three enemy regiments were mauled so badly that they were unavailable for the January 1968 Tet Offensive. In the intense, bloody battle of Dak To alone, Communist fatalities were estimated at 1,455 enemy were killed. 

However, at the operational level, these battles achieved the intent of Giap's plan by diverting General Westmoreland's attention to the outlying areas and away from the urban target areas that would be struck during the Tet attacks. 

In late December 1967, intelligence indicates a significant enemy built-up in the Khe Sanh area. Westmoreland, his staff, and the White House decided that this build-up signified that the enemy's main effort would take place at Khe Sanh. In anticipation of the big battle, Westmoreland began ordering large numbers of American units north, leaving urban areas vulnerable to attack.  

On January 21, 1968, North Vietnamese artillery began large-scale shelling of Khe Sanh followed by renewed heavy fighting in the hills surrounding the Marine base. This surge of enemy attacks confirmed Westmoreland's assumption that Khe Sanh was the focal point of a new Communist offensive. But he was mistaken. It was a ruse planned by Giap.

In the early morning hours of January 31, when the combined forces of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, a total of over 84,000 troops, struck with a fury that was breathtaking in both its scope and suddenness. In attacks that ranged from the DMZ all the way south to the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula, the NVA and V.C. struck 36 of South Vietnam's 44 province capitals, 5 of its six largest cities, 71 of 242 district capitals, and virtually every allied airfield and key military installation in the country. 

In one of the most spectacular attacks, 19 V.C. sappers conducted a daring raid on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, holding it for hours. Elsewhere in Saigon, V.C. units hit Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff headquarters, and a number of other key installations across the city. 

Of all the battles, the longest, bloodiest and most destructive was fought over Hue, in central Vietnam. Hue was also a battle where the Communist troops massacred many South Vietnamese civilians. Many were found in mass graves, the victims of what one former Vietcong official called ''revolutionary justice.''  Marines, Army and ARVN soldiers had to be sent in to retake the city in almost a month of bitter house-to-house fighting.

By mid-February or two weeks into the offensive, the Pentagon was estimating that enemy casualties had risen to almost 39,000, including 33,249 killed. Allied casualties were placed at 3,470 dead, one-third of them Americans, and 12,062 wounded, almost half of them Americans.

The images and news stories of the bitter fighting seemed to put the lie to the administration's claims of progress in the war and stretched the credibility gap to the breaking point. The tactical victory thus became a strategic defeat for the United States, convincing many Americans that the war was a lost cause.

CBS television news anchor Walter Cronkite, who had witnessed firsthand the vicious fighting at Hue, no doubt voiced the sentiment of many Americans when he exclaimed, "What the hell is going on? - I thought we were winning the war."

But perhaps nothing captured the horror of the Tet Offensive and the war itself more than the photograph of South Vietnam's national police chief, pistol in an outstretched hand, executing a suspected Vietcong guerrilla with a bullet through the head on a Saigon street as fighting raged in the city.

In truth, the Tet Offensive, as it unfolded during the next weeks and months, turned out to be a disaster for the Communists, at least at the tactical level. 

While the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong enjoyed initial successes with their surprise attacks, allied forces quickly overcame their initial shock. They responded rapidly and forcefully, driving back the enemy in most areas. The first surge of the initial phase of the offensive was over by the end of February, and most of these battles were over in a few days. There were, however, a few notable exceptions - fighting continued to rage in the Cholon, the Chinese section of Saigon, at Hue, and also at Khe Sanh - battles in which the allies eventually prevailed as well.

In the end, allied forces used superior mobility and firepower to rout the enemy troops, who failed to hold any of their military objectives. Additionally, the South Vietnamese troops, rather than fold, as the North Vietnamese had expected, performed reasonably well. As for the much anticipated general uprising of the South Vietnamese populace, it never materialized.

During the bitter fighting that extended into the fall, the Communists sustained staggering casualties. Conservative estimates put their losses at more than 40,000 killed in action, with an additional 7,000 captured. By September, when the subsequent phases of the offensive had run their course, the Viet Cong, who had borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting in the cities, had been dealt a significant blow from which they never really recovered. The major fighting for the rest of the war would be done by the North Vietnamese Army from late 1969 until the end of the war.

The casualty figures during Tet for the allied forces were much lower, but they were still high. On February 18, MACV posted the highest U.S. casualty figure for a single week during the entire war - 543 killed and 2,500 wounded. The total U.S. killed in action figures for the period February to March 1968, were over a thousand. These casualty figures continued to mount as subsequent phases of the offensive extended into the fall. By the end of the year, the U.S. killed in action for 1968 totaled more than 15,000.

Allied losses combined with the sheer scope and ferocity of the offensive and the vivid images of the savage fighting on the nightly T.V. news stunned the American people, who were astonished that the enemy was capable of such an effort. President Lyndon Johnson and Gen. Westmoreland had told them only two months before that the enemy was on its last legs and that the war was near an end. The intense and disturbing scenes depicted in the media told a different story - a situation which added greatly to the growing credibility gap between the people and the administration. Having accepted the administration's optimistic reports, but now confronted with a different reality, many Americans concluded that we were losing or at best locked in a bloody stalemate with no end in sight.

The Tet Offensive is generally considered to have ended February 25, when the last Communist units were dislodged from the ancient imperial citadel at Hue. But the struggle in Vietnam was to continue for another seven years. Eventually, a frustrated and war-weary United States withdrew, and, in the end, Communist North Vietnam's army rolled over the demoralized forces of South Vietnam.

 

 

 


Did the United States win or lose the Vietnam War?

We are taught that it was a resounding loss for America, one that proves that intervening in the affairs of other nations is usually misguided. The truth is that our military won the war, but our politicians lost it. The Communists in North Vietnam actually signed a peace treaty, effectively surrendering. But the U.S. Congress didn't hold up its end of the bargain.

Decades back, in late 1972, South Vietnam and the United States were winning the Vietnam War decisively by every conceivable measure. That's not just my view. That was the view of our enemy, the North Vietnamese government officials. The victory was apparent when President Nixon ordered the U.S. Air Force to bomb industrial and military targets in Hanoi, North Viet Nam's capital city, and in Haiphong, its major port city, and we would stop the bombing if the North Vietnamese would attend the Paris Peace Talks that they had left earlier. The North Vietnamese did go back to the Paris Peace talks, and we did stop the bombing as promised.

On January 23rd, 1973, President Nixon gave a speech to the nation on primetime television announcing that the Paris Peace Accords had been initialed by the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the Accords would be signed on the 27th. What the United States and South Vietnam received in those accords was a victory. At the White House, it was called "VV Day," "Victory in Vietnam Day."

The U.S. backed up that victory with a simple pledge within the Paris Peace Accords saying: should the South require any military hardware to defend itself against any North Vietnam aggression we would provide replacement aid to the South on a piece-by-piece, one-to-one replacement, meaning a bullet for a bullet; a helicopter for a helicopter, for all things lost -- replacement. The advance of communist tyranny had been halted by those accords.

Then it all came apart. And it happened this way: In August of the following year, 1974, President Nixon resigned his office as a result of what became known as "Watergate." Three months after his resignation came to the November congressional elections and within them, the Democrats won a landslide victory for the new Congress, and many of the members used their new majority to de-fund the military aid the U.S. had promised, piece for piece, breaking the commitment that we made to the South Vietnamese in Paris to provide whatever military hardware the South Vietnamese needed in case of aggression from the North. Put simply and accurately, a majority of Democrats of the 94th Congress did not keep the word of the United States.

On April 10th of 1975, President Gerald Ford appealed directly to those members of the Congress in an evening Joint Session, televised to the nation. In that speech, he literally begged Congress to keep the word of the United States. But as President Ford delivered his speech, many of the members of Congress walked out of the chamber. Many of them had an investment in America's failure in Vietnam. They had participated in demonstrations against the war for many years. They wouldn't give the aid.

On April 30th South Vietnam surrendered, and Re-education Camps were constructed, and the phenomenon of the Boat People began. If the South Vietnamese had received the arms that the United States promised them, would the result have been different? It had already been different. The North Vietnamese leaders admitted that they were testing the new President, Gerald Ford, and they took one village after another, then cities, then provinces, and our only response was to go back on our word. The U.S. did not re-supply the South Vietnamese as we had promised. It was then that the North Vietnamese knew they were on the road to South Vietnam's capital city, Saigon, that would soon be renamed Ho Chi Minh City.

Former Arkansas Senator William Fulbright, who had been the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a public statement about the surrender of South Vietnam. He said this, "I am no more distressed than I would be about Arkansas losing a football game to Texas." The U.S. knew that North Vietnam would violate the accords and so we planned for it. What we did not know was that our own Congress would violate the accords. And violate them, of all things, on behalf of the North Vietnamese. That's what happened.

 

 

 


Vietnam Story: A Journey Back

Background
I thought about going back to Vietnam, but it wasn't until August 2007 when I determined to make it a reality. A friend of ours, Tami (her husband Jay is a Vietnam veteran), encouraged me to visit some websites dealing with veterans returning to Vietnam. On one site, I found a story on Don of Chicago, a former Advisor in the Mekong Delta who had gone back to Vietnam on his 40th anniversary. He listed his email address on the story, so I decided to email him with a few questions. Within minutes of sending the email, my phone rang, and it was Don. It was his encouragement and contact information that convinced me it was time to return to Vietnam. 

I was so touched by Don's story and my need to do return to Vietnam; I decided to send the idea to WCCO TV (local CBS affiliate in Minneapolis, MN). I felt this story would be of particular interest to other Vietnam Vets and perhaps encourage them to get some closure on that part of our lives. Within days, I received a call from Bill Hudson, a News Anchor for WCCO. He agreed this was a story he wanted to tell. 
(http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2007/11/22/after-4-decades-a-veteran-returns-to-vietnam/)

Setting up the Trip
I set up our flights and then contacted a local vet to set up an itinerary for our in-country travel to Bac Lieu, deep in the Mekong Delta, and to arrange for a car, driver, and interpreter for me and my wife, Donna. Bac Lieu, where I spent my combat tour, was the headquarters of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) 21st Infantry Division and the U.S. Army five-man Advisory Team 51 of which I was the Radio Telephone Operator (RTO). We worked with the 42nd Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, which was part of the 21st Infantry Division. The Battalion of approximately 400 men was the smallest group that was authorized a five-person American Advisory Team.

Ho Chi Minh City
We arrived in HCMC late at night on October 18, 2007. While I had spent several days in Saigon 40 years earlier, not much looked the same. We were now staying in a five-star hotel and eating in fine restaurants. One of our first stops was the War Museum. It had several U.S. planes and tanks on display and many pictures of the war. Needless to say, it was from their point of view and highlighted what they considered to be American war atrocities. Not surprisingly, Senator Kerry was pictured with some of his comments about the war. Enough said!

Can Tho
We started our trip down to Bac Lien on October 21, 2007, with our first stop was Can Tho, the fourth largest city in Vietnam, and the largest city in the Mekong Delta, where I had spent several days during the war. I did not recognize anything from the past. The American base is now the local military headquarters. The photo shows the 1968 Can Tho street market.

We stayed in Can Tho overnight as the next morning, we were to make the final leg of the trip to Bac Lieu. I got up at daybreak and shot some film of the sampans and junks along the Hau River that feeds into the Mekong River. It is becoming an emotional trip for me at this point in time. I fight back the tears thinking about what I might find in Bac Lieu and the old memories I have of that time in my life.  

The next town down the road is Soc Trang. Our support helicopters were based in this town about 40 miles from Can Tho. It is also about 40 miles from Bac Lieu. 

Bac Lien
The road into Bac Lieu looks very different. Forty years ago, it was a poorly maintained dirt road with nothing but a few grass shacks and rice paddies alongside it. Now it is a black top highway with so many houses along it that you can hardly see the rice paddies. As we approach the city center in Bac Lieu, I can only recognize the town square, bridge, and an old water tower. Everything has changed. We check into the Bac Lieu Hotel (a three-star hotel), and my wife Donna is beginning to wonder what I have gotten her into. This town is still considered to be the "old Vietnam."

I asked our interpreter Toan to try and find anyone that was old enough to remember the war. I was in search of my old comrades in arms, the Vietnamese Rangers that with who I had served. After only about 20 minutes, a rough and rugged looking guy walks into the hotel lobby. He looks like a Ranger! I can tell by his slightly graying hair; he is what I'm looking for. It turned out to be Sgt. Che from the Ranger Battalion. While I do not remember him personally, he served with the Rangers while I was there and for years after I had left. By now, I have spread out all of my old pictures on a table in the lobby of the hotel. We have gathered quite a crowd of interested spectators. Che starts looking at the pictures and telling me stories. I am particularly interested in knowing what has happened to several of my old friends. The Battalion Commander, Maj. Kiet was killed several months after I had left in early 1968. I had heard that before, but he confirmed the story. Maj. Kiet is on left standing with Capt. Long.

My good friends were Capt. Long, the Battalion Executive Officer and 1st Lt. Tai, the 4th Company Commander. Che did not know much about what had happened to Lt. Tai but knew much about Capt. Long. After the death of Maj. Kiet, Capt. Long was promoted to Battalion Commander. He commanded the Battalion for several years and eventually attained the rank of Lt. Col. After that, he left the Army and was made the District Chief of CAI Lai, in the Can Tho area. Chee believed Capt. Long made it to the U.S. and is still alive. My search to find him continued when I returned home.

Chee took us around Bac Lieu, showing us the old American Base and various other sites. Nothing was left of any of it - not a single brick. We toured the area out by the ocean, and I learned of a Viet Cong guerilla base that was located very close to an area where I had spent a lot of time. We were very close to it but had never found it. The photo of Donna in an open market in Bac Lieu.

As a monsoon storm approached, we said our goodbye's to Chee and thanked him for his help and information. It was an emotional goodbye for me. I could not believe that I had actually found an old Ranger that I served with and learned so much in such a small period of time. Photo of me and Capt. Long.

Departing Bac Lieu
We departed Bac Lieu on October 23, 2007 - exactly 40 years to the day that I had departed it before. This time, I was leaving with a sense of closure. There was no longer anything for me in this town but memories. It was a year that I would not change for anything, but would never want to do again.  

Reflection
I am very glad that we decided to make the trip back to Vietnam and Bac Lieu. I highly encourage others to do so. Hopefully, it will give you some closure that few of us got 40 years ago.

The Vietnamese people are still wonderful. They seem very happy and friendly and glad to have us as their guests in this country. While my wife, Donna loved the people, she thinks it is one of the worst places she has ever visited. 

This country has approximately 85 million people in it, and 2/3 of them were born after the fall of the old South Vietnamese Government in 1975. Many of them do not know much about the war and consider it to be their "fathers" war or the "American" war. 

I have buried some "ghosts," gotten some answers to questions that have bothered me over the years and now have a sense of closure at that time of my life. I will always have fond memories of my comrades in arms, both American and Vietnamese. I hope someday ALL American people will understand and appreciate the sacrifices that are made by the men, women, and their families of our Armed Forces. I will always remember those that died, were wounded and those that returned after doing their duty for God and Country.

The Story Continues
In November 2007, Donna and I left Minneapolis for our annual fall fishing trip to the Florida Keys with our good friends from Boca Raton. We were sitting in our friend's condo in Islamorada, Florida, watching football (Sunday, November 18, 2007) when my cell phone rang. There was a young lady on the phone asking me if I was Steve Leighton, the guy looking for Capt. Long. I confirmed that it was me, and she said she was Long's daughter, and he was on the line with her. His English was not the best, so she would be an interpreter. This was TOTAL SHOCK for me! My search was over!! I could not believe that I found him. Now for the more shocking news - HE LIVES IN MINNEAPOLIS, MN - not 20 miles from me. I  JUST COULDN'T BELIEVE IT!!! IN MY HOME TOWN!!!!!!!!!! I have traveled halfway around the world looking for him and find him living within 20 miles of me. Simply unbelievable!!!

During our phone conversation, I think we drove his daughter crazy. He was asking me questions while I was asking him questions, and his poor daughter was trying to interpret both of us talking at the same time. 

Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Long is on the phone, and we start our 1 - hour conversation. I have learned that it was very hard on him after the war. He was sent to a "re-education" camp in North Vietnam along the border with Laos, for 13 years. He got out of Vietnam in 1993 with his family and came to Minneapolis. 

We decide to meet the next day at Applebee's Restaurant near the U of M campus. My wife and I are there in advance to make sure the restaurant is okay with this - primarily with the news camera there. 

When they arrive, I immediately knew it is him. He had aged, but it was him. He walks in; we exchange salutes, hug, and cry. I am simply overwhelmed at seeing him again after 40 years!!

We spent the next two hours filling in the gaps of the last 40 years. One of my other good friends was 1st Lt. Tai. He now lives in the states, and Long remains in contact with him. He passed my phone number on to Tai very soon, and I started the meeting process over again. 

See video of the reunion at http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2007/11/23/vietnam-vet-reunites-with-fellow-soldier/

Two days later, Long, who retired an ARVN Lt. Col, brought all of his family living in the United States to our house except one daughter-in-law who had to work. With my daughters, husbands, and four grandkids, we had a houseful. I wanted his family to know how honored and proud I was to have them all at my house and what a great patriot their father was for their homeland. He has suffered much, but tonight was just awesome. Long was a powerful man and had a very distinguished career in the military and government in his country. It has been very hard for him to leave that behind and start a new life in a foreign land. He did his part for his people and country, and he did it well. I will always honor and respect this man for all he has done in his life and especially for me. 

Four days later, I received a call from Annie (Long's daughter). She had set up a conference call for me with Maj. Tai - my other counterpart (former 1Lt Tai). He is alive and well, living in San Jose, CA. It was AWESOME finding him. He sent me some pictures, and I have done the same for him. I can't believe I have found both of them - alive and doing well in this country. Like Long, Tai spent some long hard years in a "re-education" camp. While I refer to it as "re-education," it was anything but that. This was more like a prison with lots of long hard labor, starvation, disease, etc. - Tai was lucky to survive his ten years in the North at this camp.

Final Chapter
We flew to San Francisco and went to San Jose for the night. It was another GREAT experience. My wife and I met with former Major Le Tan Tai and his family. We went through all of my old pictures, and Tai kept about 50 of them for reproducing. We met his daughter and granddaughter, along with his wife. We went out for dinner at their favorite restaurant after a visit to their home. He is doing very well for himself and his family. His son-in-law is a chiropractor, and his daughter is an R.N. and works at a local hospital. As in the past, they were all very nice people and could not believe we went back to V.N. looking for them. They were very touched by our story going back, and it was so GREAT to re-connect with him. He and my other counterpart Long had a tremendous impact on my life. I'm sure I'm a better person for it. Photo of Tai, Steve, and Long.

My only regret through all of this is that I did not do it sooner. BUT, better late than never!!

God Bless America and all that serve her!

If you have questions about the trip or want some contact information about the groups I am now active in, please send an email to the following address: leightonconsult@earthlink.net

 

 

 


The Navy Corpsman


What is a Navy Corpsman, many people ask?
Well, I've decided to enlighten you; I've taken on the task
A Corpsman is a strange fellow; I'll tell you what I mean
He joined the U.S. Navy but he's more like a Marine

When Marines are asked to go to war to fight and maybe die
They have their "Doctor" with them; he's their "go to" guy
A special breed of sailors that Marines do call their own
His job is taking care of them so they can go back home

When the shooting starts and bullets fly and men all hit the dirt
The corpsman looks around to see if anyone's been hurt
He hears a feeble voice cry. "Doc, I'm over here".
The corpsman rushes forward, his mission crystal clear

He finds a wounded comrade, a Marine that has been shot
The corpsman working swiftly, giving all he's got
The young Marine whispers weakly, "Doc, will I die today?"
"Not a chance", the corpsman replies, "if I have my way".

The young Marine did survive to fight another day
On a miserable far off battlefield, a sailor saved his life
 He'd soon be going home again to his children and his wife

So, if you ever meet a Corpsman say a silent prayer
For there are many Marines alive today who are glad that he was there
There's no way of telling just how much he's done and seen
As I said, he's in the Navy but he's more like a Marine.

 

 


Military Fact and Legends: Rise and Fall of the SR-71 Blackbird

During the last few years of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union - both long weary of the other - became unlikely allies against Adolf Hitler's takeover of Eastern Europe. Following the defeat of German in 1945, however, the wartime allies became mortal enemies, locked in a global struggle to prevail militarily, ideologically, and politically in a new "Cold War." To learn of the other side's military and technical capabilities, their actions and intentions, both sides used spies to gather information and intelligence about their enemy.

Alarmed over rapid developments in military technology by his Communist rivals, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a plan to gather information about Soviet capabilities and intentions using reconnaissance aircraft.  Thus became the birth of the U-2 spy planes. Beginning in 1956, U-2 spy planes were making reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union, giving the U.S. its first detailed look at Soviet military facilities. Managed first by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and later the U.S. Air Force, the U-2 provided day and night, very high-altitude (70,000), all-weather intelligence gathering. It was relatively slow, however.

The aircraft's vulnerability and the need for a faster reconnaissance aircraft were underscored following the downing of two U-2s.  The first in 1960 when Francis Gary Powers's U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union and the 1962 fatal downing of Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson's U-2 after being hit with a Soviet missile while flying over Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crises.

Looking to replace the U-2, the CIA turned to Kelly Johnson, one of the preeminent aircraft designers of the twentieth century, and his Lockheed's Skunk Works team.  Together they had a track record of delivering "impossible" technologies on incredibly short, strategically critical deadlines. The design the team came up with became the SR-71, which became the precursor to "stealth" aircraft that followed.  

A total of 32 aircraft were built; 12 were lost in accidents, but none lost to enemy action. Since 1976, with speed exceeding 2,000 mph, it has held the world record for the fastest air-breathing manned aircraft.  

Finished aircraft were painted a dark blue, almost black, to increase the emission of internal heat and to act as camouflage against the night sky. The dark color led to the aircraft's call sign "Blackbird."

During reconnaissance missions, the SR-71 operated at high speeds of over Mach 3 with a flight crew of two in tandem cockpits, with the pilot in the forward cockpit and a Reconnaissance Systems Officer (RSO) monitoring the surveillance systems and equipment from the rear cockpit. 

If a surface-to-air missile launch was detected, the standard evasive action was simply to accelerate and outfly the missile. Since it was much faster than the Soviet's principal interceptor, the MiG-25, that same evasive technique was used.

From the beginning of the Blackbird's reconnaissance missions over enemy territory (North Vietnam, Laos, etc.) in 1968, the SR-71s averaged approximately one sortie a week for nearly two years. By 1970, the SR-71s were averaging two sorties per week, and by 1972, they were flying nearly one sortie every day. Two SR-71s were lost during these missions, one in 1970 and the second aircraft in 1972, both due to mechanical malfunctions.

At the cost of $85,000 per hour to operate each SR-71 and $260 million per year to support some in Congress were critical of its high costs. By the mid-1970s, faced with budget cuts and concerns, the program was placed under close scrutiny.

A strong opponent of the costly program was Dick Cheney, President Gerald Ford's Deputy White House Chief of Staff. To push his agenda, he went before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee and presented a thorough, carefully detailed study on the high costs of the SR-71 program. That presentation won over many undecided members of Congress, and soon the cry grew to suspend its use. The nail in the program's coffin was the revelation that parts were no longer being manufactured, and other airframes had to be cannibalized to keep the fleet airworthy. Eventually, the program was scuttled partially because there was a general misunderstanding of the nature of aerial reconnaissance and a lack of knowledge about the SR-71 in particular (due to its secretive development and usage) was used by detractors to discredit the aircraft, with the assurance given that a replacement was under development. 

The decision to retire the SR-71 from active duty came in 1989, with the last missions flown in October that year. Four months after the plane's retirement, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., was told that the expedited reconnaissance, which the SR-71 could have provided, was unavailable during Operation Desert Storm. America's sole air reconnaissance aircraft once became the U-2.

In November 2013, media outlets reported that Skunk Works has been working on an unmanned reconnaissance airplane; it has named SR-72, which would fly twice as fast at Mach 6. However, the Air Force is officially pursuing the Northrop Grumman RQ-180 UAV to take up the SR-71's strategic ISR role.

When it comes to curb appeal, few airplanes in history can match the look of the SR-71 "Blackbird." And nothing in the Air Force's inventory - past or present - can beat its signature performance characteristics.

 

 

 


Book Review: Hidden Army

According to Pentagon records, nearly four million personnel served in and around Vietnam; most in Vietnam, others on flight bases in Thailand and ships in adjacent South China Sea. Of those 3,917,400 million men and women ordered to the Southeast Asia Theater, ninety percent were not sent there to fight. They were there to support the ten percent who were.  

Support troops included pilots, sailors, medics, nurses, cooks, clerks, drivers, engineers, communications people, military police, and many more.
 
With no front lines or secure roads, many of these support troops found themselves in combat situations. In fact, a Veteran's Administration study found that over seventy percent of support troops were directly or indirectly shot at during their tours, and over half saw someone killed or wounded. This was particularly true during the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Hidden Army is the second of two books containing the oral history of support troops the author interviewed. In both, he brought together and edited the information he skillfully pulled out of the interviewees. His first effort, The Tooth, and the Tail was released in 2012. To compile as much input as possible for this first book, he interviewed 150 men and women veterans of the war but ended up using only 62 who served in South East Asia from 1958 to 1975. That left many stories untold.

While The Tooth and the Tail was a chronological grouping of detailed accounts of who the support troops were more rather than what they did, Hidden Army - following the same oral history format - focuses more on the types of support while attempting to portray what the specific issues were for each group and how they dealt with them.  

Rock guides the reader through the period they are talking about by describing the different phases of the war and the occasional life-threating situations in which they found themselves. He also explains a little something on how the participants - work fits into the overall support scheme. Providing this - blueprint - along with historical information, was very helpful.
 
Most of the testimonial by the participants is very well presented, and the reader will get a keen sense of the pros and cons of their work and how much the support they provided to the frontline troops made the difference in life and death situations. Participants also described their frustration and triumphs, accomplishments, and regrets. Pride in their support work was obvious in many of the stories.
 
The truth is if it weren't for support troops providing the material means to fight the enemy, some of the writers of combat books would not be around.

For any serious reader on the history of the Vietnam War, this book and Rock's first book deserve their rightful place alongside those dealing with combat tactics and battle strategies. In their totality, both are long-missing critical pieces in the literature of the Vietnam War.

Reader Reviews
Every page is worth reading.  I highly recommend it to anyone who wants to truly get a sense of how it was in Vietnam for almost 90 percent of us who served as support troops.

David Willson
The VVA Veteran's Book in Brief


As with the first book, I enjoyed reading about the support guys that were there. The stories are real and not the imagination of some writer expressing what he thinks it may have been like. Everyone there had the humorous moments and the gut-wrenching sights that will always haunt them the rest of their life. Thanks, Larry, for bringing the REMF's to the front.

Kayaker


I could not put this down until I finished the entire book. Finally, a book that tells the story of all of the soldiers that did not get the glory of the folks we supported. 

Jack


About the Editor
Lawrence Rock served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1964-1967 with a thirteen-month Vietnam War tour in 1965-66 as a clerk and driver with the 1st Marine Air Wing in Danang. He left the Marine Corps as a sergeant. His passion for telling the Untold Story of Support Troops in Vietnam grew with each interview.  Some publishers suggested he write the book himself, but he felt strongly that the voices of the 150 men/women he interviewed had to be heard. As a civilian, he was a market researcher for A. C. Nielsen Company. He is currently retired and lives in Villa Hills, Kentucky. 

For those interested in the Vietnam War statistics, we recommend the following site:
http://www.mrfa.org/vnstats.ht