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Battlefield Chronicles: The Battle of the Little Bighorn

In 1874, the U.S. Army sent an expedition, led by Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer, into the Black Hills of what is now South Dakota. They returned to report that there was gold in them thar hills. Within two years, Americans were flocking by the thousands, lured there by the promise of striking it rich. There was just one problem: the land belonged to the Lakota Sioux tribe, and it was illegal – and dangerous – for the prospectors to even be there. 

The Black Hills were sacred to the Sioux, and they did not want to leave them for any reason (they're still fighting to get it back to this day). As hostile natives began to leave their reservations (if they ever were on one at all) and fight back against settlers' encroachment, government and Native leaders tried to find a diplomatic solution. But the tribes would not agree to cede the Black Hills. President Ulysses S. Grant's administration demanded that all Natives return to their respective reservations, and when the deadline to do so passed, the Army took action. The Great Sioux War was on, and the Army was about to meet the largest gathering of Lakota, Arapahoe, and Cheyenne warriors ever assembled, led by two of their greatest: Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. 

The Army struck first, as Gen. George Crook moved north from the Wyoming Territory to hit the Oglala Sioux while they were in winter quarters on the neighboring Crow Reservation. The U.S. might have struck first, but it was the Natives who emerged victorious. A detachment of 383 men under Col. Joseph J. Reynolds attacked a mixed band of 250 Oglala and Cheyenne at the Powder River, but were repulsed. The Army would wait until spring to try again.

This time it moved on the hostile tribes in three columns; Col. John Gibbon moved east to secure the Yellowstone River, while Crook again marched north, and Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, with Custer's 7th Cavalry, marched east from the Dakota Territory. They were all to meet at the mouth of the Bighorn and Little Bighorn Rivers by June 26th, where they believed the tribes would be waiting. Custer's cavalry was to make a reconnaissance-in-force along Rosebud Creek to find the hostile encampments, but could divert from the plan if Custer thought it was prudent.

On June 17, 1876, Crook renewed the fight, attacking a band of Lakota, Arapahoe, and Cheyenne warriors under the command of Crazy Horse near Rosebud Creek. After six hours of fighting, they were also defeated. Terry and Gibbon's columns continued onto the mouth of the Little Bighorn River, unaware of Crook's defeat at the Rosebud. Meanwhile, Custer had caught the trail of the enemy Natives along the Rosebud and was in pursuit. 

The main concern for the Army was that they didn't know exactly where the hostile village would be. Even if they sighted its exact location, there was no guarantee that the nomadic Natives would be in the same place by the time the U.S. troops were able to bring their forces to bear. They knew the combined tribal forces were along the Little Bighorn, so when they found it the plan was for Terry and Gibbon to form the main attack force from the north. Custer and his 7th Cavalry would approach from the east and south, cutting off any chance of escape. It was his zeal in not letting the enemy escape that would lead to his downfall.

On the night of June 24th, Custer's Native scouts reported the presence of the village just 25 miles from his position, the largest they had ever seen. Encouraged by the sighting, Custer led a night march to the Wolf Mountains, little more than a dozen miles away from the encampment. His initial plan called for a surprise attack at dawn, but because his scouts also reported that the Natives knew Custer's force was present and that he was exposed, Custer would either have to withdraw and wait for Terry and Gibbon or attack. This meant he might lose the location of the village again – and maybe permanently – unless he could attack as soon as possible. 

It's important to remember that George Armstrong Custer, despite his now-tarnished reputation, was no fool. A graduate of the Military Academy at West Point, he was a skilled cavalry officer who served with distinction during the Civil War. His audacity and aggression served him well, and he became one of the youngest generals in the Union Army. At Little Bighorn, he had a force full of around 700 experienced troops, who were relatively well-equipped and supplied. His problem was that he underestimated the troop strength of the combined Native force and didn't know what kind of firepower they had. 

He knew he was facing the largest gathering of a combined tribal force in history, but he believed he was facing between 800 and 1,000 warriors. In reality, it was more like 1,500-2,500, with some estimated as high as 5,000. They were also armed with Winchester and Henry repeating rifles, meaning not only were Custer's troops outnumbered, but they were also outgunned. And Custer was going to make one more fatal mistake: more concerned with preventing the Natives' escape than ensuring their defeat, he divided his large force into four segments: The first was a supply train, carrying ammunition and supplies. The second was Capt. Frederick Benteen's three companies, then Maj. Marcus Reno's three companies and the main body was composed of five companies led by Custer himself.  

Reno attacked the southern end of the camp, and initially caught the Natives by surprise, dismounted his cavalry, and formed a skirmish line. Eventually overwhelmed, he ordered a retreat and was pursued by the Natives until he no longer had an effective force. After crossing back over the river, they were met by Benteen's force, and they collectively reinforced their position on what is known today as Reno Hill. From the hill they could hear the fight between Custer and the tribal forces. No one knows exactly what happened to Custer before and during the battle, because no one with him survived it. 

Custer's plan was to ride around the camp and attack from the north. By the time Benteen and Reno started resupplying, he had sent a runner to Benteen with the message "Come on. Big Village. Be Quick. Bring Packs. P.S. Bring Packs." The force, under siege by the Natives, tried to establish communication with Custer but could not manage to even find him. By most accounts, his five companies never made it across the river. 

According to accounts from both the Natives and Custer's own Indian scout, his force was turned back by intense enemy fire as they tried to ford the Little Bighorn. They tried to escape onto a ridge north of the Indian camp and more than three miles from Reno and Benteen, but they were cut off and outflanked by the hostiles. Companies under Custer's command were overwhelmed and sometimes cut off from each other. 

The cavalrymen would be forced to use their dead horses as they tried in vain to dig in and fight off the hundreds of warriors who surrounded them. Crazy Horse and White Bull led the charge that broke the American lines and rode down the rest of Custer's men. Custer's Last Stand was over in about an hour after the first shot was fired. Most of the men with Custer that day were buried where they fell on what is today known as "Last Stand Hill."