Other Memories
Classroom and Field Instructor for Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape. POW Compound played the role of Camp Doctor. Land Navigation and Evasion acted as Field Corspman.
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. The criteria were announced in a War Department circular dated February 22, 1932, and authorized award to soldiers, upon their request, who had been awarded the Meritorious Service Citation Certificate, Army Wound Ribbon, or were authorized to wear Wound Chevrons subsequent to April 5, 1917 MoreHide
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. The criteria were announced in a War Department circular dated February 22, 1932, and authorized award to soldiers, upon their request, who had been awarded the Meritorious Service Citation Certificate, Army Wound Ribbon, or were authorized to wear Wound Chevrons subsequent to April 5, 1917 MoreHide
Criteria The Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal may be awarded to members of the Armed Forces in the grades of lieutenant commander (or major) and below. It is awarded for meritorious service or achieveme... The Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal may be awarded to members of the Armed Forces in the grades of lieutenant commander (or major) and below. It is awarded for meritorious service or achievement in either combat or noncombat based on sustained performance or specific achievement of a superlative nature but which does not warrant a Navy Commendation Medal or higher. It may not be awarded for service involving participation in aerial flight after January 1, 1969. MoreHide
Criteria The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in th... The Combat Action Ribbon is a personal decoration awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when operating under the control of the Navy) in the grade of captain (or colonel in the Marine Corps) and below who have actively participated in ground or surface combat. (World War II and Korea War service rate one ribbon for each period only) MoreHide
Criteria The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not suff... The Navy Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself by outstanding heroism in action against an enemy (but not sufficiently to justify the award of the Presidential Unit Citation). It may also be awarded to a unit that distinguishes itself by extremely meritorious service not involving combat (but in support of military operations), which renders that unit outstanding when compared to other units performing similar service. MoreHide
Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous ... The Meritorious Unit Commendation may be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that distinguishes itself under combat or noncombat conditions by either valorous or meritorious achievement which renders that unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify the award of the Navy Unit Commendation. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria Awarded by the Vietnam Government to military personnel who have accomplished deeds of valor or displayed heroic conduct while fighting the enemy and have been cited individually at the regiment, brig... Awarded by the Vietnam Government to military personnel who have accomplished deeds of valor or displayed heroic conduct while fighting the enemy and have been cited individually at the regiment, brigade, division, corps, or armed forces level. MoreHide
Criteria The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout... The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of South Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. MoreHide
Criteria
The unit citation of the Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Medal was awarded certain units by the Vietnamese government for meritorious service during the period 1 March 1961 to 28 March 1974.
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide
Description Holding the Line at Camp Carroll: the Battle of Mike’s Hill.
By Larry Williams
Even if General William Westmoreland was not literally rubbing his hands together in expectant glee, he certainly had a nHolding the Line at Camp Carroll: the Battle of Mike’s Hill.
By Larry Williams
Even if General William Westmoreland was not literally rubbing his hands together in expectant glee, he certainly had a noticeable bounce in his step as he marched through his headquarters and studied the battle maps of Vietnam during the first weeks of January 1968.
MACV intelligence analysis had recently identified a “cross-over point,” which had reportedly occurred in the fall of 1967. The North Vietnamese Army had reached that statistical moment when their battlefield losses exceeded their replacement ability, and for a warrior trained in attrition, General Westmoreland savored the sweet smell and imminent taste of victory.
Now he needed a massive land battle akin to the European campaigns of the previous two world wars. He sought one decisive military clash designed to drop the enemy to its knees, and he felt he knew precisely where that battle was going to be.
Convinced his nemesis, the brilliant General Vo Nguyen Giap, was about to repeat the strategy that in 1954 had defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, Westmoreland reviewed all fresh battlefield developments. He concluded the war would be won or lost at an isolated Marine outpost hunkered deep in the northern most I Corps Tactical Zone at a place called Khe Sanh. Accordingly, the general ordered the whole of I Corps reinforced. He re-shuffled his deck of military assets and by mid-January nearly fifty maneuver battalions –- half of all US combat troops –- had trucked, flown, or humped their way into the northern zone.
During this same period signs of a mounting enemy presence increased. General Giap instructed large North Vietnamese combat formations to slip over the DMZ and take up positions along strategic fronts. A cat and mouse game unfolded, and Westmoreland grew more obsessed with his plan.
The order of battle:
The 3rd Marine Division cut a defensive east/west line across Vietnam just south of the DMZ hinged on a series of fortified combat bases, which hugged a sixty-three kilometer span of National Route 9. The strategy produced interlocking bands of artillery fire that were anchored in the east by Dong Ha and the divisional headquarters, then stretched west to within two kilometers of Laos where the line ended in the mist-shrouded Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei.
Along this route, five strategic outposts unified the line: Cam Lo, Camp Carroll, the Rockpile, Ca Lu and, the focus of Westmoreland’s attention, Khe Sanh. This line had been in the making for more than two years, yet it yawned gaps big enough for whole divisions to pass through.
The ground rode level between Dong Ha and Cam Lo. But trucking further westward toward Camp Carroll, the terrain grew rugged. A succession of ridges and steep hills jutted to elevations of over 1,600 feet. Camp Carroll sat perched on a high plateau and served as the linchpin of the Marine arty shield. The artillery batteries worked under the operational control of the 1st Battalion 12th Marines. Equipped with sixteen guns, and reinforced by U.S. Army 175mm long-range guns, the Marines directed artillery fire into almost any grid coordinate from the South China Sea to Laos, as well as into North Vietnam. An 80-gun artillery fan faced the north and hammered the enemy.
General Giap wore his poker face the day he studied the buildup of Marine forces along the DMZ. A master of Soviet tactics, he decided to call and raise. He positioned his heavy artillery pieces just beyond the range of the most common guns in the Marine Corps' fire bases, the 105mm and 155mm artillery. He knew publicly stated U.S. policy prevented American forces from entering North Vietnam. The Marines would not penetrate north of the Ben Hai River.
Holding these political and military restrictions like a trump card, the general dug in his Soviet 152mm guns and his 130mm fieldpieces precisely where U.S. ground observation was limited. He employed Soviet missiles and anti-aircraft weapon systems to hinder aerial observation. He felt confident his most powerful guns were now capable of suppressing Marine artillery fire with near impunity.
When US air reconnaissance spotted the NVA shifting some 130 artillery pieces in the area north of the Ben Hai River, the Marines rushed to reinforce their artillery deployment to 180 tubes. Nevertheless, Giap’s strategy clobbered the Marine artillery bases with little effective return fire. Then, while holding the Marine fire bases fixated on counter battery missions, particularly at Camp Carroll, the general released his infantry to the attack.
The opening fray:
On Saturday, January 20, enemy units unleashed an almost simultaneous assault on both ends of the Marine defensive line. Communist troops maneuvered along the banks of the Cua Viet River channel east of Dong Ha perpetrating an attack that halted all river traffic, effectively closing the logistical lifeline flowing from the Cua Viet Port Facility.
That same morning, far to the west near Khe Sanh, India Company, 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, unknowingly fired the opening rounds in the battle Westmoreland had predicted. The longest, most controversial battle of the Vietnam War had now begun, while the Marines found themselves in a scramble.
With the presence of large North Vietnamese forces along the eastern DMZ, and a build-up of forces in the west around Khe Sanh, the 3rd Marine Division’s ability to concentrate its forces in any one area was limited. The division was spread out from its Quang Tri base in the south, to Con Thien and Gio Linh in the north, Khe Sanh in the west, and the Cua Viet in the east.
Giap seemed pleased with the unfolding situation. His attacks on both Marine flanks produced the desired results. He tossed out his next card and ordered an assault straight up the middle. A US “Rough Rider” convoy pulled out of Dong Ha early Wednesday morning, 24 January. Consisting of three trucks and a jeep mounted with a quad .50 caliber machine gun, the Marine complement trundled west, looking forward to completing their routine artillery resupply mission and rolling through the gates of Camp Carroll by the first hours of the afternoon.
Around 1030 hours, however, elements of the elite 320th NVA Division, the 64th Regiment, hastily made last-minute camouflage adjustments and checked their fields of fire. The first trap in Giap’s resolute attempt to isolate Camp Carroll and sever the main supply route was about to snap shut. Nervous North Vietnamese eyes stared into a deep valley at a curve along Route 9 where any passing convoy had to slow before turning onto the Camp Carroll access road. Silently, the soldiers waited. Listening. Alone in their thoughts. Then just before 1400 hours, a distant whine and clank of Marine vehicles signaled a column’s approach.
The Marine convoy rumbled forward, ultimately passing into the NVA kill zone. As the vehicles reduced speed and geared down in preparation for the turn toward camp, anxious faces seemed relieved to begin the final three-kilometer stretch home. Words of hot chow began to circulate. Then all hell broke loose. Small arms and machine gun fire sprayed all four vehicles. Recoilless rifles bucked trucks off their wheels as they absorbed the impact of accurate fire. Wrecked machines plumed smoke and the convoy rolled to a listless, floppy stop. Mortar rounds trounced the pinned-down Marines. Cries from wounded echoed through a din of explosions and automatic weapons fire.
Reeling Marines dismounted without delay. They found what cover they could and returned fire. The quad .50 cal machine gun remained serviceable and pelted death at the invisible attackers. The fury of fire crouched enemy heads and bought enough time for the bushwhacked Marines to get a call off for assistance. Within minutes the 4th Marines, newly headquartered at Camp Carroll, launched a reaction force. A platoon from Hotel Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines joined two tanks from Bravo Company, 3rd Tank Battalion, along with two Army M42 Dusters from Charley Battery, 1st Battalion, 44th artillery. The column roared from camp under the command of Captain Daniel W. Kent seated high in the turret of the lead tank.
The enemy anticipated the reinforcements and waited to spring the second trap of the day. When the Marine convoy drew near, a recoilless rifle blasted the lead vehicle, killing Captain Kent and immobilizing his rescue force. The Marines reacted with the full punch of their remaining firepower. Even so, locked in the kill zone, they were compelled to call for additional support.
A second relief force clamored out of Dong Ha while the Marines fought through the afternoon. Then, as sundown loomed, the sudden appearance in the sky of two UH-1E gunships persuaded the enemy to break contact. They slipped away pell-mell, leaving three dead North Vietnamese soldiers behind.
By the time the Dong Ha relief column arrived, Marine casualties were heavy. Eight dead, forty-four wounded. All vehicles in the original convoy, plus the two dusters and Captain Kent’s lead tank, required towing and so were left along the road. The fresh Marines assisted with the evacuation of the set upon troops. Then all hustled up the road to Camp Carroll.
Enter Darting Star:
The 3rd Marine Division commander, General Rathvon Thompkins, received the ambush reports and paced in his headquarters bunker at Dong Ha. The situation was dire. The North Vietnamese could not be allowed to deny access to Camp Carroll. The commander keyed his radio handset, and transferred the battle-toughened 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines into the valley with orders to clear the ambush site and reopen Route 9.
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Bendell, Battalion commander, call sign Darting Star, arrived at the ambush site at 1900 and found the earlier relief force had already evacuated the wounded and, he concluded, all of the dead. With darkness falling and moving with only one of the battalion’s companies, Mike Company, the colonel established a night-time defensive perimeter along a ridgeline overlooking Route 9. He positioned his force to screen Camp Carroll from the NVA patrols and there passed the night.
At dawn, January 25th, Mike Company, under Captain Raymond Kalm, began to sweep the valley. They reached the ambush site to discover four Marine dead from the previous day’s action. They dealt with the bodies, then cautiously proceeded to move west to east. While patrolling near the still abandoned vehicles scattered along the road, automatic weapons fire tore through their ranks. Two Marines lay dead, killed instantly. Two more fell wounded.
But Mike Company was prepared to earn their pay. They gained fire superiority and attacked with aggressive fire team maneuvers. The end of the brief action eliminated nine enemy soldiers. One NVA light machine gun was captured. Darting Star then ordered Captain Kalm to advance his company to a small hill just north of Route 9, about a thousand meters east of the contact site, set up a defensive perimeter, and wait while the battalion’s two remaining rifle companies choppered in.
In a swirl of red dust several battle-worn Ch-46s touched down on the valley floor and disgorged India Company, commanded by Captain John L. Prichard, and Lima Company, led by Captain John L. McLaughlin. H&S Company (minus) also flew to the scene. By mid-afternoon, nearly eight hundred Marines had established a three-company perimeter along both sides of Route 9 and tethered to Mike Company, which had dug in on the strategic height now being known as Mike’s Hill.
The multiple chopper sorties did not go unnoticed. Enemy forward observers watched the deployment from the stealth of the jungle on a high ridgeline to the north. They trained their 82mm mortar tubes on the Marines, who, just beginning to dig in, appeared like sitting ducks.
Mortar fire poured down. Certain 85mm artillery fire slammed in. Shrapnel thickened the air. Marines curled on the ground and endured the pounding. When a lull finally came, seventeen wounded were ponchoed aboard med-evac birds. Busy Marines set up the night watch while the Battalion maintained a 100% alert.
Dark, tense hours ticked by. Enemy infantry worked their way down the streambeds on the east and crept up the gullies, north and west of Mike’s Hill. Sporadic trip flares ignited. Shadows darted through the scrub brush. Fire-team sized listening posts reported movement all around them. The Marines braced for an attack, but thus far the enemy’s actions proved only preparatory.
On the morning of January 26, relieved by daylight and pumped up on adrenaline, Marines swept across the valley. Regaining the offense rejuvenated the warriors. Each forward step helped shake out the tightness that lay balled up like a fist in the chest, incited by prolonged stares into darkness, waiting on death.
Mike Company patrolled west. India and Lima Companies maneuvered separately toward the north with orders to cross the Cam Lo River and destroy the enemy. At 0845 a Mike Company patrol discovered a small bridge had been blown during the night. Route 9 was “impassable without engineer improvement.” Darting Star was forced to reassess his plans.
Colonel William L. Dick, 4th Marine Commander, radioed new orders from Camp Carroll. There would be no river crossing. The battalion was to “continue to secure Route 9 denying enemy access to bridges and culverts, and to patrol and ambush 375 meters north and south of the road occupying the high ground on either side as necessary.” The Marines leaned into the task.
India Company made contact with eight to ten NVA and opened up with small arms fire. They destroyed a 75mm recoilless rifle with artillery support. A Lima Company platoon patrol, led by Lieutenant John “Doc” Holladay, engaged a reinforced NVA squad, killing six of the enemy and capturing four AK-47s and an RPG. Throughout the day abandoned enemy equipment, consisting of rifle grenades, machine gun ammo, crimped cartridges, mines, and even discarded clothing was found.
Nightfall descended, however, with the battalion reporting only minor resistance. That alone raised the grunt’s suspicions. Silent faces ate from unheated C-rat cans and pondered the possibilities. Darting Star, concerned about the low ground of the previous night’s defensive perimeter, decided to deploy three detached company perimeters on favorable high ground along both sides of Route 9. He held his Command Group with Company M on Mike’s Hill. India Company moved to a promontory located about 1000 meters to the west. Lima laboriously humped up a steep prominence to the south where, once atop, they overlooked the entire valley sweep.
Accomplished under the cover of darkness the battalion’s redeployment went unobserved.
The battle for Mike’s Hill:
The Marines anticipated another sleepless night. By 0300 on January 27, the enemy probed all sides of Mike’s Hill. An estimated reinforced NVA Company had again infiltrated via dry streambeds, but their poor noise discipline suggested they were uncertain of the Marine’s exact location. When the two forces finally clashed, a wild melee commenced.
The NVA attacked up three slopes of the hill with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and automatic weapons covering their advance. Mike Company responded with its full death-dealing final protective fires. The violent assault quickly evolved into a desperate free-for-all with warriors grappling in hand-to-hand combat. Darting Star, threatened with being overrun, ordered Lima Company into the battle.
Captain John “Mac” McLaughlin led his troops into the valley, leaving the company’s 60mm mortar section on high ground to pummel an exposed enemy flank and open a gap in the enemy’s formation that Lima’s lead platoon exploited in textbook fashion. Then, wheeling toward the west, Lima maneuvered down Route 9. Sharp fighting ensued. Overcoming determined pockets of resistance, the company killed twenty-three NVA and captured three prisoners. By noon, the Lima Marines relieved a Mike Company squad ambush surrounded by North Vietnamese near the destroyed bridge.
Meanwhile, India Company was ordered to attack from west to east and link-up with Lima. This required Captain Prichard’s Marines to cross open ground interspersed with hedgerows and brush. Moving under heavy artillery covering fire, the company immediately made contact. A well dug-in NVA force of at least company size fought from masterfully camouflaged positions and chewed up India’s lead platoon. Soon, the entire company was pinned down. Costly frontal attacks failed to route out the enemy. Captain Prichard committed his reserve platoon but the casualties mounted.
Lima Company maneuvered a platoon two hundred meters west killing eleven enemy and achieving the link-up. Huey gunships circled above. Rockets fired. Automatic weapons sprayed the dug-in force. By 1400, India broke free and over ran the enemy’s positions, killing forty NVA soldiers, and stopping all resistance. Med-evac choppers descended. Casualties were loaded aboard, including Captain Prichard, who later died of his wounds. India Company, though victorious in the skirmish, no longer existed as a fighting unit. Darting Star parceled what was left of India to Mike Company and assigned one platoon from Mike Company to Lima Company. Now, instead of having “three short-strength companies” the battalion comprised two “full-strength” ones.
At 1700 hours the enemy, estimated at greater than battalion strength, had been killed, captured, or fled the field. Vehicles rolled down Route 9 from both directions to the destroyed bridge without harassment. Darting Star’s mission was accomplished.
When the body count began, one hundred thirty-one NVA soldiers lay dead. Conflicting numbers of prisoners were taken. Three 57mm recoilless rifles were destroyed. Extensive ammunition and equipment stacked up on a hastily prepared LZ, including two 60mm mortars, one NVA radio, a tripod and barrel for a .50 cal machine gun, thirty-five AK-47s, three RPGs, and eight bolt-action rifles.
Holding the line at Camp Carroll carried a dour price for the 3rd Battalion 4th Marines. Twenty-one men were killed in the action. Another sixty-two were wounded. Still, for most of the battalion’s Marines the Vietnam War proceeded without pause.
Mopping up continued for two more days. Lima Company discovered several tunnels where North Vietnamese dead were found on makeshift litters. The bodies were buried and the tunnels destroyed. The two ad hoc companies patrolled aggressively, but the enemy had withdrawn to the hills in the north.
On Sunday the 28th, Lima Company choppered up to Camp Carroll. Mike Company humped the three kilometers into camp. At sundown, an Air Force B-52 Arclight mission carpet bombed the suspected enemy routes of retreat while the Marine mess tent prepared thick steaks and served up ample gobs of mashed potatoes.
Darting Star sent a personal message to the officers and men of his command. “This battalion fought a well-disciplined enemy, suicidal in intent to maintain control of the road… Every Marine in this battalion has my sincere thanks for his superb performance, and those who were killed or wounded have my heartfelt prayers. You may all take pride in a good job, well done.”
The following day, General Westmoreland sent a message complimenting “the officers and men for the aggressive attack against the enemy’s 64th Regiment… This action undoubtedly pre-empted an enemy attack against Camp Carroll.”
From Washington the Secretary of the Navy took pleasure in presenting the Meritorious Unit Commendation to the troops. “Through their courageous efforts, indomitable spirit, and steadfast devotion to duty… (the Battalion) … upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.” General Giap, however, had not abandoned the table. In deed, he had rolled up his sleeves and leaned forward. On January 30 he dealt the attack that proved to be the turning point of the Vietnam War: The 1968 Tet offensive.
The nation-wide assault hit Westmoreland with tornadic force and left him reaping the wind. His decisive battle at Khe Sanh ground to a draw. By mid-March, the general returned to Washington with his hand played out, the bounce in his step gone, and a disillusioned American President ready to fold.... More
People You Remember 2nd Lt Burns, (KIA)L/Cpl Tim Gallagher, Cpl Paul Bresino,Sgt Jones,Gunny Phringer,Doc Mercer, 2nt Lt2nd Lt Burns, (KIA)L/Cpl Tim Gallagher, Cpl Paul Bresino,Sgt Jones,Gunny Phringer,Doc Mercer, 2nt Lt Leffan (sp),Doc Cruze.... More
Memories Jan. 27th, 68 Mike Co. was assulted by a Reenforced NVA Co at 0500 and were joined by many more NVA Jan. 27th, 68 Mike Co. was assulted by a Reenforced NVA Co at 0500 and were joined by many more NVA during the day.All of 3/4 minus Kilo Co. fought all day until near dark when we put the last of our KIA's on 6x6 trucks to be taken to Camp Carroll. As we walked down route 9 to set into our night defensive position an artillery round hit in the ditch as we were heading up the hill. It knocked down 8-10 guys flat and wounded several, with one particularly bad. We had been fighting since 0500, and now it was 1800 or so.It was decided not to risk a chopper, so we stayed up with the wounded Rocket man until first light ! The next day little changed !I think we got 150+ confirmed NVA, but later Marines found 400+ NVA in mass graves along Route 9 !... More
Description Jan 21 – Nov 23 1968. Operation Lancaster II was a U.S. Marine Corps security operation that took place in northern Quảng Trị Province from 20 January to 23 November 1968 during the Vietnam War. The oJan 21 – Nov 23 1968. Operation Lancaster II was a U.S. Marine Corps security operation that took place in northern Quảng Trị Province from 20 January to 23 November 1968 during the Vietnam War. The operation followed on directly from Operation Lancaster. The Marines patrolled aggressively. The response of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was mixed; Prolonged lulls alternated with fierce fighting. Broadly the Marines felt that they were successful in maintaining the supply.
1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines search-and-clear operation to safeguard Route 9 between Cam Lo and Ca Lu.... More
People You Remember
Sgt Jones, Cpl Bresino,Gunny Phringer, Lt Burns,Doc Cruze, PFC Phil Armigo
Memories Lima Co. 3/4 had a firefight on Jan. 7th, 68 and left one KIA/MIA behind. On Jan 11th,68 in an effo Lima Co. 3/4 had a firefight on Jan. 7th, 68 and left one KIA/MIA behind. On Jan 11th,68 in an effort to return the body Mike Co. was sweeping the previous battlefield looking through the 782 gear left on the battlefield.I spoted a jungleboot toe sticking out of the ground. I pulled on the boot and uncovered a leg.Under about 18inches of dirt was the KIA/MIA Marine left by Lima Co. ... More
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scaleThis campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.... More
People You Remember
2nd Lt Burns, Sgt Jones, Cpl Phil Frigm L/Cpl Murphy, Paul Bresino,Doc Mercer, Gunny Phringer
Memories Tet Offensive 1968 started early for 3/4, as on Jan. 24, 1968 we received word the Battalion Minus KTet Offensive 1968 started early for 3/4, as on Jan. 24, 1968 we received word the Battalion Minus K-Co.was to be helo-lifted from the jungle by the "Trace" to Camp Carroll to break up a convoy ambush on Route # 9.The NVA's 1968 Tet attack plans for their 64th Regiment was to overrun Camp Carroll and capture the huge 175 MM guns the U.S. Army had at Camp Carroll. The period of Jan. 13th thru the end of the month cost the Marine Corp 65 KIA's and 180 WIA's(evaced) in their effort to protect the strategic postion at Camp Carroll.... More
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scaleThis campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.... More
Memories Operation Robin South-June 1968, West of Khe Sahn.Lifted from Khe Sahn Combat Base on June 11, 68 toOperation Robin South-June 1968, West of Khe Sahn.Lifted from Khe Sahn Combat Base on June 11, 68 to first objective. Second objective we were assulted by two NVA Battalions at daybreak on the 15th of June. After the battle was over,the 3/4 Battalion was credited with over 600 NVA KIA's.... More
People You Remember
Capt Carr, Gunny Phringer, Cpl Paul Bresino, Doc Ballard
Memories Mike and India Co.'s 3/4 were lifted off the tarmac at Khe Sahn Combat Base and staged for an effortMike and India Co.'s 3/4 were lifted off the tarmac at Khe Sahn Combat Base and staged for an effort to help 2/4 and 3/1, who were heavily involved in stopping the NVA from over running Dong Ha.Our CH-46 was hit by ground fire, as we came in for a landing and the CH-46 to our starboard side went up in a ball of flame !... More
1st Marine Division operation centered on the Khe Sanh area of Quang Tri Province.
On April 15 1968, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. The Army 1st Air Cavalry Division, with over 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy controlled areas. The fighting was heavy. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968. Operation Scotland II lasted until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 additional Marines. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official body count
VC/NVA KIA's: 3,304 KIAs, 64 POWs
US KIA's: 435 KIA, 2,396 WIA... More
People You Remember
Cpl Phil Frigm, Cpl Paul Bresino, Sgt Jones,PFC Fuzzy Lindberg, L/Cpl Tandy Wells, Gunny Phringer
Memories
Hills 689,552 North and South, 471, 542, LZ Hawk, LZ Shepard, Khe Sahn Combat Base
Description Some of the most prolonged and vicious combat of the war opened on 29 April and lasted until 30 May when the 8,000 men of the 320th PAVN Division, backed by artillery from across the DMZ, threatened tSome of the most prolonged and vicious combat of the war opened on 29 April and lasted until 30 May when the 8,000 men of the 320th PAVN Division, backed by artillery from across the DMZ, threatened the U.S. logistical base at Dong Ha, in northwestern Quảng Trị Province.
On 29 April 1968, the 2/4 Marine Battalion Landing Team of the 3rd Marine Division, locked horns with an NVA Division (304th) in the 'ville" of Dai Do on the Cua Viet River 'horseshoe' just south of the DMZ (I Corp RVN). Intelligence had tipped our Forces that an entire NVA Division was in the first stage of a major march to seize and destroy the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters at Dong Ha. The Army’s grunt rifle battalion 3/21st Infantry, 196th LIB (out of the Americal) was attached to the 3rd Marine Division on May 1st to help quell the NVA’s intentions.
The stubbornness of the NVA was stunning (as was always the case), though they out-numbered the US troops three to one. And though the loss of American lives was staggering (one is too many), the courage and the stamina of the Marines and Army was valorous. The campaign was marked by constant bombing and shelling (aerial, land based and Naval Cruiser USS Boston). At several points the US Military powers used experimental 2000 lb bombs, when the village areas (Dai Do, Dinh To, Dong Huan, An Lac, Thuong Do and Nhi Ha) turned into a NVA hornet nest. The 3rd Marines officially list the series of actions as ended on May 15 1968 and labeled it (during Operation Night Owl) as the Battle of Dai Do. The Americal classifed it as a continuance of Operation Napoleon.
In what became known as the Battle of Dai Do, the North Vietnamese clashed savagely with U.S. Marine, Army, and ARVN forces before withdrawing.
List of Casualties:
3d Marines Division- 233 KIA 821 WIA 1 MIA
3/21 Infantry 196th LIB- 29 KIA 130 WIA 1 MIA
Navy TF Clearwater- 15 KIA 22 WIA
ARVN- 42 KIA 124 MIA
NVA- 2945 KIA 47 POW
From the start of the battle, the CO of the Marines 2/24 BLT, LT COL William Weise had great concern about airmobility. He requested that the Army provide helicopter support for resupply, extraction, insertion and medevac. The 174th AHC provided that airmobility for the entire battle. There were three Dolphin Slicks and Crews that accomplished this.... More
People You Remember
Gunny Phringer, Cpl Paul Bresino, Doc Ballard, Fuzzy Lindberg
Memories Mike Co was lifted in from Khe Sanh Combat Base. We had responsibility for 1900 meters of lines withMike Co was lifted in from Khe Sanh Combat Base. We had responsibility for 1900 meters of lines within the Combat Base.We were told we were to bail out Foxtrot 2/4,who had taken a large amount of casualities... More
Description May 28 – Jun 19; Task Force Hotel (consisting of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines and 3rd BattMay 28 – Jun 19; Task Force Hotel (consisting of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines) search and destroy operation using airmobile tactics to prevent an attack on Khe Sanh and northern Quảng Tri Province.
Background
In late May 1968 US aerial reconnaissance detected a People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) supply road being constructed through the jungle from the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos parallel to, but 15 km south of, Route 9 in an area known as the "Vietnam Salient" where Vietnam protrudes into Laos.
The 3rd Marine Division planned Operation Robin as a two-stage operation, in Operation Robin North the 1st Marine Regiment would attempt to engage the recently infiltrated PAVN 88th and 102nd Regiments of the 308th Division south of Route 9, while in Operation Robin South the 4th Marine Regiment would conduct airmobile operations further south and locate and destroy the PAVN supply road.
In preparation for the operation 219 attack aircraft and 30 B-52 sorties were flown against the intended landing zones while Marine artillery fired over 10,000 rounds.
Operation Robin North
On 2 June the 1st Battalion 1st Marines conducted a helicopter assault into Landing Zone Robin (16.576°N 106.787°E) 10 km southeast of Khe Sanh and then moved north towards Route 9 in an attempt push the PAVN against the 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines blocking positions on Route 9. That evening the 2nd Battalion 4th Marines was lifted to Robin from Ca Lu Combat Base. On the morning of 3 June the 1st Battalion 4th Marines relieved the 2/4 Marines at Landing Zone Robin.
The 2/4 Marines boarded helicopters to assault into Landing Zone Loon (16.579°N 106.753°E) 4 km west of Robin and approximately 8 km southeast of Khe Sanh. The initial landing at Loon on 3 June was met by the PAVN with small arms, mortar and artillery fire. At 6am on 4 June a company from the PAVN 88th Regiment attacked Company F 2/4 Marines resulting in 2 U.S. and 34 PAVN killed.
The 4th Marines headquarters was established at LZ Robin on 4 June and the 1st Battalion 12th Marines arrived to establish and artillery base. Companies from the 1/4 Marines replaced the 2/4 Marines on Loon on 4 June and the 2/4 Marines were lifted to establish Landing Zone Crow 2 km northeast of Loon.
On 5 June Company C 1/1 Marines encountered a PAVN bunker system 4 km south of Route 9, the battle continued until the following afternoon.
At 6am on 6 June a PAVN Battalion attacked Landing Zone Loon, after a 2-hour battle that resulted in 154 PAVN dead, the PAVN withdrew under cover of mortar and artillery fire. Due to the steady pressure on Loon it was decided to evacuate the landing zone and during the afternoon the 1/4 Marines were extracted by helicopter. The last HMM-165 CH-46 (#152533) to leave Loon was hit by PAVN anti-aircraft fire and crashed resulting in 13 U.S. killed. The total U.S. losses for their 3 days at Loon was 24 dead and 37 wounded.
Operation Robin South
On 6 June the 3rd Battalion 9th Marines conducted a helicopter assault into a landing zone southeast of Robin and near the eastern end of the PAVN supply road. The Marines found that the road was well constructed, up to 18 ft wide with numerous culverts and the trees overhead tied together to reduce aerial observation. Beside the road were bunkers, hospitals kitchens and storehouses. The 3/9 Marines moved west along the road for several days destroying it and PAVN facilities as they went.
On 11 June the 3rd Battalion 4th Marines helicopter assaulted into Lang Hole a Montagnard village south of Landing Zone Loon where PAVN prisoners indicated a major supply area was located.
On 14 June 2/4 Marines were lifted by helicopter onto the PAVN road near the Laos border and moved east to link up with the 3/9 Marines locating and destroying numerous bunkers and stores as they went.
Shortly before dawn on 15 June a Battalion of the PAVN 88th Regiment attacked the 3/4 Marines near Lang Hole penetrating the Marine position. The battle continued until 9am when the PAVN withdrew pursued by helicopter gunships. Marine losses were 16 dead and 58 wounded while PAVN losses were 219 dead and 11 captured.
At 02:15 on 16 June the PAVN attacked the 1/4 Marines at Landing Zone Torch (16.527°N 106.78°E) penetrating the Marine perimeter. Battery C 1/12 Marines levelled their guns and fired Beehive rounds into the attackers. The PAVN withdrew at 04:00 leaving 28 dead while Marine losses were 14 dead.
On the morning of 18 June the PAVN attacked Company K 3/4 Marines' night defensive position in a daylong battle the Marines with air and artillery support repulsed the PAVN attack resulting in 11 Marines killed and 30 wounded while the PAVN lost 131 killed.
Aftermath
Operation Robin concluded on 19 June when the 4th Marines returned to Khe Sanh Combat Base. PAVN losses were 635 killed and 48 captured.
The Marines would penetrate into the Vietnam Salient again during Operation Maine Crag from 15 March to 2 May 1969 reopening Landing Zone Torch.... More
People You Remember Cpl Paul Briseno, Sgt. Jones, L/Cpl Tandy Wells, PFC Fuzzy Lindberg, Doc Ballard, Doc Mercer,L/cpl MCpl Paul Briseno, Sgt. Jones, L/Cpl Tandy Wells, PFC Fuzzy Lindberg, Doc Ballard, Doc Mercer,L/cpl Murphy... More
Memories June 15, 1968 0500 had multiple RPG rounds direct fired on Doc Cruse and my fighting position. NVA wJune 15, 1968 0500 had multiple RPG rounds direct fired on Doc Cruse and my fighting position. NVA were intent on destoying our position. Angle of the hill saved our bacon in the first attack! Doc Cruse (KIA) by sniper shortly thereafter!... More
Description This campaign was from 1 June 1967 to 29 January 1968.The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions,This campaign was from 1 June 1967 to 29 January 1968.The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam swung back toward Saigon to conduct another clearing operation, MANHATTAN. This took peace in the Long Nguyen base area just north of the previously cleared "Iron Triangle."
South Vietnamese Armed Forces became more active and capable under U.S. advisors. During the year the Vietnamese Special Forces assumed responsibility for several Special Forces camps and for the CIDG companies manning them. In each case all of the U.S. advisors withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese in full command.
With an increased delegation of responsibility to them, the South Vietnamese conducted major operations during 1967, and, in spite of VC attempts to avoid battle, achieved a number of contacts.
Despite the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of 1967 of another enemy build-up, particularly in areas close to Laos and Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh. Fortunately Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat, the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh.... More
People You Remember
2nd Lt. Burns, Cpl Paul Bresino, Sgt Jones,Cpl Phil Frigm
Memories 3/4 was located at A3 (between Con Thien and Gio Linh) We ran OP's and security for Marines working 3/4 was located at A3 (between Con Thien and Gio Linh) We ran OP's and security for Marines working on finishing the "Trace". NVA snipers would fire on the Marines running the D9 CATS.Night ambushes, and Company patrols were many, and contact frequent with the NVA.... More
Description Operation Kentucky was a multi-Battalion operation conducted by the United States Marine Corps in the area south of the DMZ in Quang Tri Province. This was another operation to secure the Con Thien arOperation Kentucky was a multi-Battalion operation conducted by the United States Marine Corps in the area south of the DMZ in Quang Tri Province. This was another operation to secure the Con Thien area from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The operation ran from November 1, 1967 until February 28, 1969.
1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 26th Marines and 3rd Tank Battalion anti-infiltration operation in the Leatherneck Square between Con Thien, Gio Linh, Cam Lo and Dong Ha.... More
People You Remember
2nd Lt. Burns, Doc Cruze,PFC McKay, Cpl Parpula (sp)
Memories Jan. 18th, 1968, Mike Co. was acting as a blocking force north of the "Trace" in the Marketplace areJan. 18th, 1968, Mike Co. was acting as a blocking force north of the "Trace" in the Marketplace area.We were hit by about 50 rounds of 100+MM artillery, and then 70+ rounds of mortarfire ,which landed directly in our midst.We took heavy casualities but also got 160+ confirmed NVA KIA's.We had to walk our wounded back across the "Trace", because we couldn't get any medevacs to come in our landing zones. We got back to our defensive position and before we departed were hit with 250 mortar rounds and over 100+rounds of artillery and recoilless rifle fire.... More
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Selected as "Honorman" of graduating class of March, 1969.
Navy Instructor Training Course